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Abstract
This dissertation traces the post-Marxist and materialist positions of two leading
contemporary European thinkers: Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou. These thinkers, I argue,
collectively offer a way between the traditional Hegelian Marxist’s overarching metanarrative of a necessary evolution from worse to better, and the post-modern pessimism
of a lack of possibility for such a social evolution. It is this middle path, offered by these
two thinkers, that this dissertation seeks to explore and further explain. The focal point of
this dissertation is the type of philosophical materialism that is collectively offered by
Badiou and Žižek, what I call the “New Materialism.” I first explain the origins of this
materialist position as it emerges in the thought of Louis Althusser, then I discuss how
Badiou and Žižek, each in their own way, seek to correct the remaining problems that
exist for the Althusserian position, while refusing to reject its core materialist insights.
Finally, I assess the ways in which both Badiou and Žižek attempt to overcome the
Althusserian problems, arguing that ultimately Žižek’s corrective succeeds in remaining
within the materialist paradigm laid out by Althusser, whereas Badiou’s method brings
him dangerously close to a kind of philosophical idealism that he wishes to avoid.
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Introduction

The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and
intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that
determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their
consciousness.1
These are, perhaps, some of the most famous words in all of Marx’s writings.
They are often invoked when one talks of Marxist materialism, and said to represent a
concise encapsulation of what this doctrine is all about. The standard understanding of
this is, of course, that Marx is setting himself in direct opposition to the Hegelian
(idealist) understanding of history. History is, according to Hegel, a working out (and
working through) of concepts—or ideas—and the process by which we as humans,
collectively or as ‘Spirit’ come to consciousness of their meaning. The term Spirit is
Hegel’s term of art for the shapes of social existence that exhibit themselves at a
particular time. These shapes are constantly renewing and transforming themselves as
history moves forward. Each particular shape of existing spirit gives birth to new shapes
as things proceed and each new shape is a further working out of the concept(s)
embodied in the prior shape. We are, on Hegel’s account, always embodied, and what we
embody is precisely that particular shape of spirit that exists for us—alternatively we
could say that spirit is embodied in us—there is nothing mystical in this, it just means
that we (and spirit) are situated within a world that has particular ways of being that

1

Karl Marx, “Preface to a Critique of Political Economy” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings 2nd Edition.
David McLellen (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000) 425.

exhibit the particular (and limited) perspective on, and understanding of, a set of concepts
that make up our communal understanding of ourselves and our world. The movement of
history, on Hegel’s account, is precisely this progressive working out of the concepts
through which we grasp our existence towards their full transparency. Thus the ‘matter’
of history, i.e. human institutions, communities, events, and the like are the material
embodiment of this conceptual awareness at any given time and are part of the ongoing
work of a concept’s coming-to-be in its full richness and actuality. On this reading of
Hegel, it is the opposite of Marx’s claims above: it is the consciousness of humans that
‘determines their mode of existence.’ For example, a given historical society’s economic
practices, codes of law and property, as well as cultural practices might exhibit and be
determined by that society’s understanding of the concepts of ‘freedom.’2 So according to
this understanding of Hegel, ‘Spirit’ is always in the driver’s seat, its ‘ideas’ are what
determine the material conditions of social life for humans.
Marx on the other hand attempts to argue for the reverse (on the standard reading
of the quote above anyway), it is rather the material conditions of existence that give rise
to our ‘ideas,’ our self-conception and the world that we live in. Thus it is the very
existence of a particular, given, historical and material way of producing and organizing
the human world that leads us to our conceptual organization of the world and ourselves.
From this perspective, one can argue that my concept of ‘freedom’ in general, and myself
as a free being in particular, is determined by the very ways in which the world is
organized by the existing material (and for Marx, economic) modes and forces of

2

To be sure, Hegel does not think that every individual in a given community will have the same
understanding of such concepts or even that any individual in said community will have a transparent
understanding of their own understanding of such concepts. In fact, part of the Hegelian enterprise is to
read back into particular times and places the underlying—unconscious—understanding of such concepts.
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production. As the standard story goes, it is the very material, technologies, tools, and
modes of labor that drive human history from below and determine a given community’s
self-conception. So first there is matter, and then there are ideas that arise out this matter.
Hence Materialism. For most that have followed Marx, this reading of history places him
on one side of a traditional, and long standing philosophical opposition: that between
Materialism and Idealism, where Idealists (represented by Hegel in the reading of his
work given above) take it to be the case that what is primary, fundamental, and
determinative of the social space are ideas or the mental (and their historical
development), Materialists argue that what is primary, fundamental and determinative of
the social space is rather matter (and the mental is a product of its material base).
It is, furthermore, the case that, for many of his readers (and followers), Marx’s
Materialist position commits him (and them) to many of the other commonly held tenets
of the more general position of philosophical materialism, namely that, as with any good
materialism, there is little or no room for contingency: matter is primary and is dominated
by the law of cause and effect, thus whatever materially exists, exists as the result of a
prior cause, and itself will then serve as a cause for whatever follows it. The immaterial
(mind, ideas, or Spirit) is itself, like the effects that necessarily follow from their causes,
determined by the matter which supports it. This way of understanding Marx’s
materialism—as a kind of determinism in the last instance—is, and has been, in effect in
varying degrees in most all of those that have read and been influenced by Marx. As
Eduard Bernstein has quite nicely put the point:
The question of the correctness of the materialist interpretation of history is a
question of the determining causes of historic necessity. To be a materialist means
first of all, to trace back all phenomena to the necessary movements of matter.
These movements of matter are accomplished according to the materialist
3

doctrine from beginning to end as a mechanical process, each individual process
being the necessary result of preceding mechanical facts. Mechanical facts
determine, in the last resort, all occurrences, even those which appear to be caused
by ideas. It is, finally, always the movement of matter which determines the form
of ideas and the directions of the will; and thus these also (and with them
everything that happens in the world of humanity) are inevitable. The materialist
is thus a Calvinist without God. If he does not believe in a predestination ordained
by divinity, yet he believes and must believe that starting from any chosen point
of time all further events are, through the whole of existing matter and the
directions of force in its parts, determined beforehand. The application of
materialism to the interpretation of history means then, first of all, belief in the
inevitableness of all historical events and developments. The question is only, in
what manner the inevitableness is accomplished in human history, what element
of force or what factors of force speak the decisive word, what is the relation of
the different factors of force to one another, what part of history falls to the share
of nature, of political economy, of legal organizations, of ideas.3
This way of conceiving materialism is not only present in thinkers like Bernstein but is
also present in the body of work produced by the Frankfurt School theorists as well as in
the so-called tradition of ‘Analytical Marxism,’ albeit in a slightly modified form.
In the latter case, and we will have time to explain this further in Chapter One,
materialistic determinism is worked out in terms of functional explanation. G. A. Cohen
argues that the material base (the forces of production) is explanatory of both the
existence of a given set of production relations and a given superstructure. The
production relations and superstructure are, in turn, explained functionally, by asserting
that they exist in the particular ways that they do (in a given time) because their particular
forms are beneficial for—that is to say, sustain and advance—the forces of production
(hence the functionalism: they serve a function in their existence). In this way then, the
material determines the rest and the rest exists because of its function, which is to benefit
the material.

3

Eduard Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bernstein/works/1899/evsoc/index.htm
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Thus, for Cohen, much like Bernstein, there is a determined path in process in
history. Here he writes, “in so far as the course of history, and more particularly, the
future socialist revolution are, for Marx, inevitable, they are inevitable, not despite what
men do, but because of what men, being rational, are bound, predictably to do.”4 The
claim here is that it is because of a human faculty (rationality) and its development
grounded in material production, that we can say that there is a determined goal in
history, (the development of said rationality) and one that is realized materially. So here,
Cohen makes of historical materialism very much a kind of Bernsteinian “Calvinism
without God.”
As noted above, it is also the case that something akin to this is at work in the
materialist theories produced by those known as the Frankfurt School. Their version of
“Calvinist” materialism, however, takes on a decidedly negative tone. According to
Horkheimer, in his 1931 inaugural address as head of the Institute for Social Research,
the aims of the Institute under his guidance were to be:
…The philosophical interpretations of the vicissitudes of human fate—the fate of
humans, not as mere individuals, however, but as members of a community. It
[the Institute] is thus above all, concerned with phenomena that can only be
understood in the context of human social life: with the state, law, economy,
religion—in short, with the entire material and intellectual culture of humanity.5
This goal, according to Horkheimer is to be met by analyzing the:
… Connection between the economic life of society, the psychical development
of individuals, and the changes in the realm of culture in the narrower sense (to
which belong not only the so-called intellectual elements, such as science, art, and

4

G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000). 147 Emphasis
mine.
5
Max Horkheimer “The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute For Social
Research” in Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings, translated by G. Frederick
Hunter, Matthew S. Kramer, and John Torpey (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1993) 1. [Hereafter
BPSS].
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religion, but also law, customs, fashion, public opinion, sports, leisure activities,
lifestyle, etc.).6
Like Cohen, Horkheimer’s materialism commits him to the view that it is the very
material, economic life of a society that grounds and determines the development of the
individual members of a society’s awareness of themselves—that is, their selfconsciousnesses—and their world, as well as all of the cultural and political structures of
a given society as a whole. While early in his career, Horkheimer was convinced that
such analysis would, through its bringing to light the historically contingent nature of
culture and its social structures, “hasten developments which will lead to a society
without injustice,” what he found in such analysis was the opposite.7
In the end, What Horkheimer finds is not a materialist doctrine that allows for the
unraveling of social structures that lead to injustice and oppression, but one that instead
reinforces oppression and forecloses on the possibility of change. The material structures
that arise in modernity, rather, so enclose and control both culture and the individual that
the belief of the early Horkheimer, that through the tools of Critical Theory, humanity
could emancipate itself from oppressive forces—by coming to see them as nothing more
than particular, contingent, and thus changeable—gives way to analysis of the insidious,
determining, and totalizing nature of such material forces. Social theory and materialist
philosophy can no longer lead to emancipation. Rather, Horkheimer argues, “philosophy
is neither a tool nor a blueprint. It can only foreshadow the path of progress as it is
marked out by logical and factual necessities; in doing so it can anticipate the reaction of

6

Ibid., 11
Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory” in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, translated by
Matthew J O’Connell (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972) 221.
7
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horror and resistance that that will be evoked by the triumphal march of modern man.”8 It
cannot, however, liberate. What we must do instead is wait, resign ourselves to the fact
that social change is not yet. So here the Calvinist materialism of Horkheimer is one in
which modern humans are utterly determined by the material relations of late capitalism
and so much so that change itself no longer seems possible as it is “an inner necessity that
has led to the self-surrender by reason” of its capacity for radical social change.9 This
‘self-surrender’ is the determined outcome of the historical development of reason out of
the material forces that condition it.
Read in both Cohen’s way and Horkheimer’s way, the doctrine of materialism is
nothing more that the proverbial other side of the coin of Idealism. It finds its foundation
in the emphasis on determining factors and simply offers the same position that Idealism
offers but as reversed (it is not ideas that determine existence, but matter, or existence
that determine ideas). Over the course of the last twenty years or so, however, there has
been a growing body of work that seeks to challenge this long held view but remain
firmly in a materialist position. This literature finds its roots in the work of the French
Marxist Louis Althusser and its main contemporary representatives include (not
surprisingly) one of Althusser’s students Alain Badiou, as well as Slavoj Žižek. Each of
these theorists identify themselves as materialist but do not take this in the way that we
have been describing above. Rather their version of materialism, what I will henceforth
call the New Materialism, seeks a position outside the standard materialism/idealism
debate and, at least in part, seeks to undermine it by emphasizing not the determining

8

Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason (New York: Continuum, 1947) 112.
Horkheimer, Critique of Instrumental Reason, translated by Matthew J. O’Connell and others (New York:
Continuum, 1974) vii.
9
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nature of the material but rather its foundationally indeterminate (and non-teleological)
nature. The New Materialism, in this way, sees itself in opposition to both idealism and
the standard brand of materialism described above.
The Athusserian move (that informs the new materialists) is the one that is made in
opposition to the Stalinist interpretation of Marx’s materialism in which it is simply and
only the Capitalist economic processes that determine the both historical change and
social progress. Althusser, rather, undermines this by arguing that the material conditions
themselves are never monolithic in their existence and that though it is the case that these
conditions form the basis for all stable social structures, it is precisely their diverse and
contradictory nature that determines the social ‘whole’ itself to contain diverse,
contradictory, and indeterminate social formations which can (and do) take on different
and ultimately unpredictable paths though it is the case, according to Althusser, that we
can understand the paths that have been taken in the past by retrospectively
reconstructing the collection of elements of the material base that gain prominence at a
given time.
It is in this argument that the standard version of materialism is called into
question.10 If it is the case that the material conditions which structure our existence are
themselves multiple, diverse, and contradictory, then it is not the case that we can ever
say with any real certainty that materialism is a doctrine that presents us with a vision of
human history as teleological (as in Cohen’s case) or as completely and totally foreclosed
(as in Horkheimer’s). Rather, how it is that we come to understand ourselves (our ‘selfconsciousness’) and how it is that our world comes to be organized (both conceptually

10

This argument will, of course, be further explained in the chapters on Althusser.
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and social-structurally) is, in a sense, overdetermined by a contingent collection of
material forces and hence, non-teleological. Here Althusser writes, “instead of thinking
contingency as a modality of necessity, or an exception to it, we must think necessity as
the becoming-necessary of the encounter of contingencies.”11 What is primary is not
material determination, stability, and necessity—though these are the results of the
material process—but rather material contingency and chance. This contingency and
chance is what ‘the necessary’ is built upon and thus, it is always unstable and subject to
reversal and change. As we will see, however, Althusser’s own theoretical attempts at
overcoming the teleological view of materialism leave him with the problem of an
inability to account—in a Marxist way—for humanity’s role in social change insofar as
any change itself is relegated to the overdetermined material structures in social
existence. It is both the Althusserian insights, and the remaining problems of Althusserian
Marxism, that are critical and foundational for the new materialism of Badiou and Žižek
in that, each of them seeks to save certain elements of the Althusserian edifice while at
the same time offering a corrective to the problems inherent in it.
It is this ‘New Materialism’ that this dissertation is interested in. It is intended in
part, as a contribution to the growing secondary literature on these thinkers and the
debate around them, in part as introduction to their individual theoretical projects with an
emphasis on explaining their materialist standpoints, but most importantly as an argument
for the claim that the individual standpoints of Althusser, Badiou, and Žižek also
collectively, make up a distinct philosophical tradition, one with a historical foundation in

11

Louis Althusser, “The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter” in Philosophy of the
Encounter: Later Writings 1978-1987, Translated by G. M. Goshgarian (New York and London: Verso,
2006) 193-194. [Hereafter PE]
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Althusser’s work and one that offers a way out of the standard philosophical deadlock of
the old materialism/idealism debate.
In the process of making this argument, however, I also confront some of the
remaining problems for this particular theoretical orientation. This latter portion of the
project is accomplished through the drawing of a distinction between Badiou’s and
Žižek’s respective attempts at overcoming the remaining problems of Althusserianism.
Here I argue that Badiou’s orientation leads him, unwittingly, to come dangerously close
to a kind of structuralism that Althusser himself decries as idealist whereas Žižek’s view
avoids this through a novel reading of Hegel’s project vis-à-vis Lacanian psychoanalysis
in which Hegel becomes the paradigmatic materialist thinker.

10

Chapter 1: En Media Res: Althusser’s Aleatory Materialism and a
Challenge to the Teleological

To talk about ‘materialism’ is to broach one of the most sensitive subjects in
philosophy.12
…One can only know what exists; the principle of all existence is materiality; and
that all existence is objective, that is “prior” to the “subjectivity” which knows it,
and independent of that subjectivity… One can only know what exists.13
The world may be called an accomplished fact [fait accompli] in which, once the
fact has been accomplished, is established the reign of Reason, Meaning,
Necessity, and [Fin]. But the accomplishment of the fact is just a pure effect of
contingency, since it depends on the aleatory encounter of the atoms due to the
swerve of the clinamen.14
According to Althusser, we always begin En Media Res, in the midst of things, in
a world that has a material (and objective) reality, that is an ‘accomplished fact,’ that
exhibits itself in such a way that it looks to have structures (and meanings and concepts)
that are necessary and in some ways eternal and that, viewed from this perspective, seems
to have a determined path of development. The aleatory materialist, however, knows that
this world is not necessary, nor is it eternal, nor is the arrangement of accomplished facts
and meanings that exist at a given time the result of some process, which at bottom, is
itself necessary. It is rather, as Althusser argues, that any existing necessity is built on the

12

Louis Althusser, “Philosophy and Marxism” in PE. 272
Ibid., Essays in Self Criticism, (London, NLB: 1976), 54. [Hereafter ESC]
14
Ibid., “The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter” in PE. 169-170
13
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back of a contingent process, a chance occurrence that can be likened to the swerve of the
atoms that fall in the void as described by Epicurus. The reference to the swerve (called
the ‘clinamen’ by Lucretius) is a direct attack on any philosophical system that purports
to discover a rational and teleological process underlying the movement of history, for
there is no such thing, whatever is, is the result of contingency and chance.
The materialist philosopher knows this, and thus he does not concern himself with
an attempt to discover some ultimate ‘Truth’ that underlies what is, but rather begins with
what he does know (and the only thing that he can know): the ‘what is’ itself, what exists
here and now, at this moment, in this conjuncture. He begins with the ‘objective’ material
reality that exists for him and through the science founded by Marx—the science of
historical materialism—and elaborated on by Althusser—that of the aleatory nature of the
material itself—is able to uncover the contingent nature of the conjuncture. It is this that
allows the aleatory materialist to see that any seemingly fixed necessity, or determined
fact, or meaning, or concept is itself nothing more than a relation, a chance occurrence,
that results from, and emerges in, the relation that is produced by the contingent coming
together of multiple and diverse elements which in themselves, are nothing (this is to say,
that these elements themselves become what they are in relation to the contingent ‘whole’
that is formed as a result, they do not pre-exist it).
It is this form of materialism that Althusser thinks offers a new (and proper)
philosophical position and one that steps outside of the traditional philosophical
opposition between idealism and (traditional) materialism, which is already a trap as it is,
he argues, always already defined in idealist terms. In these first two chapters, I will
outline Althusser’s arguments for aleatory materialism while attempting to further define

12

this position. I will also show how his aleatory materialist position is linked to, and
emerges out of, his earlier work.

Section One
In service of the first goal of this chapter, we should begin the process of making
sense of aleatory materialism by way of Althusser’s contrasting of it to what he calls
‘Traditional Philosophy’ which, he argues,
…Assigns itself the irreplaceable historical task of speaking the Truth about
everything, about the first causes and the principles of everything in existence,
hence about everything that is knowable; about the ultimate purpose or destiny of
man and the world. Hence it sets itself up as a ‘Science’ of the totality, capable
not only of providing the highest and most indubitable knowledge, but also of
possessing Truth itself. This Truth is logos, origin, meaning…15
There are three characteristics of traditional philosophy that Althusser points out above,
first that it attempts to “speak the Truth” about the totality that is everything that is, this is
to say that traditional philosophy’s goal is to accurately describe the nature of all that is
as a totality. In order to do this, it attempts to speak of the ‘origins’ or logos (here the
reasons) for the existence of what is (this is the second characteristic of traditional
philosophy) and finally, in speaking of the Truth of what is in terms of origins or reasons,
traditional philosophy also posits purposes or the telos of what is.16
Althusser certainly has in mind here those systematic philosophies posited by the
likes of Kant or Hegel which (on the standard readings of them anyway) do in fact
attempt such explanations of the totality of what is, and also the philosophies produced

15

Ibid., “Philosophy and Marxism,” PE. 267.
To be sure, there are many philosophies and philosophers that Althusser points to as not fitting in to this
conception of philosophy. These are the ones he points to as the philosophical fathers of his brand of
materialism and they include, not only Lucretius and Epicurus (whom we have already referenced), but also
Spinoza, Machiavelli, Heidegger, and Marx. We will have time to discuss this further below.
16
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by earlier thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle who, though divergent in many of their
beliefs are also engaged in the traditional philosophical practice. In these few examples,
we can also see that Althusser’s characterization holds for philosophies that offer
divergent responses to the questions of origin and end and the Truths that are produced
based on these. This is what traditional philosophy in general attempts to do—regardless
of the ways that that a particular philosophy works these questions out—the goals are the
same for all. Now, as regarding these differing ways of answering the question of the
Truth, Althusser points out that that there are two general ‘tendencies’ in the history of
traditional philosophy, two general strategies that are employed in offering such answers:
there is the idealist tendency and the materialist tendency.17
At the most general level, we could say that the idealist tendency in traditional
philosophy holds—in one form or another—that what is, is as it is because it is a
representation in cognition. This is to say, that the world is as it is because we cognize it
as such, it is our ability as cognizers to place that which we perceive under a set of
concepts and thus organize our perceptions in particular ways that allows us to perceive
that which exists in the ways that we do. To be sure, there is much disputation as to just
what this cognizing power amounts to in the philosophies which have a tendency toward
idealism—for instance, in Plato’s view, the concepts, or ideas that organize the world and
its objects are not simply the result of human reason but rather much more eternal and of
a higher order, whereas for Kant, though these concepts are fixed and eternal, they are
nothing more than the result of the ways in which human reason is structured. It is,

17

To be sure, Althusser is not saying that all positions in ‘traditional philosophy’ are only idealist or
materialist, he is aware of the fact that most philosophies contain elements of both within them. This is why
Althusser points out that they exhibit certain tendencies, that is most traditional philosophies, while
asserting both materialist and idealist principles, tend to favor one or the other in their final outcome.
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however, nonetheless the case that both of these philosophies can be characterized as
having this idealist tendency. They offer a Truth about the totality of what is based on
this view and in doing so also posit an origin of the totality of what is (that origin is the
concepts or the ideal itself). This also then, leads directly to a positing of an end, purpose,
or goal based on this Truth.
If the idealist tendency in traditional philosophy links Truth, origin and end to the
ideal in this way, then the materialist tendency in traditional philosophy is guilty of
making the same mistake according to Althusser, it simply does this in a slightly different
manner: rather than claiming that it is the ideal that offers the truth of what is, traditional
philosophical materialism makes the claim that it is ‘matter’ or the material that is the
Truth of what is, and as such forms both the origin and end of all that is. We can see this
problem by looking to the way in which some have interpreted Marx’s own version of the
materialist philosophical position, namely those of the analytical Marxist school. We will
use G. A. Cohen as our example here and show how it is that Cohen’s form of
materialism is nothing more than a veiled form of idealism (and thus, not truly a
materialism).
According to Cohen, the ‘Truth’ of what is, is worked out in terms of functional
explanation. In his Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense, Cohen argues that
according to Marx, the material base (the forces of production) is explanatory—is, in
other words, the origin—of both the existence of a given set of production relations and a
given superstructure. The production relations and superstructure are, in turn, explained
functionally, by asserting that they exist in the particular ways that they do (in a given
time) because their particular forms are beneficial for—that is to say, sustain and
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advance—the forces of production (hence the functionalism: they serve a function in their
existence).
The problem with this reading is that it turns the relations of production into the
primary mover of the process of history. The relations of production become the origin of
what is, and these are, on Cohen’s own account, ideal structures. Here Cohen tells us that
what is truly material are only those things which fill the category of the productive
forces. These are things like, the “instruments of production” (tools, machines, etc.), “raw
materials” used in the labor process, and “labor power” itself, which he defines as “the
productive faculties of producing agents: strength, skill, knowledge, inventiveness, etc.”18
These forces are, according to Cohen, developed/used in the ways that they are as a result
of the relations of production, which he defines quite generally as “EITHER relations of
ownership by persons of productive forces or persons OR relations presupposing such
relations.”19 These are on Cohen’s account non-material relations, they are the
social/ideal ‘forms’ which determine the material content to be (and be used) the ways
that it is at a given time in history. Cohen argues that we should recognize:
…a distinction between the content and the form of a society. People and
productive forces comprise its material content, a content endowed by production
relations with social form. On entering production relations, persons and
productive forces receive the imprint of the form those relations constitute: a
Negro becomes a slave, a machine becomes a portion of constant capital…20
We should take careful stock of what is being asserted here. The claim is that
whatever is material (persons, raw materials, tools) is determined by what is not material,
the ‘form’ that the matter is given by the relations of production. According to Cohen’s

18

G. A. Cohen Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defense. 34
Ibid., 34-35
20
Ibid., 96
19

16

argument, the forces of production do not simply cause the relations of production and
the superstructure to be organized in a particular way, but rather the relations of
production, in their development, cause the development—and detemination—of the
forces of production. The relations of production serve the function of determining the
material of the forces of production to be what they are. It is this functional analysis that
yields the teleological determinism inherent in Cohen’s account.21 This is best explained
in relation to what Cohen calls the “Development Thesis” and the “Primacy Thesis
Proper.” It is these two propositions, he argues, that make up the foundation of Marx’s
historical materialism; they are:
1. The productive forces tend to develop throughout history (the Development
Thesis).
And,
2. The nature of the production relations of a society is explained by the level of
development of its productive forces (the Primacy Thesis Proper).22
As we have seen, beginning with (2), Cohen explains that the productive forces are
nothing other than the material means (labor power, raw materials, tools) that are “used
by producing agents to make products.”23 The relations of production then make up the
determining and explanatory factors of both the superstructure of a given society (which
are clearly ideal: Legal codes, political organizations, religious institutions, forms of
consciousness and so forth), and the form that the material forces of production exhibit.
We can, I think, now clearly see why this way of understanding Marx’s materialism
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attributes to it a kind of idealism via offering a teleological account of history. This is
best viewed by thinking through the implications of Cohen’s Development Thesis.
Regarding this, as asserted by (1) above, the claim is that the forces of production
are in a process of development throughout history and it is this development that is
sustained and furthered by the relations of production that produce the form that the
forces take. Here Cohen links the productive forces to “human faculties” and argues that
there is an “extensive coincidence…between the development of the productive forces
and the growth of human faculties” or as he later calls it “human power.”24 The ‘human
faculties’, in their development, cause the continued development of the forces of
production in a particular way—that is, they ‘form’ them—and do so in foreseeable
direction, namely the one that furthers the development of said faculties. Thus, according
to Cohen it is the progress and development of ‘human faculties,’ which (in the end)
drives human history and the progressive development of human societies. This progress
first takes place in the material forces, which in turn coincide with the ‘progress’ of
human power. He writes:
To say that forms of society rise and fall according as they advance and retard the
development of the productive forces is to predict massive transformations of
social structure as the productive forces progress. The master thesis of historical
materialism [the Primacy Thesis] puts the growth of human powers at the centre
of the historical process, and it is to this extra-social development that society is
constrained to develop.25
The Development Thesis, coupled with the Primacy Thesis is, in this way, a
teleological thesis; it asserts that there is a definite goal that humanity is in process of
achieving (i.e. the broadening of human power) and that the means by which this goal is
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achieved is first in the development of the material forces of production by the relations
of production (which themselves can be explained by their function in furthering the
development of the productive forces). Elster puts this point nicely when he asserts that
for Cohen, “the relations of production obtain because and so long as they are optimal for
the development of the productive forces.”26
Thus, for Cohen, Marxist materialism uncovers a determined path in process in
history. It both shows us an origin for what is (the productive forces as they are
conditioned by the relations of production) and based on this, an end (the growth of
human powers). Here he writes, “in so far as the course of history, and more particularly,
the future socialist revolution are, for Marx, inevitable, they are inevitable, not despite
what men do, but because of what men, being rational, are bound, predictably to do.”27
Here again—much like the Kantian claim—the argument is that it is because of a human
faculty (rationality) and its development grounded in material production, which is itself
determined by certain production relations, that we can say that there is a determined goal
in history, (the development of said rationality) and one that is realized materially.
As noted above, Althusser develops his version of materialism as a counter to that
proffered by those who practice Traditional Philosophy. This is in part because as also
noted above—and to be further discussed later—his view is that Traditional Philosophy is
not sufficiently aware of the fact that its own ‘Truths’ are not in fact eternal nor are they
necessary, but are rather the product of a historically situated, and contingently
constructed world. In setting itself up as offering the Truth about what is, and hence
offering an origin and end, Cohen’s version of (Marxist) materialism remains an idealist
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materialism, it posits an end and it is the positing of an end that keeps this version of
materialism one that is internal to, and hence does not escape, idealism as such.
Furthermore, this problem is exhibited in very way Traditional Philosophy’s materialist
representatives make their arguments. Here Althusser argues that the traditional
materialist philosopher (like Cohen) offers his theory as a response to the idealist and in
doing so, his arguments are intimately tied to, and informed by idealism. Althusser’s
point is then, both that (as we have seen) traditional materialism makes its arguments in
the same way that idealism does and that this is because it is merely asserted as a
response to the idealist understanding. Here he argues that:
…In the philosophical tradition, the evocation of materialism is the index of an
exigency, a sign that idealism has to be rejected—yet without breaking free,
without being able to break free, of the speculary pair idealism/materialism; hence
it is an index, but at the same time a trap, because one does not break free of
idealism by simply negating it, stating the opposite of idealism, or ‘standing it on
its head’…On closer inspection, most materialisms turn out to be inverted
idealism.28
In order to ‘break free’ of idealism, then we must not only offer a philosophy that rejects
all idealist premises (including those still hidden in the traditional versions of
materialism), but we must also reject the very form of argumentation that is required by
traditional philosophy. This is to say that a properly conceived materialism is one which
argues that the very claim to ‘Truth’ that is offered by traditional philosophy (in any of its
forms) is to be rejected, and along with it, any talk of ultimate origins or ends. Such
“Truth” is according to Althusser, merely ideological. If we are to be proper Marxist
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materialists, then we must rid ourselves of the Idealist temptation, as idealism itself is
ideological.29
Althusser’s aleatory materialism is just such a materialism. It attempts to show the
traditional philosopher that she cannot have her conclusions, that they simply do not
follow, that she too is trapped in ideology when she sees her conclusions as the reveling
of some ultimate truth of the way things are. Althusser attempts to break free of the
idealism/materialism pair by rejecting any notion of an end or goal. Now that we have
begun to see the distinction Althusser seeks to draw between his brand of materialism and
that offered by Traditional Philosophy, we can turn to a further explanation of exactly
what the view consists of. In order to fully see this, I propose that we begin by looking at
how this idea emerges out of Athusser’s earlier work, as it is in relation to this that that
his late materialist position is best explained as well as argued for.30 We can begin here
with a brief discussion of Althusser’s overall philosophical project in his early years,
namely a complete reinvention of Marxist theory through a re-reading of Marx’s own
project.

Section Two
In the opening pages of “The Humanist Controversy” Althusser relates an
anecdote about his 1963 encounter with one of the then members of the Frankfurt School,
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Erich Fromm.31 As the story goes, Dr. Adam Schaff, a friend of Althusser’s, had met
Fromm at a conference in the United States and in the course of their meeting, Fromm
had mentioned to Schaff that he was in the process of putting together an edited
collection of Marxist writings (which would eventually become the collection entitled
Socialist Humanism).32 At Schaff’s insistence, Fromm wrote Althusser asking him to
submit something for this collection. When Althusser expressed apprehension to Schaff
about the possibility of Fromm accepting his work—saying that the title of the work led
him to believe that it would be a “Missa Solemnis in Humanism Major”—his friend
replied with this syllogism: “Every humanist is a Liberal, Fromm is a humanist;
therefore, Fromm is a Liberal.”33 Meaning, of course, that as a liberal, Fromm would not
reject the paper simply because it went against his views, that he would allow the
readership to determine for itself what to think. This is because, of course, as a ‘liberal,’
Fromm should have enough of a belief in the individual’s autonomy and ability to use
their own rationality to determine what to think. Fromm, however, rejected the article.
Althusser writes of this, that it confirmed his suspicion that, “between Humanism
and Liberalism on the one hand, and the conjuncture on the other, there existed
something like…a non-accidental relation.”34 The point of this remark, to put it briefly is
that Fromm and other humanist Marxists fail to see that their humanism is itself an
ideological interpretation of Marx’s thought, one that is stuck in a particular, and idealist,
ideology that Marx himself—according to Althusser—worked his way out of in his later
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work. The core of Althusser’s thought here is that there is ideology, and then there is
Ideology. The first sense of the word is the standard one, there are particular ideological
forms that exist in particular times and particular places throughout history. These
operate in much of the standard ways that Marxists have analyzed (as a kind of
rationalizing, and propping up of the current existent modes of production such that those
that exist within them come to see them as the Truth, as necessary, and as absolute). It is
the second sense of the word, however, that is particularly Althusserian: his point here is
that ideology itself is inescapable that it is ever-present as he points out in the essay that
he had submitted to Fromm:
…Ideology is as such an organic part of every social totality. It is as if human
societies could not survive without these specific formations, these systems of
representations (at various levels), their ideologies. Human societies secrete
ideology as the very element and atmosphere indispensible to their historical
respiration and life.35
It is the belief that one can escape ideology all together that is challenged by
Althusser and it is this that is the mistake of the idealist materialism of traditional
philosophers like Cohen. By challenging this, Althusser also challenges the belief that the
human will is autonomous in the sense that the humanist Marxists think it is (or could be
if we could release ourselves from the grips of ideology). Here Althusser claims that “...
only an ideological world outlook could have imagined societies without ideology and
accepted the utopian idea of a world in which ideology (not just one of its historical
forms) would disappear without a trace.”36 Althusser thinks that overcoming this
particular ideology—the humanist ideology—means overcoming the young Marx’s
idealist belief in the end of history as a reconciliation of man with himself through the
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revolutionary activity of overcoming the false consciousness given to those that are
oppressed by ideology. In order to see this, we should first say more about the standard,
or ‘humanist’ understanding of ideology so as to see the contrast between it and
Althusser’s understanding of it. We can view this ‘standard’ reading in the Frankfurt
School theorists.
One of the many definitions given of the concept of ideology by those of the
Frankfurt School is the one given by Adorno when he states that ideology is “objectively
necessary and yet false consciousness.”37 For Adorno and others in the Frankfurt School
all ideology is productive of a kind of consciousness that is ‘false;’ a distorted view of
one’s existence in which one finds themselves confronted with a reality that necessarily
exists as divorced from them, autonomous, and with certain rigid structures and “facts”
that have a kind of absolute status. These rigid structures help maintain or prop up a
certain economic system (and all that goes with it). Further, this rigidity extends to one’s
thoughts about the kind of being that they themselves are (one’s view of human nature)
and thereby makes one complicit in one’s own oppression. For instance, the view that we
have some ‘natural’ and set drive to compete with one another helps prop up and support
the competitive nature of the capitalist system, or the view that under capitalism, you can
‘become’ anything that you want and if you are not successful it is simply because you
are not trying hard enough.
According to the Frankfurt School critics, these and other forms of ‘false
consciousness’ manifest themselves in an especially insidious form in today’s capitalist
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societies. We are, argues Horkheimer, “continually being prodded by the techniques of
mass culture that hammer the industrialistic behavior patterns into [our] eyes and ears and
muscles” in such a way as to make even our bodily habits conform to this particular
social organization.38 As noted above, one is in the grips of false consciousness (and
hence ideology) when one fails to see their subordination to the current power structures
and instead comes to view the capitalist economic system—and themselves as a part of
it—as the necessary, ‘natural’ or ‘factual’ order of things. Horkheimer continues,
claiming that even “a concept such as that of ‘fact’ can itself be understood only as a
consequence of the alienation of human consciousness from extra human and human
nature, which is in turn a consequence of civilization.”39 We are alienated from the truth
of our subordination when we find ourselves in this predicament, and we—as members of
the modern capitalist society—find ourselves in this predicament all the time, thus we are
always alienated. To say, however, that our consciousness of ourselves and our world is
‘false’ and that it is an ‘alienation’ of ourselves from our ‘nature’ both human and
inhuman, is to also imply that there is a remedy, that we can come to be rid of the
‘falseness’ of our consciousness, that we can become un-alienated and that we can come
to see through the ideology that subordinates us.
Though the theorists of the Frankfurt School take this to be an increasingly
difficult prospect, it is nonetheless a driving impetus behind their work. Through just the
right theorization, and just the right critique of our culture and its ideologies, they think it
possible to at least keep reminding us of the ideologies to which we succumb, and within
which our false consciousness is created, thereby keeping a pathway open that might in
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some way lead to some form of enlightenment that exists beyond them in which we can
come to see our subordination and ultimately, throw it off. To this Horkheimer writes:
If philosophy succeeds in helping people recognize these factors, it will have
rendered a great service to humanity. The method of negation, the denunciation of
everything that mutilates mankind and impedes free development, rests on the
confidence in man… If by enlightenment and intellectual progress we mean the
freeing of man from superstitious belief in evil forces, in demons and fairies, in
blind fate—in short, the emancipation from fear—then the denunciation of what is
currently called reason is the greatest service that reason can render.40
It is this ‘confidence in man’ and the ability of humanity to overcome its enslavement to
false consciousness by overcoming the ideology that puts it in place, that betrays the
humanistic tendency of Horkheimer and others of the Frankfurt School. The belief that
one can, ultimately, under the right conditions and in the right historical moment throw
off their chains and through this create a better world depends on the belief that humans
are (or at least can be) rational and autonomous agents and that, given the right tools, they
can come to see the arguments of the cultural critic as rational and hence emancipatory. It
is precisely this point that Althusser’s reading of Marx, and the theory of ideology that he
builds out of this, denies.
Althusser argues that the belief that we can free ourselves from false
consciousness and ideology comes in part from a particular reading of Marx that
emphasizes a kind of continuity between his early work and his late work. The problem
is, according to Althusser, that those that hold this view fail to see that Marx himself was
caught in a particular ideology in his early work—that of a kind of Feuerbachianism—
and subsequently frees himself of this in his later work. It is, claims Althusser, under the
influence of Feuerbach that Marx makes his pronouncements about the end of alienation
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and the reconciliation of humanity with its ‘essence’ in the coming communism and so
on.41 Marx’s conception of humanity’s having such an ‘essence’ and the subsequent
belief that this implies, namely that there is a ‘truth’ about us that we have been alienated
from in the capitalist modes of production comes from Feuerbach. In these early writings,
there is no discussion of ‘ideology’ as such because, according to Althusser, Marx did not
yet have a theory of such a thing, nor did he need one, the Feuerbachian concepts of
‘man’ and his ‘alienation’ from himself gave him all of the explanatory power that was
necessary for the critique of capitalism as it was given in the early writings. Althusser
points out here that according to Marx’s early view:
History is the alienation and production of reason in unreason, of the true man in
the alienated man. Without knowing it, man realizes the essence of man in the
alienated products of his labor (commodities, State, religion). The loss of man
produces history and man must presuppose a definite pre-existing essence. At the
end of history, this man, having become inhuman objectivity, has merely to regrasp as a subject his own essence alienated in property, religion, and the State to
become total man, true man.42
According to Althusser, it is this view that Marx abandons when, in his later
work, he begins to use the conceptual apparatus of the base/superstructure model (and the
all important concept of ideology).43 The argument here is that Marx came to see that
while his Feuerbachianism had initially helped propel his work, it too would have to be
overcome as the belief in an ‘essence’ of humans (and thus a kind of humanism) was
nothing more than a particular ideological form itself and one that was limiting his
ability to make sense of social phenomena in a fully materialist fashion. Althusser claims
that Marx began to realize this as early as the Theses on Feuerbach and he offers a
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reading of a portion of the Sixth Thesis to back this claim up. The crucial moment
according to Althusser is the moment when Marx states at the beginning of the thesis
that: “Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human
essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the
ensemble of the social relations.”44 Here is what Althusser has to say about this:
To give this theoretically contorted sentence a meaning, one has to retrace, in
reverse, the detour it had to make simply in order to be pronounceable. This is the
detour I mean. It is necessary to have done with Feuerbach, and therefore with
what he included in the human essence. It is not enough to say, as in 1843: Man is
the world of Man, society, the State. The world of Man is not the objectification
of his essence; it is not mere objects, it consists of altogether astounding realities:
relations, taken in their ‘ensemble.’45
Althusser argues here that in order for Marx to even make such a claim he has to already
have let go of the influence of Feuerbach. This is because as Marx claims here, it is not in
the objects (commodities, society, the State) of the human world that we find an alienated
(and thus reclaimable) ‘essence’ of humanity but rather it is the ‘social relations’ that
become grouped together into a particular ‘ensemble’ at a given time that offers us
something like a ‘human essence.’ But this means that there is no ‘abstract’ essence in
humanity to be objectified—rather, it is social relations and the ensemble of them that
exists at any given time that calls something like an essence into being. This ‘essence’
however, is not really an essence but is rather an ideological mis-recognition. It is not
something ‘recoverable’ or eternal, but is rather contingent and determined by the ‘social
relations’ as they are at any given moment. Furthermore, this ‘essence’ has no existence
of its own outside of the contingently grouped social relations. It is a ‘whole’ that is
dependent on the elements (the social relations) upon which it is premised.
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So, the shift that begins here, according to Althusser, is a move away from a kind
of humanism in Marx where we begin with an alienated human essence and become
unalienated through a process of objectification and reconciliation, the origin and end of a
rational historical process, to a kind of anti-humanism in which our understanding of both
ourselves and our world is nothing more that the product of a particular, contingent set of
social relations that congeal into a particular ensemble at a given point in history.46 This
explains, claims Althusser, the increasingly shifting emphasis in Marx’s texts to the
analysis of these social relations (economic relations, forces of production, etc…) and the
move away from the more utopian concerns of the early Marx. As is well known, in
making this argument, Althusser draws upon the Bachelardian concept of an
‘epistemological break.’ Althusser’s debt to Bachelard is important not just for his rereading of Marx but has important implications for his later work as well. I will offer a
brief sketch of this concept (and Althusser’s use of it) and we will then return to this later.

Section Three
Bachelard’s own use of the concept of an epistemological break refers both to his
conception of the changes that the sciences themselves undergo throughout history, and
the changes that they affect in epistemology more generally. Like Comte, Bachelard
argues, that the human pursuit of knowledge is characterized by a history of radical shifts,
discontinuities, and ruptures with earlier conceptions of reality; in order to come to know
anything new, according to Bachelard, the scientist must ‘break’ with her previously held
beliefs about the nature of the world. Unlike Comte, however, Bachelard does not
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conceive of these ruptures as only serving the function of revising and correcting one’s
epistemological standpoint.
They do in fact act as revisions but these revisions do not, for Bachelard, reveal a
truth about the nature of reality that pre-exists scientific practice (though the scientist
herself does think of her practice this way), the practices that a scientist engages in are
involved in the construction of the objects a given science studies. The scientist usually
does not recognize this, and is in this way trapped in a kind of ideology (in Althusser’s
sense, namely an imaginary relationship to their world). Furthermore, the practices that
the scientist engages in are themselves (in an Althusserian sense) fully material and act
on the scientist’s knowledge in a dialectical manner such that these practices themselves
(through their partial construction of their object) influence the scientist’s conceptual
awareness. In order to see this further, we should back up a moment a take a look at how
Bachelard describes this process, beginning with his concept of the rupture or
epistemological break that takes place in scientific practice and leads to a rejection of
previously held beliefs.
The rejection that is conditioned by the break is not a mere rejection of some of
the scientists conceptions about the nature of the world and revision of others, but it
requires a kind of rooting out—in a Cartesian fashion—of those beliefs that hinder one’s
ability to incorporate the ‘new’ into their understanding (and a continued vigilance in
making sure that earlier conceptions of reality are not creeping in to the scientific
process), it is precisely the ‘new’ experience that the scientist has that allows for this,
though the scientist herself may not recognize this process for what it is as Bachelard
points out:

30

For the scientist, knowledge emerges from ignorance as light emerges from
darkness. The scientist fails to see that ignorance is a web of positive, tenacious,
interdependent errors. He does not recognize that intellectual darkness has a
structure and that, this being so, every correct objective experience, must always
entail the correction of a subjective error. But errors are not easily destroyed one
by one. They are coordinated. The scientific mind can only establish itself by
destroying the non-scientific mind…47
The point here is, again a Comtean one, that the ‘ignorance’ itself is not actually a lack of
knowledge, it is a particular kind of knowledge, a fully positive web of beliefs that make
up the scientist’s pre-scientific worldview (and self-understanding). This comes from
many sources according to Bachelard, all of which are socio-historical in origin. This is
to say that the web of positive belief is the result of the influence of the social, the
knowledge that is imparted to one by one’s schooling in the currently (and dogmatically)
held beliefs about the nature of the world. This schooling can take on explicit forms such
as in the case of actual schooling and it can take on less obvious forms such as that
commonly held beliefs about the nature of the world that one finds in one’s everyday
experience that are found in religious traditions and the like. It is precisely this everyday
experience that needs to be rejected in order for the scientific outlook to take hold, as it is
this positive web of beliefs that acts as a barrier to the experiencing of the ‘new’. It is the
ability to recognize a ‘new’ experience for what it is, rather than something which
confirms one’s pre-existing belief system, that constitutes and allows for scientific
‘advancement,’ but in order to recognize such a new experience one must refrain from
seeing it from the perspective of those previously held beliefs.48
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It is the rejection of this web of beliefs—which for Bachelard form what he calls
‘epistemological obstacles’—that is the result of the epistemological break that is made
possible for the scientist as a result of the experience of the ‘new’ in her investigations.
What the experience of the ‘new’ does is open up a space from which to view one’s web
of beliefs as that which prevented the acquisition of this new knowledge in the past, and
hence allows the scientist to reject this web as error. To be sure, for Bachelard, this
process does not in the end really uncover a ‘truer’ objective reality, rather it is simply a
changed conception of it and one that makes the previous ways of understanding look as
if they are errors (thus it retroactively confers the title of ‘error’ on one’s previous
beliefs). As noted above, Bachelard seeks to show how it is the ‘new’ experience found
in science is itself in part generated by scientific practice and its modes of knowing. Here
Bachelard writes:
Scientific observation is always polemical; it either confirms of denies a prior
thesis, a preexisting model, an observational protocol. It shows as it demonstrates;
it establishes a hierarchy of appearances; it transcends the immediate; it
reconstructs first its own models and then reality. And once the step is taken from
observation to experimentation, the polemical character of knowledge stands out
even more sharply.49
Not only does scientific practice construct its objects in this way, but it does so with the
help of scientific instruments which are the material component of scientific practice. The
laboratory, the microscope, the spectrometer; these are all material representations of a
given scientific practice. Bachelard continues:
Now Phenomena must be selected, filtered, purified, shaped by instruments;
indeed, it may well be the instruments that produce the phenomenon in the first
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place. And instruments are nothing but theories materialized. The phenomena
they produce bear the stamp of theory throughout.50
Furthermore, the instruments themselves then, not only ‘produce; their objects, but they
also influence the conceptual apparatus that the scientist employs. In this way then, the
scientific mind is the dialectally produced product of the material practices it employs
(and the experiences it has as a result of this practice) and through which it constructs its
world. Here Bachelard in making this point, tells us to “consider how ‘realism’ changes,
losing its naïve immediacy, in its enounter with scientific skepticism. Similarily
‘rationalism’ need not be a closed system a priori assumptions are subject to change
(witness the weakening of Euclid’s postulates in non-Eucidean geometry for example).”51
The further Bachelardian point here is that it is this (not necessarily the
knowledge itself) that is the upshot of the scientific perspective. It conditions the scientist
(if done properly anyway) to view the world (and any given knowledge about it) with a
kind of openness that recognizes that any ‘facts’ that exist are non-permanent and can be
overcome by the discovery of new evidence. In this way, Bachelard defines “the
philosophy of scientific knowledge as an open philosophy, as the consciousness of a
mind which constitutes itself by working upon the known, by seeking within reality that
which contradicts anterior knowledge.52 The scientist becomes the kind of thinker
(through her practice) that rejects the givenness with which reality seems to exist.
Further, the experience of the ‘new’ itself is conditioned by the practices (and the
instruments) that the scientist both engages in and engages with. It is this characterization
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of scientific practice and the epistemological break with given reality that appeals to
Althusser and that Althusser reads into Marx’s project.
The claim is then, that it is the scientific discovery of the method of historical
materialism that allowed Marx to see the Bachelardian ‘web of beliefs’ that conditioned
his previous philosophical understanding of things—the result of the left-wing Hegelian
thinking of Feuerbach’s humanism—as an error and thus made it possible for him to
reject it as ideological. Further, it is out of this the Marx himself experiences the ‘new’—
it is the scientific practice that Marx engages in that partially produces—or reproduces,
Marx’s world. So, for Althusser’s Marx, it is a break with a given ideology that Marx’s
science itself conditions, thus Marx becomes a true scientist (in the Bachelardian sense)
in his rejection of humanism and this comes about through the scientific practice he
engages in by developing the method of historical materialism.
To be sure, this does not mean, according to Althusser, that in the epistemological
break Marx himself leaves all ideology behind. For Althusser, this is simply not a
possibility, for as Bachelard has taught us, ideology itself (in the form of the web of
positive beliefs) is ever present even if particular ideologies are overcome. All knowledge
that exists at any given time is only provisional at best, if one were to take it as absolute
fact, then they would lose the scientific perspective and return to the ideological.53 What
Marx does accomplish however, is both the ability to reject the web of belief that
conditioned his previous thought, and the beginnings of a new theory of the social. Now
that we can see the relationship between Bachelard’s philosophy of science and
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Althusser’s re-reading of Marx, we should turn our eyes back to the concept of ideology
and the materialist position that emerges in relation to this reading. As we will see in the
next chapter, if it is in part the result of Althusser’s application of Bachelard’s concepts
of the epistemological obstacle and the epistemological break, it is also in part due to his
reading of Spinoza as a thinker who can offer an antidote to a kind of (bad) Hegelianism
that infects other (humanist) readings of this concept. The next chapter will also explain
the connection to contingency that Althusser’s materialism forges and that we have not
yet discussed in detail.
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Chapter 2: Ideology, Material Practice, and the Imagination: Spinoza as
Antidote to Humanist Marxism

If we never were structuralists, we can now explain why: Why we seemed to be, even
though we were not, why there came about this strange misunderstanding on the basis of
which books were written. We were guilty of an equally powerful and compromising
passion: we were Spinozists.54

As noted at the end of the previous chapter, this chapter concerns itself with
Althusser’s conception of ideology and its reliance on a certain reading of Spinoza. The
above quotation, taken from a text written during what is commonly known as Athusser’s
‘middle period’ should serve as a guide for us here, for in it, Althusser himself claims to
be a ‘Spinozist,’ a claim that he will reiterate much later.55 In what follows, I propose to
take him at his word, and to attempt to discern what it is in Spinoza that Althusser deems
so helpful in articulating his own position. In order to better explain this; however, I wish
begin by saying a bit more about Althusser’s conception of ideology.
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Section One
Ideology is, says Althusser, “a system (with its own logic and rigor) of
representations (images, myths, ideas or concepts, depending on the case) endowed with
a historical existence and role within a given society.”56 The term ‘representation’ should
be taken in a Kantian sense, as something that exists prior to belief— a representation is
simply an intuition, an objective experience. Ideology then, as a ‘system of
representations,’ is the experience of an objective world that is the background against
which an individual comes to have beliefs about themselves and the nature of that world.
A given ‘system of representations’ is, for Althusser, born of the particular arrangement
of material social practices that exist at a given time in history. In other words, the
‘system of representations’ is nothing more than what makes up a given society itself. It
is, as note above, the background against which individuals become conscious of their
existence and that which informs their understanding of themselves in relation to the
world in which they find themselves. Furthermore, this ‘system of representations’ that is
a given society is more than anything a structure (in the literal sense of the word—as that
which ‘structures’ or holds together) that depicts one’s social world as a totality with a
particular set of seemingly natural meanings, necessities, possibilities, institutions, and
traditions. As Althusser goes on to point out, this seeming unity is “constituted by a
certain specific type of complexity” and is “imposed on the vast majority of men, not via
their ‘consciousness’” but rather, “via a process that escapes them.”57 Althusser
continues:
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Men ‘live’ their ideologies…not as a form of consciousness, but as an object of
their ‘world’—as their ‘world’ itself…so ideology is a matter of the lived relation
between men and their world. This relation only appears as ‘conscious’ on
condition that it is unconscious, [and] in the same way only seems to be simple on
condition that it is complex, that it is not a simple relation but a relation between
relations, a second degree relation.58
There are, according to Althusser, first and foremost social relations. These are made up
by any of the multitude of materially existing practices found in a given society: the
exchange of goods (economic relations), familial relations (relations between adult and
child, and sibling to sibling, as well as particular familial traditions that contribute to the
individual’s understanding of themselves vis-à-vis other members of the family),
governmental relations (forms of governing, judicial relations, and such), and there are
other institutional relations such as schools and religious organizations. All of these
social relations are very real, very existent and multifarious relations of which we are all
a part at any given time (though they are contingent in that they differ at different
historical places and times).
Each of these is constructed and sustained by a particular set of material practices.
For example, physically going to church on Sunday is a material practice that helps
sustain the Christian social relation as does bowing one’s head to pray, the practice of
physically exchanging money for goods sustains the current mode of economic
relationships, the common practice of treating male children differently than female
children sustains the existing gender differences, and so on. Consciousness, as Althusser
points out in the quotation above, is the “relation between” these relations and it
functions as a kind of “second degree relation.” His point here is that this ‘second degree’
relation is the (paradoxically unconscious) product of all of these disparate relations and
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the practices that make them up. It holds them together and makes them appear to those
that are subject to them as if they are natural, non-contingent, and necessary. Here
Althusser writes:
All ideology represents in its necessarily imaginary distortion…above all the
(imaginary) relationship of individuals to the relations of production and the
relations that derive from them. What is represented in ideology is therefore not
the system of real relations which govern the existence of individuals but the
imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live.59
The social relations (and their material practices) in this sense ‘produce’ the
consciousness of the subject in such a way that she, in her ‘imaginary’ relationship to
them, consciously lives these relations as her world, but this happens at a level that is
below the level of her consciousness. It is, instead, the altogether unconscious
production—through the material social relations that she participates in—of her
consciousness as her lived relation to the world. The claim that Althusser is making here
is that consciousness itself—one’s subjective awareness of oneself and one’s world—is
always already ideological. Ideology is then, produced by the real social relations, the
material practices in which we are always enmeshed, but at the same time ideology
misrepresents these relations, that is, makes them appear as static, natural and necessary.
Traditionally, the concept of ideology is of a set of (mistaken) beliefs that one has
about her world which can be overcome and somehow ‘set right.’ We have seen (both in
the last chapter and so far in this chapter) that for Althusser, this is an impoverished
understanding of ideology as it neglects its fundamental role in our subjective awareness.
For Althusser, ideology is not simply something that we believe or are trapped in. It is
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rather something that we as subjects actively produce (and reproduce) in our engagement
(our lived relation) with our world and material practices that form this engagement. The
distortion that exists in ideology is not, for Althusser, simple false belief about the world
(as there is no real falsity of the beliefs themselves- they are simply that which emerges
out of material practice), the distortion found in ideology is that which arises from its
inability to recognize its historical nature, that it is not eternal, nor necessary but rather
the result of a set of historically contingent activities/practices which are themselves
subject to change. Ideology merely reproduces its conditions and in doing so, denies
access to both its status as historical and its nature as contingent. This is the ‘imaginary’
relation that is produced by ideology. It is here, à propos the ‘imaginary relation’ that
ideological consciousness constitutes between the individual and her conditions, that
Althusser’s reading of Spinoza becomes relevant as it is—Althusser’s reading of—
Spinoza’s understanding of the imagination that serves as the reference point.60

Section Two
Althusser most often appeals to the Appendix of Book one of The Ethics when
referring to the Influence of Spinoza on his own theory of the imaginary.61 We should
recall that here Spinoza argues (as he does throughout Book One) that the idea that there
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is a final cause (a Telos) in Nature is a strictly human invention, that we perceive things
in Nature from our human perspective and attribute things to it that simply do not inhere
in the natural world. The telos that we see in nature is our own application, for as Spinoza
argues:
This doctrine of Final Causes turns Nature completely upside-down, for it regards
as an effect that which is fact a cause and vice versa. Again, it makes that which is
by nature first to be last; and finally that which is highest and most perfect is held
to be most imperfect.62
Spinoza’s point here is that when we look to the world and ‘see’ order, and purpose we
commonly regard it as an effect of a hidden cause that exists in the natural world that
grants that purposiveness to nature (like a creator God, who is both the origin and end of
all that is, or simply the well ordered purposiveness of nature itself) however, this ‘effect’
is itself a cause of humanity’s mistaken belief in final causes. What we see as an effect of
some final, well-ordered cause, is not the effect of such a thing but rather that which
causes in us the belief that there are such causes. Hence it is not human reason that is in
control and truly comprehends its world when it recognizes purposiveness, but instead
humanity’s belief in such a telos is caused by its (necessarily) mistaken relationship to its
existence. For Althusser’s Spinoza, the necessarily mistaken relationship (and the
teleological perspective that attends it) is the result, as Althusser argues, of the ‘illusion
of the subject’ that Spinoza discerns.63
As Spinoza argues, part of what it is to be human—in one’s lived relationship to
one’s world—is to take oneself to be the center of action and to “act always with an end
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in view, to wit, the advantage that [we] seek.”64 Since this is part of what it is to be
human (as we live our humanity anyway) we come to think that other things in the world
follow this same process (and like us, have themselves, goals and purposes for which
they exist and act). When we encounter things that seem not have such purposes, we
attribute them to a ‘divine’ intelligence that in fact does have a purpose in mind (one that
we simply cannot comprehend). Because we (as humans) tend to look to things in nature
as means to fulfilling our own purposes, we come to think that this divine intelligence has
created nature to fulfill our needs that the natural world and its events have such a
purpose. Here Spinoza writes:
When men became convinced that everything that is created is created on their
behalf, they were bound to consider the most important quality in every individual
thing that which was most useful to them, and to regard as of the highest
excellence all those things by which they were most benefitted. Hence they came
from these abstract notions to explain the natures of things: Good, Bad, Order,
Confusion, Hot, Cold, Beauty, Ugliness; and since they believe that they are free,
the following abstract notions came into being: Praise, Blame, Right, Wrong.65
It is in the space of these and other abstract notions that we form and place on the
world, based on our own notions about what benefits us, that we come to consciousness
both of ourselves, and the world in which we live. We (mistakenly) think that these
notions are in fact in the world itself—as a natural part of it, stemming from its inherent
purposiveness—rather than the result of a process of mystification that is inherent to our
subjective awareness (and one who’s particular content is ultimately determined not by
us, but is the effect of the world on us). Thus Spinoza argues that humans do not
understand that this is a subjective mystification. We do not see that this is an effect of
our ‘lived’—our conscious subjective—relationship to a world in which we find
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ourselves (an effect that is conditioned by causes that escape us- because we take them to
be effects themselves of the ‘purposiveness’ of nature). It is in this way that humans
come to “Mistake their imagination for their intellect, they are firmly convinced that there
is order in things, ignorant as they are of things and their own nature.”66 In other words,
our lived/conscious/subjective relationship to our world is a mystification of the real
relations that underlie and determine our subjective awareness. Spinoza continues:
It will suffice at this point if I take as my basis what must be universally admitted,
that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that they have a desire to
seek their own advantage, a desire of which they are conscious. From this it
follows that men believe they are free, precisely because they are conscious of
their volitions and desires; yet concerning the causes that have determined them to
desire and will, they have not the faintest idea, because they are ignorant of
them.67
As we should be in a position to see now, what Spinoza gives us in this theory of
the imaginary, according to Althusser, is a nascent theory of ideology; one that excavates
the connection between a subjectivity that is ideologically constructed and a subjective
belief in freedom, purposes, and teleology. As Althussser puts it, “Spinoza showed us the
secret alliance between Subject and Goal.”68 Furthermore, on Althusser’s account of
Spinoza, we also get a theory of ideology that shows us how ideology is not simply a
mistaken relation between the individual and the individual’s world (one that can be
righted by a proper re-orientation of one’s awareness), but rather a theory of ideology that
shows us how it is that one’s ideological consciousness is materially produced and
materially invested through the practices in which one engages. Here Althusser writes:
Spinoza’s “theory” rejected every illusion about ideology…but at the same time it
refused to treat ideology as a simple error, or as a naked ignorance, because it
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based the system of this imaginary phenomenon on the relation of men to the
world “expressed” by the state of their bodies. This materialism of the imaginary
opened a way to a surprising conception of the First Level of Knowledge: not at
all, in fact, as a “piece of knowledge”, but as the material world of men as they
live it, that of their concrete and historical existence.69
For Althusser, Spinoza’s thought on subjectivity’s imaginary relationship to its world
(and the purposes that it constructs in this relation) does not simply make an
anthropological claim, that is, Spinoza (according to Althusser) is not simply saying that
it is human nature to add purposes where there are none, but that the ways in which our
subjective imaginary relation to our world are produced (and hence the kinds of purposes
we come to see in the world) are themselves historically and materially produced.
Althusser realizes that this is an unorthodox reading of Spinoza, but as he points out, “to
be a heretical Spinozist is almost orthodox Spinozism, if Spinoza can be one of the
greatest lessons in heresy the world has ever seen!”70 In other words, Althusser readily
admits to using Spinoza for his purposes—he rejects, or at least ignores, the portions of
Spinoza’s corpus in which Spinoza’s views about our imaginary relation to our world
become anthropological, for instance—but it is still this heretical Spinoza whom inspires
and grounds this portion of Althusser’s revision of ideology and the materialist doctrine
that he constructs. For our purposes, it matters little whether or not Althusser gets
Spinoza right, what we are interested in is making sense of Althusser’s claims to be a
Spinozist and what that ultimately entails. Now that we have some sense for how
Althusser uses Spinoza in making sense of his revision of the concept of ideology, we
should turn back to Spinoza, to see what it is in Spinoza’s thought that leads Althusser to
see this type of materialism emerging from it.
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Our own nature is, according to Spinoza, one that is determined to be as it is by
forces that exist outside of us, forces that impinge not only on our bodily existence but
our mental life as well. We as natural beings are a part of a larger whole that is Nature,
and Nature (or God in Spinoza’s parlance) is a giant mechanistic system of causes and
effects. Furthermore, according to Spinoza’s strict Anti-Cartesianism, there is no real
separation between mind and body, rather, “the object of the idea constituting the human
mind is the body, a body actually existing.”71 As pointed out above, the body is, as a part
of nature, subject to the forces exerted on it by other existing bodies and the events of
which they are a part. The mind is, like the body, determined to be what it is, not by
acting as its own cause. Its nature is, rather, the result (the effect) of causes that exist
outside of it:
The human body is affected by other external bodies in a great many ways and is
so structured that it can affect external bodies in a great many ways. But the
human mind must perceive all that happens in the human body… The idea which
constitutes the formal being of the human mind is the idea of the body.72
Our mental life takes on the character that it does, according to Spinoza, not of its own
freewill, but rather as a result of that which happens to our bodies, of those things which
we physically experience and are a part of (those external things which ‘affect’ the body).
Further, since the individual human body is the kind of thing that it is, namely a physical
entity that is itself acted on by other bodies, it too is not truly a singular entity, separate
from all other bodies. We are, as Spinoza argues, “passive insofar as we are a part of
nature which cannot be conceived independently of other parts.”73 The ‘part’ that is my
individual body, is not separate from other parts of Nature and is thereby tied to these
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other parts insofar as they act on me as causes and are effects which flow from my causal
efficacy.
What we are as individuals, is again, the result of the world in which we find
ourselves and that which exists in it (materially) at the time that we come into the world.
Our minds—that is our consciousness—are determined by our bodily existence, and our
bodily existence is determined by the particular set of (material) causes that impinge on it
at a given point in history. These causes are both physical and social, there are
historically existing social ‘bodies,’ or material ‘institutions’ in Althusser’s parlance, that
act on us as individuals and help construct our understanding of ourselves. Recall again
the claims about the material and social practices in which we find ourselves in our
world—it is through these practices and the beliefs that are constructed out of them that I
come to understand both myself and my world (that I live my world). These practices
both pre-exist my individual existence and are the material out of which I build my own
knowledge of myself and the world in which I find myself. This ‘social body’ is that to
which I am connected in a Spinozist fashion (both bodily and mentally- it forms the
background against which I come to conscious awareness, and out of which I derive
epistemic and conceptual material).
The imaginary relation that we have to the material substrate in which we are
defined, is for Spinoza a reversal of the proper order of things, as it is for Althusser—I
imagine that I am both free in relation to this substrate (that I choose it), and that this
material is simply the natural order of things, the way things fundamentally (and
epistemologically) are. In my ideological imaginary, I miss the historical nature of both
the material relations that exist and the conceptual (mental) knowledge that attends it, as
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well as my entrapment in, and construction by, that particular material constellation in
which I find myself.
It is here again that we can see the importance of Spinoza’s thought for
Althusser’s materialism. Not only do we get “an abstract theory of ideology” from
Spinoza but further, Spinoza’s thought represents a materialist anti-humanism par
excellence. Consciousness on this reading, is nothing more than a ‘second-degree’
imaginary relation that has no existence of its own—it is not free from that which
determines its awareness (at least not in its everyday existence)—, it is an ‘idea’ of the
body (which is itself determined by Nature, or the constellation of bodies in causal
relations that exist at a given time), formed as it is as a result of those material causes that
act on the body, and those causes can be (and are) seen in an Althusserian light as
including the historically constructed material practices and the material social
institutions in which these practices are encased, which engage us and contribute to our
conception of our world, and our conception of ourselves as a part of it. Again, we should
be sure to note that this is Althusser’s reading of Spinoza, it in no way claims to be the
definitive reading of Spinoza. It is, as I have noted above (and as Althusser himself
notes), a ‘heretical’ reading of Spinoza.
We now can turn back to some of the discussion of Althusser’s claims about a
split in Marx’s thinking from the first chapter in order to further see how it is that
Althusser conceives of the (Spinozist, or heretical Spinozist) connections between
(material) body and mind, individual bodies and social bodies, and ultimately how this
plays into his view of consciousness’ ideological construction. Recall that, as we saw in
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the last chapter, the Althusserian claim is that Marx’s thought began in a particular
ideology (that of a kind of Feuerbachiansim). Althusser points out here that:
Marx did not choose to be born to the thought German history had concentrated in
its university education, nor to think its ideological world. He grew up in this
world, in it he learned to live and move…the young Marx emerged into the
thought world of his own time, to think in it in his turn, and to enter into the
exchange and debate with the thoughts of his time which was to be his whole life
as an ideologue.74
The key point to note in the passage above is the claim about the university education as
a concentration of a particular way of thinking. This education is what made the young
Marx what he was according to Althusser. This is to say that it is the education, which
produced the consciousness of the Young Marx. This educational apparatus is the
‘material’ out of which the Young Marx as thinker ‘emerged.’75 The German university is
then, a material representative (a Spinozist social body) in which this knowledge had its
life, and it is by being engaged by the practices involved in attending the German
university (both physically and mentally) at the time, that Marx came to think the ways
the he did in his youth. In this reading of Marx’s development, we can see again
Althusser’s conception of the material-ideological construction of consciousness itself.
Consciousness is, as we have seen, the secondary relation, between the material
relation, between the individual’s body and causes that act on it. Consciousness as this
‘secondary relation’ is in fact a kind of ideological distortion but not as something that
can be thrown off through a proper mode of critical awareness. It is rather a distortion—
or a constitutive imaginary—that is necessary and constitutive of any consciousness
whatsoever and one that is lived (and produced) in and by the very material practices that
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it embodies. This is the point that is being made when Althusser claims that: “the
category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology only insofar as all ideology has the
function (which defines it) of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as subjects.”76 As
ideological, consciousness is distorted because consciousness’ knowledge (and its world)
appears to it as natural, static, and non-historical. This ideological mode of awareness is
only ever partially overcome in that ideology is never something that we can be rid of and
new modes of ideology arise as old modes are overcome.77 There is then, a kind of
symbiotic relationship between one’s subjectivity and ideology: it is in ideology that the
subject is constituted but at the same time it is the constituted subject that sustains (or
reproduces) ideology. Althusser’s theory of interpellation is meant to further explain this
point.
One is ‘interpellated’ or ‘hailed’ by ideology when one recognizes himself as the
‘subject’ of its call or the one that is being hailed. Althusser’s classic example here is of
the policeman who hails a passerby on the street by saying “hey you there!” It is in the
physical act of turning around and responding to the hail that one becomes a ‘subject”
and is thus interpellated by the hail because as Althusser points out, “he has recognized
that the hail was ‘really’ addressed to him, and that ‘it was really him who was hailed’
(and not someone else). We are, argues Althusser, always in a state of being interpellated
in this way. By engaging in any material social practice we admit (unconsciously) that we
are the ‘subject’ of such a practice and in doing this, we become the kind of subject that
engages in that practice and thus are constituted by it. For instance, by engaging in the
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practice of taking my comprehensive exam in order to move on to the next level in my
progress towards gaining my doctorate, I recognize myself as the kind of being who takes
such an exam, this is to say I respond to the hail of that particular practice with a ‘yes,
that is me!” In doing this, I become interpellated as a particular kind of subject and at the
same time, I sustain not just the practice of comprehensive exams, but also the entire
network of practices that surround the institution of the university. Thus, I am both
interpellated as a subject by the ideological ‘apparatus’ of the university and in the
recognition of myself as the kind of being that responds to such a hail with a “yes, that is
me” I prop up the apparatus itself (and consequently many other social apparatuses that
are linked to such an institution).
This, as we should be able to see now, is a process that is always happening, I am
always being interpellated by the social practices that I engage in thus I am always
already the subject of ideology. When I go to the grocery store, I am interpellated by the
ideological practices that I engage in while I am there—politeness, using a shopping cart
or basket, paying for my food, etc.—and I generally (unconsciously) respond to this
interpellative process with the recognition of myself in such practices. When I am driving
and I accidentally blow a stop sign, I find myself interpellated as a subject who is guilty
(even when there is no one around to catch me—it is enough that I feel that moment of
fear as I look to see if there is a policeman lurking anywhere) and I recognize myself as
such. We should keep in mind that in all of this, my recognition of myself as the subject
of ideology is not just the recognition of myself as such a subject at that moment. Rather,
in my constitutive imaginary I recognize—or misrecognize—myself as always having
been such a subject. This is an important point not to be missed, when I am interpellated
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and I recognize myself as the one being hailed, part and parcel of the recognition is the
misrecognition that I have always-already been that subject that is subjected to such
practices and is beholden to them.
In this way, as Althusser points out, “Ideology has always-already interpellated
individuals as subjects, which amounts to making it clear that individuals are alwaysalready interpellated by ideology as subjects, which necessarily leads us to one last
proposition: individuals are always already subjects.”78 Not only is it the case that since
we are constantly in a process of being interpellated we are always already subjects,
Althusser also argues that though ideological practices may differ at different historical
times and places, the structure of interpellation is ever present. This is what is meant by
his claim that “Ideology has no history.”79 Our preceding discussion of Althusser’s
reading of Spinoza should help make sense of this claim, we always find ourselves in an
ideological/imaginary relation to our world (in our conscious lived existence) in which
we take ourselves to be free beings, but that conscious existence is in reality, the result of
the material/external causes that act on and interpellate us as the beings that we come to
take ourselves to be. We always find ourselves interpellated as subjects by some grouping
of social relations and the practices which make them up (apparatuses in Althusser’s
terminology) and while these change as history changes, the process of our constitution
by them—and the constitutive imaginary itself as the lived relationship to the world—
remains stable.
We should, however, be careful in using the word ‘structure’ here, as it smacks of
the accusations that continue to be leveled at the Althusserian project that it is nothing

78
79

Ibid., 132
Ibid. 120

51

more than a kind of Structuralist Marxism, accusations that Althusser himself thinks are
false and miss the importance of Spinoza in his thought. I want to now briefly turn back
to the claim in the quotation that began this chapter. Recall that in it, Althusser defends
himself against the charge of structuralism by citing his ‘Spinozism,’ we are now in a
position to see what he means in making this claim and how he thinks what he is doing is
not structuralist, or at least not simply structuralism as applied to Marxism. Furthermore,
a discussion of this will illuminate, for us, the question which has remained in the
background until now: what role the claim to contingency plays in Althusser’s
materialism and why it is so important.

Section Three
The standard way of understanding the Althusserian position of anti-humanism, is
by reading it in relation to the structuralist movement then underway in much of the
intellectual scene in both France and on the continent more generally.80 We might,
however, challenge this view by thinking through the implications of the foregoing. If it
is the case that Althusser draws the inspiration for his particular brand of Marxist antihumanism from the likes of Bachelardian philosophy of science, backed up by a novel
reading of Spinoza’s materialism, then it seems that, as he himself has repeatedly tried to
point out, his own brand of anti-humanism cannot simply be reduced to a kind of
structuralism. As Warren Montag points out, Althusser began a serious study of
structuralism as early as the academic year 1962-63 in which he gave a year-long seminar
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on the subject.81 Among the students that participated in this seminar were Pierre
Macherey, Etienne Balibar, and Jacques Ranciere. Each of these students produced works
out of this seminar that were critical of structuralism in a variety of ways.82 It is also
during this year that the foundations for Althusser’s own criticisms of, and attempts to
distance himself from, the structuralist movement were laid.
To begin to make sense of this criticism (and its foundations), we should recall
our discussion of Bachelard in Chapter One. According to Bachelard, the proper
scientific attitude is the one that remains open, that rejects the seemingly settled nature of
scientific ‘fact,’ that seeks to “disrupt the habits of objective knowledge and make reason
uneasy.”83 This, again as we saw in chapter one, is because, as Bachelard points out,
‘objective’ knowledge is always in a certain sense ideological, and forms an
‘epistemological obstacle’ to scientific practice. Therefore, since our very subjective
awareness is first conditioned by a knowing that is taken to be objective (and hence is
itself, conditioned by these epistemological obstacles), Bachelard argues that “we must
constantly strive towards a desubjectification” in order to gain access to the ‘new’ in
science.84 That is, we must continually interrogate this subjective awareness (and its
attendant conceptual schemes) as it always harbors ideological potential.
Though structuralism itself gives one the philosophical tools to effect such a
desubjectification and hence to think the outside of the human ‘subject’ as that which
determines (rather than is determined by), it has its own problems. First, structuralism
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itself merely displaces the category of ‘subject’ from the individual human to the
structure, leaving intact both an origin (the origin of things is to be found in the structure)
and an end. And second, in doing so, the concept of ‘structure’ becomes ideological
insofar as it becomes a part of ‘objective’ science and thus, objective knowledge, and
thereby remains uninterrogated by those who make use of it. As we are now in a position
to begin to see, structuralism itself—when treated as a philosophical movement—is
nothing more than a traditional philosophical theory, which as any traditional philosophy,
is both idealist and ideological in its purported claims to be the ‘right’ or ‘correct’ (nonhistorical) way to understand social existence. To put it in Bachelardian parlance,
Althusser’s main charge against ‘structuralism’ is that it had (in his time) become an
ideological ‘epistemological obstacle’ in the theoretical pursuits of his contemporaries
(and in his own early work as well).85
Here Althusser writes that we must remember that, “Structuralism [is] born of
theoretical problems encountered by scientists in their practical work (in linguistics from
the time of Saussure, in social anthropology from the time of Boas and Levi-Strauss, in
psychoanalysis, etc.).”86 Thus it is (like any scientific practice) a historically situated
theoretical phenomenon, born of a particular conjunctural set of problems and questions.
Furthermore, Structuralism is not a unified body of theory, with a unified conceptual
apparatus, but rather “a jumble of vague themes that only realizes its ultimate tendency
under certain definite conditions.”87 This is to say again, that there is no ‘Structuralism’
but rather certain structuralisms that are responses to particular problems and questions
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that arise in a given conjuncture or historical moment. To treat these Structuralisms in
any other way, for instance, as the way to understand social phenomena, (which as we
have already noted, Althusser thinks many of its own practitioners do) is to turn
structuralism into a traditional philosophy, to neglect its historical nature as an
epistemological phenomena, to neglect the specificity of its existence and arrival on the
scene. This is to make it ideological and non-scientific.
Althusser makes this point in his criticism of Levi-Strauss’ structuralist account of
social phenomena such as kinship, which he claims vacillates between two mistaken
postions: The first is that of a bad (read- ideological) formalism in which kinship
structures are the material ‘incarnation’ of a ‘logical principle’ found in the ‘human
spirit’ or the structure of the brain as such—he calls this Levi-Strauss’ “materialist side,
which combines a binary linguistic approach with a cybernetic conception of the human
brain.” 88 The problem here, is that this brand of materialism assumes a static human
nature (or ‘Spirit’) vis-à-vis logical/mental structures that are expressed in various ways
in differing groups. Althusser is thinking here of passages in Levi-Strauss such as the one
in which he, in the midst of attempting to account for the existence, and common roots
of, differing social practices appeals to the (non-historical) notion of a structure of the
human mind. Here is one example of such a passage, in it Levi-Strauss is attempting to
make sense of the existence of “dual organization” structures of social phenomena:89
Dual organization is not in the first place an institution… It is above all a
principle of organization, capable of widely varying, and in particular, of more or
less elaborated applications. In some cases the principle applies only to sporting
competition. In others it extends to political life…in others again, to religious and
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ceremonial life. Finally, it may extend to the marriage system. In all of these
forms, there is a difference in degree, not of kind; of generality and not of type.
To understand their common basis, inquiry must be directed to certain
fundamental structures of the human mind, rather than to some privileged region
of the world or to a certain period in the history of civilization.90
The second mistaken position according to Althusser is that of a kind of functionalism.
To this he writes:
If [according to Levi-Strauss] certain rules governing marriage and so forth exist
in primitive societies, it is so that these societies can live, survive, and so on. (a
functionalist biologist subjectivism: there is a ‘social unconscious’ which ensures
exactly as an acute intelligence would, that primitive society possesses the means
it needs to live and survive. Just as one must criticize this functionalism, which on
the theoretical plane, invariably takes the form of a subjectivism which confers
upon ‘society’ a form of existence of a subject endowed with intentions and goals,
one must criticize and reject the concept of the unconscious, its indispensible
correlative, of which Levi-Strauss is compelled to make liberal use. I would go so
far as to say that the concept of the unconscious is no more a scientific concept in
psychoanalysis than in sociology, or anthropology or history…)91
To be sure, Althusser does not mean that we should reject the concept of the unconscious
altogether, he cannot mean this, as he makes extensive use of this concept himself (as we
have seen in the foregoing). The concept of a ‘social unconscious’ that Althusser accuses
Levi-Strauss of making use of (and thus falling into functionalism) is, of course, a
Durkheimian one (though for Durkheim, this is called a ‘collective consciousness,’ not a
‘social unconscious’). It is certainly something that Levi-Strauss is aware of and builds
his theory out of, but it is also something which Althusser himself is both aware of and, at
times, is also indebted to. I wish to look primarily at this second criticism of Levi-Strauss
and Structuralism (though we will have brief reasons to return to the first problem posed
for Levi-Strauss by Althusser), as it is here that we can best see how Althusser seeks to
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distance himself from it and ultimately gain further insight into how Althusser’s own
project—that of aleatory materialism—attempts to avoid such a problem.
We should begin by looking a bit further at both Levi-Strauss’ and Althusser’s
debt to Durkheim. The Durkheimian concept of a ‘collective consciousness’ is drawn in
distinction from that of individual consciousness and it is this collective consciousness
(or the social consciousness) that is to be studied when seeking an account of social
existence. As Stephen Turner has pointed out, according to Durkheim, “the form of
consciousness is determined by its content, and the content of collective consciousness
differs from the that of individual consciousness.”92 This is to say, that the Durkheimian
model of social analysis rejects the subjective viewpoints of individuals in a given society
as offering a valid account of social life. A proper understanding of social life comes
from the rules and laws that act as unconscious determinants of the forms of
consciousness that individuals in a given society come to have. This conception of social
existence is very influential for both Althusser’s account of the conscious life of
individuals—think here of the theory of interpellation described above, it is the ‘social
consciousness’ and its rules that form the background against which individuals come to
awareness and through which they become recognizable to both themselves and others as
members of a society—and Levi-Strauss’ studies of kinship relations and mythologies, in
which, as Turner shows us, Levi-Strauss “present(s) the view that these collectively
shared practices…must be seen as complex systems of signification, with sets of rules, or
“logics,” of their own, which it is the task of the sociologist and anthropologist to
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decipher.”93 Unlike both Levi-Strauss and Althusser however, Durkheim thought that
deciphering these social ‘logics’ meant coming to understand the underlying causal laws
that formed the relations between individuals, their practices, and the ‘social
consciousness.’ Neither Levi-Strauss, nor Althusser hold this view of the proper mode of
explaining social phenomena. As Turner points out elsewhere:
For Levi-Strauss, the ‘causal law’ explanatory conception is replaced by a very
different view… [For Levi-Strauss] to explain is to discover an order of relations
that turns a set of bits, which have limited significance on their own, into an
intelligible whole. This order may be termed ‘the structure’. It is only when
considered as a whole that the structure is intelligible…94
In other words, looking for causal connections á la Durkheimian approach, misses the
complexity that is truly explanatory of social phenomena (the structure) because it limits
itself to the conceptual apparatus of causality. Rather, one must come to understand the
relations that exist between social phenomena, such as social practices, that form the
structural whole and can explain their existence and role in a given society—So here
causality matters little in scientific explanation- one must first understand relationality.
Something similar could be said about the Althusserian project- Recall our earlier
characterization of consciousness as a ‘relation between relations.’95 For Althusser, like
Levi-Strauss, what matters for proper social explanation is a proper understanding of the
(structural) relations between various practices that make up a social structure. The
Althusserian critique of Levi-Strauss is, as noted above, that Levi-Strauss (and hence
structuralism as a movement) goes wrong when he/it becomes insufficiently aware of the
fact that the ‘structured whole’ that structuralism seeks to describe is not a unified whole
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‘endowed with a conscious existence’ for which the relations that make up a given
structure exist, and which is perpetuated (read- benefits) by these relations (hence the
worry about a kind of functionalism creeping into the account). For this we can return to
Althusser’s Spinoza.
Thinking of the Spinozist conception of consciousness itself as conditioned by the
imaginary relation between itself and that of which it is conscious (and the materialism
which is called into existence by this view, that is the materialism of the conditioning of
mind by the body and the individual body, by that of other bodies which are themselves
connected to all other causes that exist in nature) we can begin to see just how it is that
Althusser’s aleatory materialism is both an anti-humanism and attempts to avoid the more
problematic aspects of structuralism: Though, as we have seen, it posits the conscious
world of the human as a world that results from the coming together of a select grouping
of elements, the elements of the materially existing bodily practices in which we engage
(or rather by which we are engaged and so constituted), it categorically refuses to
attribute a telos—even an immanent one—to the existence of what is. There is no ‘social
subject’ doing the determining or being benefitted by the existence and grouping of a set
of practices for Althusser, the concept of a social subject itself is a historico-ideological
one. We can see this point, and how it relates to his Spinozism by making a detour
through Althusser’s conception of the discipline of history (and his critique of a certain
type of history).
Althusser argues that there are two types (or ‘modes’ in his parlance) of historical
investigation. The first is what he calls “the History of the traditional historians” and it is
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in this category that he places Levi-Strauss’ ethnological research. Those who practice
this type of history:
…Talk about ‘laws’ of history because they consider only the accomplished fact
of past history. History in this case, presents itself as a wholly static object all of
whose determinations can be studied like those of a physical object; it is an object
that is dead because it is past.96
This form of history is one that Althusser terms ideological. It is ideological because it is
unaware that those ‘laws’ that the historian (or ethnologist) discerns in her investigations
and to which she subjects that historical analysis are themselves imposed on her object
(her historical research)—and on her subjective awareness itself—as identifiable laws by
the given conjuncture of which she is a part—they are not the ‘laws’ that the particular
historical object that she studies existed under. They are her ‘laws,’ only discernable in
her time, and resulting from the material substrate that contributes to her conscious
awareness. These ‘laws’ are retroactively read into the history which the historian
investigates and attempts to account for.
To recognize this, is to do a second kind of history according to Althusser, the
kind of history that Althusser terms Geschichte, which as he describes it, “designates not
an accomplished history, but a history in the present [au présent].”97 Those who practice
history au présent recognize that their historical research and its insights is determined by
their own conjuncture—by the historical time and place in which they live and out of
whose material the historian is created (that is, she do not think that she is uncovering
origins or eternal truths—to think this is to remain trapped in Ideology). Further defining
the conditions of a given moment or conjuncture Althusser continues:
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It is necessary to bear in mind that ‘conjuncture’ means ‘conjunction’, that is, an
aleatory encounter of elements—in part, existing elements, but also unforeseeable
elements. Every conjuncture is a singular case, as are all historical individualities,
as is everything that exists.98
One way of making sense of the claims made here about the aleatory nature of a given
conjuncture (and hence the contingent nature of a given ‘historical law’ that is allegedly
discerned by practitioners of the first kind of history, Levi-Strauss included) is to look to
Althusser’s critique of Hegel’s system as in it we see the foundations of the point that is
being made here.99
As Althusser understands it, Hegel’s version of a dialectical history relies on a
conception of historical creation and change as explained by the existence of one ‘simple’
contradiction. For Hegel (according to Althusser) the dialectical motor of history is
contradiction—the contradiction between consciousness’ “sensuous existence and its
knowledge.”100 What drives both the given existence of particular social formations and
their mutation and change is the contradiction that arises between a given individual’s
(and a given culture’s) understanding or self concept and the way that that self concept
plays itself out in that individual’s/culture’s lived expression of that awareness. To put
the point briefly (and perhaps a bit roughly), on Hegel’s conception of history, particular
historical individuals come into the world as members of particular societies that have
particular sets of ideals through which they understand themselves and their world and in
accord with which they seek to define themselves. In the actual putting into practice of
such ideals, these individuals and societies come to understand the real meaning of them
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and it is often the case that there is a contradiction that emerges between the social ideal
that individuals seek to embody and the ideals themselves as they become materialized,
or get lived in that social world.
As noted above, on this reading of Hegel’s account of things, it is usually one
fundamental contradiction that defines and gives body to a given social formation.
Coming to consciousness of that given contradiction is to come to consciousness of the
real meaning of that ideal in its fully objective existence—which is ultimately to change
one’s conscious awareness. This change, then, in turn affects the whole of society as it
attempts to come to terms with the contradiction that it experiences. Althusser cites
Hegel’s understanding of the emergence (and downfall) of Roman society as an example
of this theory:
Rome: its mighty history, its institutions, its crises and ventures, are nothing but
the temporal manifestation of the internal principle of the abstract legal
personality, and then its destruction. Of course, this internal principle contains as
echoes the principle of each of the historical formations it has superseded, but as
echoes of itself—that is why it too has only one centre, the centre of all the past
worlds conserved in its memory; that is why it is simple.101
Hegel reduces a complex history to the existence of one principle, one ‘law’ that
determines and defines all of the complexity. We should recall the claims made in the
first chapter against Cohen’s version of Marxism. The same problem exists for Hegel (on
Althusser’s account)—the analysis yields a simple teleological principle, which defines
the origin and the end and presents itself as a necessary development. Again we
encounter an idealism (an ideology). This idealism, however, is one that is conditioned by
a misrecognition of historical analysis, it is a doing of history that thinks it is identifying
objective explanatory historical tendencies and structures but is in fact, only identifying
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history as it is in the present, or was, in Hegel’s present, at his conjuncture, from within
his given historical moment. A moment in which the identification of the ‘simple’
principle of development and change (the abstract legal persona) was identified (and
identifiable) and retro-actively posited as the guiding principle of historical creation and
change. In other words, the mistake that Hegel makes here is the same mistake that the
Humanist Marxists make in reading the early Marx and the late Marx as offering the
same theoretical position: they (both Hegel and the humanist Marxists) stand at the end of
a particular historical development and read the end back into the beginning, retroactively
conferring a unified development from origin to end on a subject that does not in itself
have such a teleological principle.
On an Althusserian account of things, Hegel’s given conjuncture (or the given
conjuncture of the humanist Marxists), as is the case with any given conjuncture, and the
‘law’ that becomes identifiable within it, however, was/is itself overdetermined by a
number of factors that are not reducible to a simple principle or a simple contradiction,
rather as Althusser argues, a given conjuncture is made up of a, “vast accumulation of
contradictions…some of which are radically heterogeneous—of different origins,
different sense, different levels and points of application—but nevertheless merge into a
ruptural unity” and form the background conceptual/material apparatus that the historian
uses to make sense of the past. 102 Furthermore, to read the problematic of a given
conjuncture back into a past conjuncture is to mis-recognize the heterogeneity of
contradictions that exist at any given time, the radical contingency of the particular
combination of elements that come together to make up a given conjuncture, and the
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discontinuous and ruptural nature of historical development itself. This is also the
problem that exits for a Levi-Straussian, and more generally, a structuralist, account of
social phenomena—in making such claims, Levi-Strauss runs the risk of retroactively
positing an objective and a-historical ‘law’ of social organization, one that becomes
identifiable as a ‘law’ in his own conjuncture, namely the ‘law’ of ‘structure’ to exist and
determine the social space, and one that comes to have the status of a kind of nonhistorical scientific ‘truth.’
As noted earlier, Althusser gave a year long seminar on structuralism in 1961-62.
Out of it came Pierre Macherey's first publication, a piece on Canguilhem's philosophy of
Science called “Georges Canguilhem’s Philosophy of Science: Epistemology and the
History of Science.”103 Althusser wrote a short forward to it for its publication. Why this
is important is that in the piece, Macherey makes the same argument (via Canguilhem)
about contemporary views of the history of science that Althusser makes above in
relation to history more generally: that they always see a telos retrospectively in the
'progress' of the sciences, that this ultimately comes from a present view implanting the
progressive story in the history- Macherey here cites Canguilhem's study of the concept
of 'reflex' wherein Canguilhem debunks the claims by historians of science that Descartes
had a theory of the reflex that was later worked out by the progress of the sciences (the
progress of reason). Rather the basic claim is that this (and other scientific concepts) are
invested with ideological components (think again here of Bachelard's web of beliefs)
and through (proper) scientific practice they become disburdened of their (conjunctural)
ideological components- but this process radically changes the content of the concepts
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themselves such that they come to have radically different content (so- the concept of
'reflex' in Descartes is not the same as the concept of 'reflex' in the biological sciences of
the late 1950s early 1960s in Canguilhem's example, but we fail to see this from our
perspective). Once generated, these 'new' concepts become ideologically (and materially)
invested with contemporary-conjunctural ideological components (hence the problems
with the histories that are written of the sciences- we tend to apply our ideologically
invested concepts to those that existed in the past and see continuity wherein there is
none if we look carefully). How do these arguments help us in making sense of the
grounds upon which Althusser attempts to distance himself from structuralism? In his
introduction to the original publication of Macherey’s paper Althusser writes that
Canguilhem’s work (as interpreted by Macherey) show us:
… A new [conception] of history, which above all, abandons the old idealist
schema of a continuous mechanistic or dialectical progress, without breaks,
paradoxes, set backs, or leaps forward. [Here] a new history appears: that of the
becoming of reason which is scientific but is stripped of this reassuring idealistic
simplicity, which just as kindness is never forgotten but always finds its reward,
ensured that a scientific question never remains without a response, but always
finds its response. Reality has a little more imagination: there are imaginary
responses which leave the real problems they evade without a true response, there
are sciences which are called sciences and are only the scientific imposture of a
social ideology.104
Both Macherey’s paper and Althusser’s comments in his introduction to the paper
coupled with his view of the discipline of history more generally show the "method" that
Althusser and his students were attempting to employ at this time, and it is in the method
that we can see the critique. If we think back to the Spinozist/Bachelardian (and now
Canguilhemian/Machereyan) claims that science (properly practiced) gets us to realize
that all knowledge is provisional at best, never complete or completely static/accurate,
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that is always harbors some ideological components and is always tied to its times (its
conjuncture) and the material available to it- to believe otherwise is to fall into ideology,
then those that practice structuralism without this critical/scientific awareness remain
trapped in structuralist ideology- the concept of structure now serves as the ideological
concept that explains the existence of social phenomena. When Althusser critiques LeviStrauss, he accuses him of misunderstanding the concept of ideology at same time that he
makes the arguments cited above.105 It is this that he is worried about when Althusser
makes this accusation, that 'structure' is supposed to explain the existence of ideology
(conceived of as kinship relations and the like) for Levi-Strauss but the concept of
structure is itself ideologically invested in the current conjuncture and remains (at least in
Althusser's time) immune to proper scientific awareness.
For Althusser, as we can now begin to see, in any given conjuncture, there is
simply what is, the particular conjectural set of social relations that come together at a
particular time and out of which a particular lebenswelt is born. Here he returns to
Spinoza and writes:
Now I thought that Spinoza could consider every singularity, including that which
took place in the lebenswelt of the imagination, as universal singular
individuality, As a case, almost in the sense in which the Wittgenstein of the
Tractatus writes, “Die Welt ist alles was der Fall ist,” an untranslatable sentence,
but one that more or less means “the world is everything that is the case.” What is
the case if not that which comes to pass, if not purely and simply that which
“befalls,” as if by accident, that is, without origin or end? That which befalls in
existence and in being, in the world constituted by similar “falls,” by similar
“cases,” to infinity.106
Recall again the claims that we made above in relation to Spinoza, (in relation to
Althusser’s ‘heretical’ reading of Spinoza): For Spinoza, what is, is as it is as a result of
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the causes that bring that which is into existence. These causes are not teleological, that
is, they are not the result of an intentionality which attempts to achieve goals—they are
mechanistic/naturalistic causes. Our minds (our imaginary relationship to our world) are
caused to be as they are by our material bodily relations, which are themselves connected
to other bodies which are themselves connected to this larger mechanistic causality with
all of its aleatory contributions to our existence both as individuals and as societies. We
might say here—sketchily—that Althusser’s aleatory materialism is then an attempt, as
he says, to think the radical contingency of necessity in that what it strives to do is remain
open to the non-necessity of facts and particular theoretical enterprises in the sciences for
understanding social phenomena (in a Bachelardian/Spinozist sense)- that is not get stuck
in traditional philosophy (by rejecting both origins and ends) while at the same time
admitting that there are certain ‘necessary’ features of a given particular social formation
that make up its quasi-universal nature. These necessary features are made up of the
multitude of material practices that condition the ideological awareness of those living in
that social formation.
This universality, however, is singular in the sense that it arrives on the scene as a
singular result of the contingent and aleatory nature of the particular combination of
elements (practices) that combine at that time (thus it is a ‘case’ in the sense alluded to
above). This ‘universality’ moreover, is not one ‘concrete universal’ in the Hegelian
sense of the term, that makes up a part of a larger process unfolding in history, it is
completely and utterly singular in its contingent nature and further, this universality is
itself only existent in the elements that make it up (and the elements themselves are what
they are as a result of the same contingency). That is, it has no existence of its own, it
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emerges, as we do, en medias res. It is here, however, that Althusser backs himself into a
corner. The distinction that he wants to maintain between science and ideology collapses
under the weight of his theorization of the nature of science itself- if all science or
scientific ‘truth’ is conjunctural and historical, then it seems that we have a simple
relativism, we have no way of pulling the non-ideological true from the ideological and
holding it apart in such a way as to overcome the ideological. As Althusser himself
argues:
…We know that there is no pure theoretical practice, no perfectly transparent
science which throughout history as a science will always be preserved, by I know
not what Grace, from the taints of idealism, that is, of the ideologies which
besiege it; we know that ‘pure’ science only exists on condition that it continually
frees itself from the ideology which occupies it, haunts it, or lies in wait for it.
The inevitable price of this purification and liberation is a continuous struggle
with ideology itself, that is, against idealism…107
Now that we see the problem that arises for Althusser, we can in the next Chapter,
turn to the thought of Alain Badiou and begin to look at the ways in which Badiou’s
theory emerges out of Althusser’s and attempts to offer a solution to the problem we are
left with in relation to it.
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Chapter 3: Badiou’s Materialist Project: Stasis and Change

As noted in the introduction to this project, what I hope to do here is to show how
it is that both Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek share a theoretical debt to Althusser while at
the same time attempt to overcome the impasse left in the Althusser’s theoretics. This
chapter begins that project in relation to the thought of Alain Badiou. It is certainly well
known that Badiou’s thought is indebted to Althusser.108 This chapter gives a brief
overview of Badiou’s materialist thought, and its relation to Althusser, echoing some of
what has already been pointed out by others but also taking issue with what some have
said. The chapter that follows this one will then move to a discussion of the details of
Badiou’s attempt at a solution to the problems of Althusser’s theory as identified in
chapter two and it will, most importantly, assess the success of Badiou’s method of
correcting Althusser’s theory in the construction of his own.
Badiou, like Althusser, remains steadfastly committed to a certain type of
Marxism, one that asserts that radical change is not only possible, but is in at least in one
sense, inevitable. This inevitability is not, however, akin to the vulgar Marxist notion of a
necessary evolution through capitalism ending in communism, rather, for Badiou, radical

108

See for example, Peter Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth (Minneapolis and London: University of
Minnesota Press, 2003), Jason Barker, Alain Badiou: A Critical Introduction (London: Pluto Press, 2002)
and Adrian Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology: A Trabscendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 2008). Each of these books devotes some discussion to connections
between Althusser and these thinkers. We will have ample time to engage with each of these books on this
topic in what follows.

69

change is inevitable because it is simply something that happens, the idea that a given
historical moment, or conjuncture, could give way to a kind of eternal stasis, or put an
end to history is flatly false according to Badiou. Large-scale change has happened in the
past, and will happen again.
Furthermore, for Badiou, modification is not true change; it is instead a way for a
given social order to stave off real change and perpetuate itself in its attempts to assert a
false (ideologically driven) eternal stasis. For Badiou, change is not something that
happens slowly and gradually, it happens as a result of a quick and revolutionary shift in
which the existing order is destabilized and ultimately toppled. Thus, as Adrian Johnston
has nicely put the point, for Badiou, our worlds have two temporalities, one which can be
characterized as relatively static, in which nothing really changes and one in which there
is a rapid fire change that results from what Badiou characterizes as an ‘event.’109
The event, for Badiou, is something which emerges out of a given ‘situation’—
Badiou’s term for a state of affairs or a given historical moment that is relatively static—
and has the effect of making the static temporal mode which always appears as stable,
natural, and necessary to those living in it, exhibit its normally hidden fragile instability.
By shining a light on the unstable nature of the static temporality; the event paves the
way for a change that inserts a break (we can think here of a break in the Bachelardian
sense) or a rupture with a given temporal moment. The event itself, however, is not
enough. Events require the recognition of their evental status by individuals who
experience them in such a way as to be affected by their appearance and become the
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event’s ‘subjects.’ These evental subjects work to sustain the ‘truth’ that the event brings
to light.
One of Badiou’s examples of such an event and the subject who arises in its wake,
helping to usher in the change that is announced by the event, is the conversion of Saint
Paul. Briefly, Badiou argues that Saint Paul becomes a Christian in becoming a ‘subject’
of the event that befell him on the road to Damascus. It is only as a result of this that Paul
becomes Saint Paul. As Badiou describes it, Paul becomes the ‘subject’ of this event and
declares his fidelity to its truth (the resurrection and the Christian belief in the equality of
all before God); a truth which he passively receives and which occurs within the
‘situation’ that existed at the time (a situation in which this particular truth was not
existent). The event exceeds the situation in which it arises because for Paul (and
subsequently, his followers) it effectively emptied—or ‘voided—that historical moment
of its prior organization and all of the existing different identities and social organizations
based on them. For Paul and his followers, no longer were there Jews, Greeks, Romans,
Christians, and other identitarian categories; there were simply, only, and universally
God’s subjects.110
As a result of this event, and the work of those that became its subjects, the social
world was irrevocably changed, and was so in a radical (and quick way). For Badiou
(who is a committed atheist) it matters little that this was a theological transformation.
What matters is this example’s exhibition of the power of the event. As Badiou theorizes
it, Paul’s conversion shows us the difference in the two temporalities, the unchanging
relatively static world that Paul found himself in prior to the event, in which there existed
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many differences that were conditioned by the existing historical situation and the quick,
revolutionary change that follows on the heels of that event, in which those differences
no longer make sense (at least for those who became the event’s subjects).
As noted above, the affirmation of such an evental ‘truth’ will depend on those
who are subjected to it by experiencing the ‘event’ that reveals it. Events and their truths
cannot be guaranteed, justified, provoked, or proven based on anything about a given
historical situation as it is prior to an event’s happening. In other words, events are
ephemera, but what they reveal is not. Before the event, our knowledge and experience of
the world (and of ourselves) is the product of the historically contingent order, structures,
and differences that exist at any given time within which there is really no universality. It
is only in the revelation provided by the ‘event’ that one is able to see the historically
contingent nature of one’s existence and modes of knowing the world (which is part of
the universal truth that such events reveal). Thus, as Badiou points out, “to enter into the
composition of a subject of truth can only be something that happens to you.”111 The
recognition of universality can only, on Badiou’s accounting of things, come through the
passive reception of the event itself. Thus, as is the case for Althusser, Badiou conceives
of change as depending not on the activity of individuals working within a given situation
seeking change, but rather, on the aleatory, or the chance occurrence of an event which
then can reorient individuals to become the agents of such change.112

111

Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil trans. Peter Hallward (New York and London,
Verso, 2001). 51
112
Bruno Bosteels has gone as far as to suggest that Althusser’s theory of the aleatory is itself influenced
by Badiou’s own grappling with the question of the possibility of change. See. Bruno Bosteels and Alain
Badiou, “Can Change Be Thought? A Dialogue with Alain Badiou” in Alain Badiou: Philosophy and its
Conditions, edited by Gabriel Riera (New York: SUNY Press, 2005), 237-262. While Badiou does not deny
this claim, I think it is impossible to be sure of the directionality of influence in particular cases such as

72

In order to properly understand this we will have to understand the status of the
“event” (which convokes, or brings to light shared and universal truth), what Badiou
means by ‘truth,’ and the status of the “subject” of the truth that is founded in the event.
To make sense of these all-important components of Badiou’s thought, however, more
needs to be said about the ‘two temporalities’ (stasis and change) that are the backbone of
Badiou’s thought and the materialist grounding and implications of this theory.

Section One
Setting aside for a moment, any discussion about what constitutes such an ‘event’—
as we will return to this later—and instead concentrating on the claim that events “void”
the existing differences between people (and things) we can begin to see that, according
to Badiou, any particular existing organization of things in the world is not eternal, stable,
or ultimately necessary, but rather something which is of contingent historical origin.
This goes for any of the various ways objects in the world are carved up and cataloged by
our systems of knowledge and is also true of human awareness and social organization
(political and otherwise). Those things that count as beings, on Badiou’s account of
things, are as they are as a result of an operation he describes in the beginning of 1988’s
Being and Event as the count-as-one.113
Badiou writes, “what has to be declared is that the one, which is not, solely exists as
an operation, in other words, there is no one, only the count-as-one.”114 Being in-itself
(what Badiou terms ‘being-qua-being’) is not a one, or a whole, but rather an infinite—
this, especially since Althusser is not around to be asked. I would rather just point out the shared theoretical
point that exists here.
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or incomplete—multiplicity that comes to be structured (made to appear complete) by a
particular operation of counting-for-one that produces a ‘situation’ in which being
presents itself as containing a multiplicity of structured ones. In this process, being’s
foundational and fundamental incompleteness is, according to Badiou, subtracted from
that which is presented in the situation. That is, what is covered over—subtracted—in
presentation is the fundamental lack-of-completion of being.
Badiou argues, moreover, that a given multiple itself only comes to be legible as
multiple (as a ‘one’ that is but a single multiple in a consistent multiplicity of ones) in
presentation (in being made consistent so as to become legible by the operation that
counts the multiple as one). Summarizing this, Badiou claims:
…The multiple is the regime of presentation; the one, in respect to presentation is
an operational result, being is what presents (itself). On this basis, being is neither
one (because only presentation itself is pertinent to the count as one) nor multiple
(because the multiple is solely the regime of presentation).115
To understand ontology, according to Badiou, is to think the foundational
inconsistent/incomplete multiplicity in-itself; outside of any counting operation that
makes such a multiplicity a structured, consistent multiplicity of ones. In order to do this,
that is, to think being’s incompleteness, we must come to understand the counting
operation and the ways in which the situation (which, as we have seen, is what results
from the count) is structured so as to both present itself as a totality of structured ones
and contain (a hidden) incompleteness. In Being and Event, Badiou turns to mathematics,
and more specifically, to Cantorian set theory as a means by which to think such an
ontology of being in which we are able to discern the non-existence of the whole, and the
twin processes which create the one, namely the process of the count-as-one, and the
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subtraction of being’s incompleteness (its inconsistency). In the next section I will give a
brief account of the portions of Cantor’s mathematical theorization that are important for
Badiou.

Section Two
According to Cantor, a well-ordered set of numbers is a set in which, for every
number that is a member of that set, there is a new number that is ordinally related to that
number insofar as it is the successor of the original number. This is commonly known as
the theory of ordinals and can be demonstrated most basically in relation to the natural
numbers, which are themselves ordinals. For every natural number (and for the set of all
natural numbers), there is a number, which is ordinally related to that number such that it
follows the original number in succession (the number 2 is ordinally related to 1, and 3 is
ordinally related to 2, etc.). The theory of ordinals applies, according to Cantor, both to
finite numbers, like the natural numbers, and to what he calls ‘transfinite numbers’ or
ever increasing infinite sets of numbers. In this way, there is no one set or collection
which can/does collect together all ordinals into a closed whole. That is, there is not one
infinite set containing all possible ordinals, but rather, there are multiple ‘transfinite’ sets
of ordinals (which are themselves ordered in relation to one another).
Cantor argues for the existence of transfinite sets of numbers, in part by referring
back to the point we have already seen, that sets of numbers can be ordinals in the same
way that a single numbers can be ordinally related to one another. Given this, we can see
how one can have a set of all the natural numbers (an infinite set) which can itself be an
ordinal in relation to the set of all the natural numbers plus one, and that set can be
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ordinally related to a greater set and so on. Hence one can suppose the existence of
multiple infinite sets, or transfinite ordinals as Cantor himself argues:
…The smallest transfinite ordinal number, which I denote ω, belongs [to the
transfinite], for it can be increased, enlarged to the next greater ordinal number
ω+1, this again to ω+2, and so on. But the smallest actually infinite power or
cardinal number is also transfinite, and the same holds of the next greater cardinal
number and so on.116
The smallest of the transfinite ordinals (Cantor’s ω) is the set that contains all of the finite
numbers (the natural numbers and their fractions), commonly denoted as א0. Cantor
proved that this set is smaller than the set of the so-called ‘Real numbers’ (the set
containing both the finite numbers and the ‘irrational’ and ‘transcendental’ numbers) so
here we have two distinct infinite sets of differing sizes. Further, Cantor famously goes
on to prove that the infinite set containing the real numbers is equivalent to 2א0 (That is, it
is the power set of א0).
Once proving this, Cantor asks whether the 2א0 is equivalent to the transfinite
number that is denoted by א1 (or ω+1 in Cantor’s own notation), which would then make
it the transfinite ordinal that is the immediate successor to א0. This is the content of the
Continuum Hypothesis, and if the Continuum Hypothesis were to be proved true, then
א1—the transfinite ordinal that follows א0—would be equivalent to 2א0, which would then
in turn mean that א2 would be equivalent to 22א1, and so forth. The proof (or disproof) of
the truth of Continuum Hypothesis has major implications beyond the realm of
mathematics and set theory as Peter Hallward points out:
[The Continuum Hypothesis]… Asserts an orderly, well-defined relation between
the conventional measuring system of mathematics (the numerical hierarchy of
alephs) and the real numbers of physical science. If this Continuum Hypothesis
116
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were true, not only would there be (pace Bergson) a precise, measurable link
between physical continuity and number, but everything within the transfinite
universe could be thought of as in its appropriate place, as occupying degrees in a
clearly ordered hierarchy… On the other hand, if CH cannot be proved, there is at
least one infinite number, 2א0, that cannot be assigned a definite place in the
cumulative hierarchy. Looking at the equation from the other way around, if CH is
not true, the smallest infinite power set (2א0) is a kind of pure immeasurable excess
over the set א0 itself. A universe that denies CH would thus accept a degree of
ontological anarchy. It would tolerate the existence of sets that could not be
assigned any clear place in an order that would include them.117
As is well known, though the Continuum Hypothesis has neither been proven true nor
false, P.J. Cohen has shown its independence from the axioms of set theory and this, for
many—including Badiou—, is tantamount to a proof of its falsehood.118 For Badiou, the
philosophical take-away from this is that being is not closed- there is no foundational
consistent whole (this is the meaning of the Badiouan claim that ‘the one is not’). Further,
because being as it presents itself to us, is such that it appears well-ordered (and
complete), presentation itself must also contain that which is inconsistent (not wellordered). Without the formalism of the set theoretical matheme outlined above, Badiou
argues that:
…The inconsistent multiple is unthinkable as such… the inconsistent multiple is
solely—before the one-effect in which it is structured—an ungraspable horizon of
being…the pure multiple scarcely occurs in presentation before it has already
dissipated; its non-occurance is like a flight of scenes from a dream.119
In appearance, the inconsistent multiple is barred from showing itself. Being, as
presented to us—as in-situation—, is always-already structured by the count-as-one
operation. This is why being as such (being-qua-being) is unthinkable without the aid of
set theory. The mathematical formalism of set theory allows us to think the ontological
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position of inconsistent multiplicity, and thus to think the incompleteness of being from
within a situation in which such inconsistency (and its attendant incompleteness) inexists. Badiou continues:
…Since everything [in a given situation] is counted, yet given that the one of the
count, obliged to be the result, leaves a phantom remainder—of the multiple not
being in the form of the one—one has to allow that inside the situation the pure or
inconsistent multiple is both excluded from everything, and thus from presentation
itself, and included, in the name of what ‘would be’ the presentation itself, the
presentation ‘in itself’, if what the law does not authorize to think was thinkable:
that the one is not, that the being of consistency is inconsistency120
That which is presented as consistent—and hence becomes a multiplicity of ones that are
legible in a given situation—is made possible only by the law of the count, which in
covering over the remaining inconsistency, makes it into something, namely that which is
nothing (or no-thing) in a given situation:
Once the entirety of a situation is subject to the law of the one and consistency, it is
necessary from the standpoint of immanence to the situation, that the pure multiple,
absolutely unpresentable according to the count, be nothing. But being-nothing is as
distinct from not being as the ‘there is’ is distinct from being.121
Badiou’s name for this particular nothingness that exists, that has a place in a given
situation (after the act of the counting operation), but does so as subtracted from view in
presentation, is the ‘Void.’ In discussing the place of the void in Badiou’s work, we
should be careful to point out here, along with Sam Gillespie, that the void is not be seen
as “a physically existing vacuum, or a lack, or a wound at the center of experience. It is
simply Badiou’s name for what is subtracted from presentation. And since nothing
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preexists presentation…the inconsistent un-presented of any situation is named the
void.”122
Gillespie is correct in drawing a distinction between the pure multiple, who’s status
we can think mathematically as a result of Cantorian set theory (and developments in
relation to this), and the ‘Void,’ which for Badiou is the name for that which comes-to-be
as a result of the counting operation and the resultant situation, but who’s being is that of
the nothing (or the subtracted), which, though distinct from the pure multiple, we also are
able to think with the help of the matheme.123 The theory of the void is central for
Badiou’s conception of change. In order to properly see this, we must first say more
about the nature and status of Badiou’s conception of the ‘situation’ as the (seemingly)
static mode of temporality in which the void inheres.

Section Three
We have already seen how it is that, according to Badiou, beings are counted-as-one
(or have the kind of existence that they have) in the particular ways that they are as a
result of their being a part of a ‘situation.’ Badiou defines a ‘situation’ as a “presented
multiplicity” and he goes on to explain that a situation is “the place of taking place” of
being as presented at a given time.124 There are, according to Badiou, many different
situations and each one “admits of its own particular operator of the count-as-one.”125
The “operator” is termed by Badiou the ‘structure’ of the situation. It is the structure of
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the situation that determines how things are counted-as-one and thus, how things show up
as presented multiples:
When anything is counted-as-one in a situation all this means is that it belongs to
the situation in the mode particular to the effects of the situation’s structure… One
must not forget that every situation is structured. The multiple is retroactively
legible therein as anterior to the one, insofar as the count-as-one is always a
result.126
In 2006’s Logics of Worlds Badiou further elaborates the concept of a ‘situation,’
which he now terms ‘world.’127 Just as there are multiple situations, there are multiple
worlds defined by their particular structures which count-as-one various objects that
belong to those worlds. The key innovation in Logics of Worlds for our purposes is
Badiou’s elaboration of the ‘transcendental’ nature of a (given or local) world’s structure.
Understanding this can both help us further make sense of Badiou’s (remaining) debt to
Althusser and his own brand of materialism.
“Every world” argues Badiou, “contains a transcendental organization”—or a
structure in the parlance of Being and Event—but this organization is not to be confused
with the Kantian version of transcendence, which relies on a subjective constitution of the
existence of what is.128 Rather, for Badiou:
The transcendental…is altogether anterior to every subjective constitution for it is
an eminent given of any situation whatsoever…it is what imposes on every
situated multiplicity the constraint of a logic, which is also the law of its
appearing, or a rule in accordance with which the ‘there’ of the being-there allows
the multiple to come forth as essentially bound.129
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It is the transcendental organization that imposes a structure, or a ‘logic,’ on Being and
beings such that they come to have the status that they do. As we will see, this
transcendental is for Badiou, the non-ideal material structure within which, even we as
beings, come to awareness of ourselves and our world. It is material insofar as it is not
imposed on the world by consciousness but rather, one’s conscious awareness is the
product of the ways that the transcendental organizes and categorizes the world in which
individuals find themselves.
Returning to the concept of a world (a situation) then, Badiou argues that we
should understand this in terms of a “metaphor for the localization of multiples.”130 A
world is the non-empty place within which multiples come to be legible insofar as they
are counted-as-one by the particular logic that structures the count (the transcendental).
The way in which the transcendental counts-as-one various multiples, and thus brings
them to consistency allowing for their appearance is through a process (an operation) of
defining the identity of a given multiple in relation to other multiples that appear inworld. The transcendental is then, the operation, which identifies the ways in which
particular multiples are identical to, and differ from other multiples that come to consist
(and hence to appear) in a given world. Here Badiou writes:
…We will call ‘appearing’ that which, of a mathematical multiple, is caught in a
situated relational network (a world), such that this multiple comes to being-there,
or to the status of being in a world [étant-dans-un-monde]. It is then possible to
say that this being is more or less different from another being belonging to the
same world. We will call ‘transcendental’ the operational set which allows us to
make sense of the ‘more or less’ of identities and differences in a determinate
world.131
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The transcendental of a given world is then, the operational set which, as Badiou says,
“pronounces upon” or fixes the “degrees of identity and difference” that exist between
multiples, and in doing so, makes them come to consist with one another in
appearance.132
We might think of how the world of the university defines the ways that people
and things show up as members of its world. It does so through the defining of the
‘degrees of identity and difference’ between them. The various roles that individuals
fulfill in the structure of the university, i.e., from the most general categories of student,
faculty, staff, classroom, lab, library, dormitory, etc., to more fine-grained categories of
identity and difference. The differences that exist in a student population between
undergraduate and graduate, for instance, or between various ranks amongst faculty
(assistant professor, professor, adjunct faculty and so forth) define the world of the
university and these differences do so by way of constructing categories that identify and
define the various positions that individuals and things can inhabit within the world of the
university (through an operational process of defining the ways in which things are ‘more
or less’ identical) such that they come to appear—to be consistent members of its world.
What matters in appearing, in the ‘fixing’ of the multiple such that it can appear
consistently, is the operation—or the set of operations—which defines the ways that it is
possible for the multiple to appear. The multiple itself does not enter into the process of
its being defined in its being-there; its appearance is the result of this process. Thus, it is
the operation that does this work and the operation is the a-subjective structure that
emerges in the relations that come to be defined between objects, which then in turn
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defines the existence of those multiples that are presented in a given world. This is
important as it returns us to the materialist theme.
As we have seen, a ‘local’ world and those objects (or multiples) which come to
inhabit it is defined by its transcendental, or the structure of the count which marks out
the set of identities and differences that exist within it and which constructs the beingthere of the beings that exist within it. It is in this way that the world makes consistent the
multiples that come to be legible as such. Here Badiou argues:
It is therefore clear in what sense we call transcendental that which authorizes the
local (or intra-worldly) evaluation of identities and differences. To grasp the
singularity of this usage of the word ‘transcendental’, we should note that as in
Kant, it concerns a question of possibility; but also that we are only dealing with
local dispositions, and not with a theory of universal difference. To put it very
simply: there are many transcendentals; the intra-worldly regulation of difference
is itself differentiated. This is one of the main reasons why it is impossible to
argue from a unified ‘centre’ of transcendental organization, such as the Subject is
for Kant.133
In the example of the university-world given above, those individuals who appear
as members of this world, do so only insofar as they are subjected to the operations which
define the categories that they may come to inhabit and so appear within the situation.
This is true for the objects that exist in this world and for the humans that exist in the
world. It is the structure or the logic, that is defined by the set of operations, which as we
have seen, construct the categories that people may come to inhabit (through a process of
relational differentiation) that allows for a person’s appearance in that world. The
individual human plays no role in the construction of this world except insofar as she, if
she comes to appear in the world of the university, is defined by it; by the set of
transcendental ordering operations that define the places that the individual can inhabit.
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The world of the university pre-exists my coming to inhabit it, and if I do come to inhabit
it, I do so in the ways prescribed by the logic of the structure. Of course, if I am a being
that inhabits the world of the university, it is never only this that sets the terms of my
identity. I can, and do, inhabit multiple worlds as do many other ‘objects’ as Badiou
points out:
It goes without saying after all, that a being… can appear in different worlds. It
would be absurd to think that there is an intrinsic link between a given multiple
and a given world. The ‘worlding’ of a formal being, which is its being-there or
appearing, is ultimately a logical operation: the access to a local guarantee of its
identity. This operation may be produced in numerous different ways, and it may
imply entirely distinct worlds as the grounds for the further operations it elicits. In
particular, man is the animal that appears in a great number of worlds.
Empirically, we could even say that it is nothing but this: the being which, among
all those whose being we acknowledge, appears most multiply. 134
Badiou takes this as further evidence for his claims about the human’s lack of ability to
be the ‘centre’ from which the transcendental organization of a world emanates. Pace
Althusser’s theory of interpellation, I do not construct the categories that I come to
inhabit, I am inhabited by them such that I come to understand myself in the particular
ways that are defined by their particular logics. Further, since I am a being who can be
‘worlded’ (or interpellated) multiply, I simply cannot be the agent of this process, I am
that which is acted on by it in different ways, at different times, in different situations (to
shift back to the language of Being and Event). Hence, in my being ‘worlded’ by a
particular materially existent logic, I am not a subject. My ‘selfhood’ has the character
and status of that which comes from the logic of the world (and its process of relational
differentiation). This is one place in which Badiou breaks with Althusser. Recall that for
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Althusser, I become a subject by being subjected to the interpellative process. Badiou is
unwilling to call the human as worlded (or interpellated) a ‘subject.’135
It is in this way that, according to Badiou, my “worlded” self is materially, an
‘other-self’ or an object-self. It is an ‘other-self insofar as the selfhood that I find myself
with is defined not by me or my choices, but by those things which present themselves to
me as possible choices to make (where there are such choices), ways to be, or identities to
inhabit which have their existence in something other than me, namely the material of the
world and the transcendental logic that structures it. This self is an object self insofar as I
am presented in this world (both to myself and others) in the same way as all other
objects are, again as determined by the law of the count and the transcendental structure
that defines the worldhood of the particular world in which I find myself. In other words,
who I am as a being in-situation (or a being that is ‘worlded’), is a being whose
‘identity’—whose own being—is defined in its being by its being differentiated from and
related to other multiples—by ‘being-other’ than those multiples to varying degrees—by
the structural logic of the count. As Badiou puts the point: “…a ‘real’ being is the one
which, appearing locally (in a world), is at the same time its own multiple-identity—as
thought by rational ontology—and the various degrees of its difference from other beings
in the same world.”136
We are firmly in the realm of Althusserian anti-humanism here, but this account
of the structure of social existence is also akin to the one given by Levi-Strauss and
structuralism. What is important, for Badiou, in making sense of how things appear in a
given world, is not the things themselves (or the conscious awareness of those humans
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that show up in particular ways in a given world) but the relations between those things
and people that are presented in a world, and said relations are defined, as we have seen,
by the logic or the law of the count, which is itself non-ideal. In this way, Badiou fully
endorses a structuralist account of the worldhood of a given world (or situation). We will
return this in detail in the next chapter but I bring it up here in order to return to the
question that began this section of the chapter, namely the question of the defining of the
static mode of temporality.
Worlds are that which ground this mode of temporality. Everything that appears,
or is presented in a world is in its ‘proper’ place and is determined to be the way it is by
the place that it inhabits. In this way, beings in a given world are fixed and relatively
static. Again we can return to my example of the world of the university in order to make
sense of this. The categories marked out by the world of the university are themselves
relatively static. It is true that over long periods of time, the world of the university
changes shape slightly, but it never does so in a radical and quick way.137 The basic
categories that are available to be inhabited by various beings are fixed not by the beings
that inhabit them, but by their relations to other categories and only shift and change
insofar as the other categories shift and change (which is itself a long slow process, and
hence, on Badiou’s account, not really change at all). I now would like to turn to a brief
discussion of the other mode of temporality that Badiou defines- the mode of change, in
which a given world (and its attendant static temporality) gives way to a new existence.
137
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Section Four
We know, from the foregoing, that Badiou’s understanding of ontology is such
that change is made possible by the foundational lack of closure in existence. The failure
to prove the truth of the Continuum Hypothesis (or, its having been proved independent
from the axioms of set theory at least), for Badiou, guarantees this claim. There is, in
existence, as Hallward puts the point in the quote cited earlier “a degree of ontological
anarchy.”138 It is, on Badiou’s account, this that is the foundation for the possibility of the
overcoming of the static and unchanging temporality that attends the existence of a given
world. Badiou argues, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, that it is in the moment of
an ‘event’ that this bit of anarchy appears in a given world and disrupts its stasis. The
event, does not, however reveal the inconsistent multiple as such (or being-qua-being) as
this is never revealed, we only access it through the formalism of mathematical ontology.
Rather what appears in the moment of the event is the ‘void’ of a given world, that
particular bit of being that exists as ‘the’ nothing as determined by a given logic or
structure, and as such is subtracted from the everyday quotidian experience of that given
world. The appearance of this void then acts to destabilize the logic or the structure of the
world insofar as it disrupts the relations amongst the beings that are presented in that
world and displays the lack of closure and hence the lack of the necessity of that
particular existing relational logic.
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We might, in order to make sense of this, return to thinking about the nature of
being as it appears in-situation (in a world). Specifically, we should look again at the
being-there of humans in a given world. As we already noted, the being-there of the
human in a given world is defined by the relations that exist between that particular
human and other beings that are counted-as-one by the law of the count. We described,
along with Badiou, the nature of this being as ‘being-other.’ This means, as we saw that
the worlded self is such that it gets its identity through its being marked as something
‘other’ than this or that being (again, it is the relations of identity and difference that
matter here).
There is, however, a further (and important) lesson to be drawn from this
according to Badiou. Namely, that in my being ‘worlded’ by a particular logic or
structure, I am a being who, in appearance or in presentation (both to myself and to
others), is split. Not only do I become an ‘other-self’ in the ways described above, but I
also become something ‘other’ than what I am outside of the structural logic of that
particular world, or what I would be outside the law of the particular world in which I
find myself and to which my experience of myself is bound as Badiou notes:
The key to thinking appearing, when it comes to a singular being, lies in being
able to determine, at one and the same time, the self-difference which makes it so
being-there is not being-qua-being, and the difference from others which makes it
so that being there, or the law of the world which is shared by these others, does
not abolish being-qua-being.139
Though it is the case that the law of the world is what defines my identity ‘inworld,’ this does not, as Badiou claims above, ‘abolish’ being-qua-being in my own case,
and in the case of other beings found in a given world. In the case of individual humans

139

Badiou, Logics of Worlds. 117

88

we can say (or speculate) that a human as being-qua-being is something other than a
human as encountered in a given world. Recall that, as we also noted above, according to
Badiou, humans are beings who have the possibility of being worlded in many different
ways. Again, this brings us up against the claim that, as a human, I am fundamentally
split in my being worlded. I am, in a given world identified by the law of that world, but I
am not coextensive with that identification (though it appears to me and to others that I
am). The fact that I can be worlded in other ways by other transcendentals allows me to
think (theoretically) the incompleteness of being in-world though I am unable to glimpse
this incompleteness as it has been subtracted from view by the logic of the
transcendental. It is only in the space of the event that this is revealed to me.
The event has the power to show me that the identity(s) that I find myself with
(and those that others find themselves with) are non-necessary, derivative, and ultimately
unstable. That is to say, the event reveals the incomplete nature of the transcendental and
the world that it constructs not by revealing being-qua-being itself, but by revealing the
void of the situation, or the split between myself as worlded and myself as a being that is
not only my worlded self (the event can show me that my worlded self is not-all there is).
It shows my being in excess of the world in which I find myself. In doing this, the event
allows for the possibility of acting not only in the ways prescribed by the transcendental
but in ways that are no longer conditioned by it. In this way then, the event allows for the
creation of a true subjectivity insofar as those who experience the event become the
agents of the change that it makes possible by acting in fidelity to it and working to bring
about an end to the particular transcendental that first conditions their existence.
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Ultimately then, the ‘event’ reveals to one her previously unrecognized subjective
limitations—by revealing the excess of her selfhood—through giving her a new, shared
and revealed truth that is ex post facto read back into her remembered existence prior to
the event and transforms it such that she comes to see herself as always having been such
a subject and subjected to such a universal truth. At the outset of this chapter, we looked
briefly at one of Badiou’s examples of the evental subject, namely the evental subject of
Saint Paul, I now want to turn to one of Badiou’s other examples of this process—that of
the French Revolution—in hopes of further clarifying his thought.
As Badiou points out, there are, from the perspective of the historical situation
many differing and scattered causes of (and actors in) the Revolution: “the electors of the
General Estates, the peasants of the Great Fear, the sans-coluttes of the towns, the
members of the Convention, the Jacobin Clubs,” and so forth. 140 However, Badiou
continues, “the halting point for this dissemination is the mode in which the Revolution is
the central term of the Revolution itself, that is, the manner in which the conscience of the
times…filters the entire site through the one of its evental qualification.” 141 The point
here is this: as with the case of Saint Paul, the French Revolution is an event because the
differences between the individual actors that existed prior to the revolution (the General
Estates, the Jacobin clubs, the members of the Convention, etc) come to be “filtered”
through the “one” event, namely the revolution itself. The different classes involved in
the revolution came to share the term ‘revolutionary’ thus the event revealed a shared
truth that was not present initially. Badiou continues: “the peasants are certainly
presented in the French situation of 1789-1790, but not those peasants of the Great Fear
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who seized the castles,” the peasants that exist after this event are changed by the
event.142 They became the peasants of the Revolution. This is not only the case for the
peasants but for all the prior categories of people (the Jacobins, Convention members,
etc.) at the moment of the revolution, these other categories too were emptied of their
previous meanings and were henceforth filtered through the one “universal” category—or
truth—of the Revolution. It is this category that came to (retroactively) filter each
individual’s understanding of himself as always having been a member of the one
universal ‘revolutionary’ class.
It is in this way that the political activity that came to fruition in the French
Revolution is, according to Badiou, indicative of a ‘rupture’ with the existing situation
(or world), as founded in an ‘event’ (here the event of the French Revolution) that acts as
a site for the production of a “truth” which is that which is truly ‘new’ and can have a
kind of ‘universal’ status in that it implicates—or interpellates—equally all of those that
are involved in it regardless of their seeming differences. This, furthermore, allows
individuals to become subjects of the universal truth that is founded in the event and act
in fidelity to such truth—which is ultimately to come to be able to act as agents of change
against the static pre-evental world. As we now have a good picture of Badiou’s
understanding of both stasis and change—or the ‘two temporalities’ of our worlds in
Johnston’s parlance—we can move, in the next chapter to an in depth discussion of the
ways in which Badiou’s theory offers a corrective to some of the problems of the
Althusserian arguments and an assessment of the success of this corrective.
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Chapter 4: Badiou as Structuralist, or the Idealism of Formalism

One way to productively understand Badiou’s thought in its response to Althusser is
to do so in relation to his comments in a recent interview with Bruno Bosteels in which
he points out that much of his work has been an attempt to unite the disparate thought of
Althusserian anti-humanism/structuralism and Sartrean subjective freedom. It is, in a very
important sense, around these two poles that the entire Badiouan edifice is built. As
Badiou states in this interview:
If I think of those who have been Althusserians, Lacanians, and Maoists—which was
the normal itinerary for the militant intelligentsia from 1968 to 1972—they were all a
bit younger than me. So what did this mean? It meant that they had not had the time
to be Sartreans… I found in Sartre’s theory of practical freedom, and particularly in
the subjectivized Marxism that he was already trying to produce, something with
which to engage myself politically, in spite of everything, in the situation. This did
not keep me from taking my distance from Sartre, nor from participating in that
generation of mine which indeed started to take a major interest in the question of
structure. But in the end, I entered this debate from the point of view of Sartre…This
meant that against all odds, I have always been concerned in a privileged way, by the
question of how something could still be called ‘subject’ within the most rigorous
conditions possible of the investigations of structure.143
In attempting to both retain what he thinks Althusser (and structuralism) gets right—
namely the conception of the overdetermined nature of a given conjuncture or a world in
which we find ourselves and the identities that attend it—but also overcome the problems
of such a conception, namely the inability understand and account for the possibility of
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(radical or revolutionary) change, Badiou seeks to unite these two traditions. Thus Badiou
theorizes the event and the two temporalities of stasis and change.

Section One
In regard to stasis, as we saw in detail in the previous chapter, we get a kind of
mathematized Althusserian/structuralist theoretics of a series of “worlds” or “situations”
which present themselves as de-subjectified, fully determined, objective totalities in
which everything is presented as if it is in its proper place, as determined by the structure
or transcendental logic that conditions that world/situation in its constructing of the
relations of identity and difference amongst ‘objects.’ However, as Badiou takes pains to
argue, such presentation conceals that which might act to disrupt it in the form of the
‘nothingness’ or ‘void,’ described as a fully positive—though subtracted, or unpresented—moment of a given world. Because, as we have seen, for Badiou ‘the one is
not’ but only comes to be in the ‘operation’ which counts-as-one beings in a given world,
there is always something which is unable to be brought under the law of the count
except as that which is subtracted (which is a form of objectification). It is this that, as we
have also seen for Badiou, allows the possibility of change via its revelation in the
moment of the event.
The event shows to those humans who are able to recognize it, the normally
hidden ‘not-all’ of a given world (the void of that world). This revelation, if properly
experienced—that is, if it is to become an event—also then reveals the counting operation
or transcendental logic to be just that: an operation which has conditioned apparent
objects and identities, but is itself not necessary nor totalizing. In other words, the event
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reveals the fact that the world’s logic is merely contingent, and not all there is. This then
allows for the possibility that those who experience the event shed the logic of the world
out of which they emerge, losing along the way, the very set of differences and identities
that first marked their awareness. It is here that agency is born for Badiou: those who
become ‘subjects’ do so by being, in Althusserian language, ‘interpellated’ by the event,
which they then, as we have also discussed, work to integrate into existence with the goal
of changing the very fabric of that existence to match the new world that they themselves
have already come to know.
What is important to see here (as has already briefly been pointed out at the
beginning of chapter 3) is that it is not just the event itself that is important for the theory
of change, those who are subjectified by it are also key to the process. The happening of
the event is, of course, indispensible, but it is the ability of the human to be subjectified
by the event, and the commitment to the ‘truth’ of the event that is cultivated by those
who are subjectified, that is necessary for the process of change to take place. So, it must
be the case that the human be the kind of being that is capable of being subjectivized by
the event, that is, the human must be the kind of being that is capable of shedding the
identity that she comes to have as a result of the world that she first finds herself in.
Though it is true that, for Althusser (and for structuralism), we are the kinds of beings
whose ‘identity’ shifts and changes as institutions and practices shift, change, and
interpellate us in various and different ways (we are, in other words, the kinds of beings
whose nature is not fixed) Althusser’s theory cannot, on its own, allow for the freedom
from the conjuncture and its ways of determining both individuals and objects, that
Badiou seeks.
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For as we saw in the first two chapters of this study, on Althusser’s account of
things, humans are always trapped in, and constructed by, the ideologies in which they
participate. And these ideologies, though in some sense built out of and sustained by
human activity, are never owned by, or in the control of individuals. That is, for
Althusser, subjects find their existence within the conjuncture itself (they are not
oppositional to it). Ideology is what regulates and controls the understanding and
behavior of individuals. Even Althusser’s heroic attempt at maintaining a distinction
between ideology (objectivity, necessity, determination) and science (the recognition of
ideology as historical and non-necessary) collapses under the weight of his understanding
of the insidious nature of ideology and its workings (even ‘science’ is, or quickly
becomes infected by ideology such that the difference between science and ideology is
shrunken to such a small point that it becomes difficult to maintain the distinction, and all
becomes tainted by the ideological) as Althusser himself argues:
…We know that there is no pure theoretical practice, no perfectly transparent
science which throughout history as a science will always be preserved, by I know
not what Grace, from the taints of idealism, that is, of the ideologies which
besiege it; we know that ‘pure’ science only exists on condition that it continually
frees itself from the ideology which occupies it, haunts it, or lies in wait for it.
The inevitable price of this purification and liberation is a continuous struggle
with ideology itself, that is, against idealism…144
Here is where the Sartrean theory of subjective freedom becomes important for
Badiou. As Nina Power argues, we can best see this connection vis-à-vis Sartre’s
conception of the group-in-fusion found in The Critique of Dialectical Reason.145 Power
explains this connection by first pointing out that Sartre’s opposition between the status
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of ‘sociality’ and the status of the ‘group-in-fusion’ (the autonomous collectivityautonomous in a Kantian sense- as free from external determinants) can be mapped onto
the Badiouan distinction between the counted-as-one non-subjects of the world and the
subjectivized agents of change that exist in the wake of the event. She does this by
explaining that for Sartre, the former is “always on the side of the order and antagonism
that constitutes capitalist atomization, inertia and seriality”, while the latter is, in effect,
that which results from a ‘disalienation’ that extracts those who come to constitute the
‘group’ from the individuated seriality of the social that first defines the existence of the
group’s members.146 In other words, for Sartre, the group-in-fusion is a break or a rupture
with the determined nature of the social, and it is this that makes the group into a
(political) subjectivity capable of affecting change (albeit only briefly on Sartre’s
accounting of things). Sartre uses the example of a collection of people waiting at a bus
stop to indicate the ‘serially’ determined nature of the social as opposed to the unity of
the ‘group in fusion.’ Regarding this example Sartre writes:
To begin with, it should be noted that we are concerned here with a plurality of
isolations: these people do not care about or speak to one another and, in general,
they do not look at one another; they exist side by side alongside a bus stop. At
this level it is worth noting that their isolation is not an inert statute (or the simple
reciprocal exteriority of organisms); rather, it is actually lived in everyone’s
project as its negative structure. In other words, the isolation of the organism, as
the impossibility of uniting with Others in an organic totality, is revealed through
the isolation which everyone lives as the provisional negation of their reciprocal
relations with Others.147
For Sartre, our lived experience of the relations between one another, that is, our lived
experience of the ‘social’ is filtered through the serialized isolation between individuals.
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It is this serialization that structures the world in which we find ourselves and militates
against any unification amongst individuals in our everyday quotidian existence. Further
it also militates against many forms of true subjective agency as it is the case that the
serialized isolation between individuals in a given social structure is what (re)produces
and gives support to the very structures in which we find ourselves, and as long as we
remain serialized in this way, we are as Sartre argues, impotent in relation them.148
However, unification does happen. It happens through praxis for Sartre. We can find
ourselves taken out of the sphere of serialization in the moments in which we come to be
‘fused’ with one another in pursuit of a common goal or a common work.149 It is in this,
as we have seen, that we become autonomous in the sense that, in the collective unity
produced by the ‘group in fusion’ we are extracted from the individuated seriality that
defines the social world in which we first become aware of ourselves.
Power continues, explaining that, as with Badiou’s conception of the subject,
(which is itself importantly non-individuated) for Sartre, “the group-in-fusion, is not a
‘return’ to some previous essence, as a simple re-reading of alienation would have it” and
moreoever, “the group-in-fusion as Sartre describes it, also involves a kind of immanent
anti-organicism, in the sense that the project that unites the members of the group cannot
be seen from the outside (nor for that matter, can the group as a whole be
comprehended).”150 Meaning that the only thing that holds the group together in a unity is
the group’s own activity and the experience of those who make up the group, the external
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observer cannot identify the group as such a collectivity because there is nothing external
to mark if off from other collections of individuals which remain serially determined.
Sartre’s attempts at making sense of the emergence of such groups out of (and in
opposition to) the conjuncture is thus, on Power’s reading both materialist, insofar as the
group is a result of, or only comes about in, existence (it does not pre-exist its coming to
be), and anti-humanist (insofar as it is not the realization of a pre-existent essence). But,
Sartre’s conception of this is also at the same time a kind of humanism, as Power points
out, insofar as it is only the decision, or the commitment of those humans that act as a
group in Sartre’s sense that sustain the existence of the group itself. Thus, she dubs the
Sartrean theory of the group-in-fusion (quite rightly) a kind of “anti-humanist humanism
whose concern is the subject, rather than an idealist or essentializing humanism.”151

Section Two
It is this “antihumanist humanism” of the Sartrean subject that serves as the model
for Badiou’s own theory of the subject as the oppositional force founded by the event. So,
Badiou’s use of the Sartrean conception of the process of change that is initiated by the
group in fusion as over against the seriality of the social is what allows for Badiou to
account for the possibility of radical change (and true subjective agency) in a way that
Althusser cannot while at the same time, allowing Badiou to retain, as we have also seen,
much of the Althusserian edifice.
In Badiou, however, subjective agency—though it has the force of change that
results from the agent’s extraction from the (ideological) world/situation in which she
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first finds herself—remains thoroughly bounded by and to the taking place of the event.
Though it is true that the Badiouan subject gains autonomy, she only does so from the
existing world’s logic. The Badiouan revolutionary subject is still determined in her
behavior and her being- it is just that this determination comes from her recognition of
the event and the fidelity to it that is provoked in her by it. So the Badiouan subject
remains in a very important way, a proto-structuralist and fully materially generated
subject albeit one whose identity is conditioned by a relation to a happening that
disappears as quickly as it appears rather than the structure or world. I wish now to turn
to a discussion of this and why it poses a problem for Badiou’s own materialism. As we
will see, Badiou’s account of the nature of worlds, their transcendental logics, and his
account of change via a structuralized Sartreanism brings his theory dangerously close to
the very kind of structuralist idealism Althusser himself was wary of.
First however, for further evidence à propos the structuralist nature of the
Badiouan subject, recall the last line of the long quote referenced at the beginning of this
chapter, in which Badiou himself points out the structuralist nature of his enterprise.
There he claims that he is interested in making sense of, as he puts it, “what can be called
subject” while remaining fully within a structuralist framework.152 Further, in Logics of
Worlds commenting on Deleuze’s simultaneous adoption—via what Deleuze terms
Sartre’s conception of the “impersonal transcendental field” of the group in fusion—and
critique of Sartre’s conception of the subject, Badiou registers his agreement with the
Deleuzian claim to the effect that:
Sartre was prevented from thinking through all the consequences of his idea
because he continued to tie the impersonal field to a self-consciousness…He did
152
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not expose the subject to the chance of a pure Outside. One of the names of the
Outside is ‘event.’ That is why the event, as that to which the power of a thought
devotes itself and/or that from which this power stems, has after Sartre become a
term common to most contemporary philosophers.153
In other words, Sartre remained faithful, in Power’s terminology, to a “disaleination” that
is provoked by an experience of being-with others, or finding oneself enmeshed in an
impersonal ‘we’ as opposed to the seriality of the ‘I,’ but this provocation comes, for
Sartre, from the being-with another itself and not from anything material, or external to
consciousness on Badiou’s account. So for Sartre, though the true (Sartrean/Badiouan)
subject emerges in existence—and is hence, materially generated in this way—she only
emerges by recognizing herself in the other (another consciousness). Sartre is explicit
about this in his description of the group in fusion that he saw as constituted in the
storming of the Bastille:
Everyone continued to see himself in the Other, but saw himself there as himself,
that is to say, in this case, as a totalization in himself of the Parisian population,
by the sabre blow or the rifle shot which would kill him.154
The Sartrean ‘impersonal field,’ as Deleuze puts it, is constituted in reference to a kind of
mirroring effect in which each individual steps out of his or her own ‘personality’ and
recognizes herself in the other and thus the unified consciousness of the group appears
through the shedding of the individuated consciousnesses of those involved. This is, as
pointed out above, for Sartre, accomplished through, and in reference to, consciousness
alone. As Badiou laments, Sartre did not think through the further foundations of the
unification experience itself and the conditions upon which such an experience rests. If he
had, on Badiou’s (and Deleuze’s) account, his analysis would have bottomed out in the
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event. But for that one needs the anti-humanism afforded by both Althusser and
structuralism. One needs to think beyond consciousness, to the structures that condition it
for both the consciousness of the serialized multiple individual and the “impersonal”
unified, agent-like, subjectivity of the group in fusion. Thus, though the Sartrean subject
is material in the sense that it is generated in existence (as Power points out), it is not
materialist in the sense of being itself conditioned by that which is other than
consciousness, or the material ‘event’ that interpellates the subject, which as Badiou
claims, is the mark of a true materialism. This is to say, whereas for Sartre the ‘event’
would be the result of the unification that is the group in fusion (the ‘event’ of the
storming of the Bastille for instance) that unifies disparate consciousnesses into a force
capable of effecting such an event, for Badiou, “The event cannot result from the passion
of a body, nor can it differ in kind from these actions and passions. On the contrary, an
active body adequate to the new present is an effect of the event.”155 The “active body” is
thus a structural effect of the event, not that which conditions it. Another way to put this
same point, might be to say that for Badiou, the event is the material phenomenon that
underlies the operation which comes to count-as-one the subject, who then works to
reorient the consistent multiplicity of a given world to mirror the awareness she now has.
With all of this in view, we can now turn to a discussion of the not-so-materialist
outcomes of Badiou’s materialist thought.
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Section Three
Recall the Althusserian critique, discussed in Chapter two, of Levi-Straussian
style structuralism. The basic point that Althusser makes there is that Levi-Strauss and his
followers become “traditional philosophers” (that is, idealists) the moment that they
forget the connection to the specific historical moment in which their theories are
produced. That is, when they forget the conjunctural nature of the foundations of the
theory and begin to posit structuralism as an a-historical scientific ‘truth’ of social
organization and in so doing, make the ideological (and idealist) mistake of conferring a
kind of abstract subjectivity on ‘structure itself. This is, of course, the result of the
continually present danger of the impurity of theory as pointed out in the Althusser’s
statement of this problem referenced earlier in this chapter. Something of a similar order
can be brought to bear on the Badiouan edifice and in so doing we can show that
Badiou’s account here suffers from some of the same problems (though on a different
scale) that Althusser attributes to the traditional structuralist account. It is precisely this
problem that pushes Badiou away from a full fledged materialism.
I am, of course, not the first to take up such a line of argument in relation to
Badiou’s thought and I wish to begin by looking at two other versions of this claim
before turning to some additional ways that we can see the danger of idealism emerge for
Badiou. We have, thus far, been talking about temporality in Badiou in relation to two
modes: stasis and change, but there is another way of thinking about this theme. We can,
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along with Peter Osborne, translate our terms for Badiouan temporality into structuralist
terms: synchrony and diachrony.156 Here Osborne writes that for Badiou:
Time is reduced to two dimensions—synchrony and diachrony—and diachrony is
no more than a serial ordering of synchronically defined situations. Situations are
considered ‘historical’ in which there is ‘at least one evental site’…but there is no
unity to these situations, no ‘evental situation’ and hence no history.157
Badiou’s ontology is ahistorical insofar as on the one hand, it is concerned with exposing
the formal or synchronic properties of the ordering relations between objects found any
given world/situation that make up the ‘structure’ of those worlds. On the other hand,
Badiou’s ontology is concerned with the historical (the diachronic) insofar as it attempts
to theorize those worlds in which an event arises and the properties of the subjects that
are created by them, but as Osborne points out above, since there is no ‘evental’ world
because events are, as theorized by Badiou, things that appear and quickly recede in
normally synchronically ordered worlds, history just is the history of ahistorically (and
mathematically) structured worlds punctuated by the occasional ‘event’ and the subjects
that arrive in its wake and thus it is the job of the philosopher to theorize the structures of
these worlds insofar as they yield both stasis and the possibility of change. Osborne
continues:
…It is precisely the idea that philosophy is to be pursued, systematically, through
a thinking of mathematics that is Badiou’s primary classical, rationalist and
idealist trait—its return to Plato—however modern the maths.158
So for Osborne, Badiou’s philosophy returns to idealism because it rejects the diachronic
and favors the synchronic or, in other words, because it seeks to understand and analyze
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the structures of worlds/situations synchronically and thus, independently of history. It is
not interested in the connections between the structures of a given world and that world’s
history—it doesn’t find the history of the situation to be important for the production of
either the given world or the process of change—the world does not produce history,
rather, the world is nothing but a static de-historicized conglomeration of subjectless
objects that gain their status as objects through the structural relations between one
another imposed by the (again non-subjective) transcendental. The event is what
produces history though (oddly) it too is a-historical insofar as it is divorced from the dehistoricized history of the world in which it appears as we have seen: though it arises
within a situation/world, the event is not something that is itself conditioned by it (and so
cannot be the subject of philosophical investigation, until after its happening).
I would like to push Osborne’s analysis further here and point out that the formal
synchronic description of worlds that Badiou gives us throughout both of his major works
comes dangerously close to an idealism insofar as he, at the synchronic level, reifies the
mathematical structure that he uses to analyze various worlds in both their synchronic
nature and their harboring of potential diachrony. That is, the mathematical structure, for
Badiou, becomes an ideological—and hence ideal—blind spot in his otherwise
materialist theory. This is precisely the point that Adrian Johnston, in a pair of essays,
develops further in relation to the Badiouan mathematic ontology and the concept of the
count-as-one respectively.
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Section Four
Johnston points out that when faced with concerns about the properly materialist
nature of Badiou’s thought, given that abstract mathematical structures are considered to
be the foundations of ontology, Some of Badiou’s defenders—Johnston cites Fabian
Tarby here—point to the fact that “Badiou rejects the portrayal of mathematics as a
fabrication of the human mind overlaid onto the objective world” so ultimately,
“Badiou’s mathematical ontology is materialist insofar as mathematical entities and
configurations are viewed, by Badiou-the-Platonist as enjoying ontological weight, as
participating in real being.”159 Johnston’s initial response to this is worth quoting at
length:
Believing in the ontological reality of mathematics does not make one a
materialist. Put differently, metaphysical realism is not equivalent to
materialism—quite the contrary. Metaphysical realists tend to be, not
coincidentally or by accident, idealists. At least in glancing back through the
history of philosophy, one discerns a strong correlation between materialism and
the diametric opposite of metaphysical realism, namely nominalism.160
If Badiou is a realist about mathematical entities, then his materialism is undercut by this
belief, as it forces him into a position of accepting the reality of abstract, formal or ideal
entities. Johnston goes on to critique Badiou’s well-known rejection of the life sciences in
favor of the formalism of pure mathematics as further entrenching this problematic
idealist materialism via Badiou’s recent comments on the status of physics and its
application of mathematics to empirical. Badiou argues that the life sciences (represented
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here by physics) are stuck at the level of presentation, only a pure mathematics can get to
the ontological. First here is Badiou:
…The more you decompose the concept of matter into its most elementary
constituents, the more you move into a field of reality which can only be named
or identified with increasingly complex mathematical operations. “Matter” would
simply be, immediately after being, the most general possible name of the
presented (of “what is presented”)…Matter, in the sense in which it is at stake in
physics, is matter as enveloping any particular presentation—and I am materialist
in the sense that I think that any presentation is material. If we consider the word
‘matter,’ the content of the word ‘matter,’ matter comes immediately after
being.161
It is on the basis of the distinction drawn here between the domain of pure mathematics,
the study of being-as-such (ontology), the ‘applied’ mathematics of physics, namely
‘matter’ or, the particular collection of objects and relations found in presented worlds
that Johnston is able to further call Badiou’s professed materialism into question:
What raises serious questions and difficulties in this context is the firm line of
demarcation partitioning being and matter (instead of “thought and matter”), a
line drawn in accordance with the full-fledged mathematization of ontology.
Moreover, this line…indeed does end up segregating “impure” empirical
disciplines, keeping them outside the enclosure of ontology properly speaking.
And to Badiou’s disadvantage, this is where Tarby’s previously critiqued and
utterly inadequate defense of the materialist credentials of the mathematical
ontology of Badiou-the-platonist returns with a vengeance: the manner in which
Badiou differentiates between L’être and la matiére that is tied up with a Platonic
ontology that, if deemed to be materialist, renders the very opposition between
materialism and idealism entirely null and void. How is this not metaphysical
realism, an otherworldly doctrine inextricably intertwined with idealist
spiritualism?162
Once the specter of such an ‘idealist spiritualism’ haunting Badiouan Materialism vis-àvis Platonist metaphysical realism is raised we can, along with Johnston, identify the
ways in which Badiou’s twin concepts of the count-as-one and the de-subjectified
transcendental are also complicit in idealism’s continued grip on Badiou’s philosophy.
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As Johnston points out in the second essay with which we are dealing here, some
of Badiou’s critics (himself included) have raised questions about the status of the
‘operation’ that is the count-as-one.163 Recall that, the count-as-one is the always already
present ‘law’ that structures given situations, identifying what is ‘presented’ in a situation
(and in what ways presentation takes place). That is, the count-as-one, at least in Being
and Event is the operation that makes the inconsistency of being-qua-being into objects
or consistent multiples, thus it defines the status of objects that are presented. However,
as these critics argue, since Badiou himself denies that the count-as-one is a ‘being’ and
gives it rather, the strange—and unexplained—status of an ‘operation’ (one that is, again,
always already in effect in presentation), this all important concept seems to be, in
Johnston’s words, “an ethereal, spectral, operation of unification” that is real-yet-abstract
and hence problematically idealist in line with the realist idealism outlined above.164
In Logics of Worlds, as we saw in the previous chapter, Badiou uses the concept
of the count-as-one much less, replacing it with the idea of the a-subjective
‘transcendental’ (or the transcendental logic) as that which stands in for and serves the
same function as the count-as-one of Being and Event. The transcendental is that around
which a given world and its objects are structured much like the law that is defined by the
counting operation. But here, the transcendental, rather than being described as an
‘operation’, is itself included in that world that it structures (rather than being an operator
that in some sense pre-exists the world that is structured by it). As Johnston notes, this
has been seen as a sign of a move away from the problematic idealism inherent to the
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concept of the count-as-one by some of Badiou’s readers. Johnston cited Alberto Toscano
here:
Toscano believes that [the] anxieties about Badiou’s less-than-fully materialist
status circa 1988 subsequently are assuaged in two ways after 1988: First, the
2006 conceptualization of the transcendental is purportedly less, as it were,
mysteriously faceless than the anonymous count-for-one; second, the immanence
of each transcendental regime to its respective world supposedly (re)-secures
Badiouan thought as a form of strict materialism.165
However, Johnston also rightly points out that Badiou doesn’t give up the count-as-one
in 2006, the concept remains in use in Logics of Worlds and further when it is used, it is
so at a crucial moment in the description of the status of objects presented in a given
world. Speaking of the nature of objects in Logics of Worlds recall that, as we saw in the
previous chapter, Badiou claims that:
It goes without saying after all, that a being… can appear in different worlds. It
would be absurd to think that there is an intrinsic link between a given multiple
and a given world. The ‘worlding’ of a formal being, which is its being-there or
appearing, is ultimately a logical operation: the access to a local guarantee of its
identity. This operation may be produced in numerous different ways, and it may
imply entirely distinct worlds as the grounds for the further operations it elicits.166
The point—as we also discussed in the last chapter—is that the appearance, or the beingthere of a given object in a given world does not, for the Badiou of Logics of Worlds,
exhaust the object. A given object can be worlded in multiple ways, by multiple
transcendentals, and insofar as the particular appearance of a given object in a given
world is defined by the relations that develop between it and other objects, the
appearance of that object is (as we pointed out in the previous chapter in relation to the
identity of humans in given worlds) defined in its being-there by other beings, or other
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objects. This defining however, does not fully define and circumscribe the object, it is
also defined in this by being other than what it is outside of a given world.
The object is thus split in its being worlded. It both is what it appears to be insofar
as its appearance is defined by the relational structure, and it is importantly, not-all that it
is in appearance or as Johnston puts the point, “The Badiouan object is never entirely
situated in and structured by its respective world without reserve (or in Lacanese, “not
all” of the object is in its world).167 Though the object’s nature exceeds the appearance,
the object is made consistent through the subtraction of all that is not relationally
consistent with other objects in that world, but as Badiou notes (and as we also made
clear in the last chapter) this subtraction does not destroy the excess of the object or its
nature outside of the relational structuring of the transcendental:
The key to thinking appearing, when it comes to a singular being, lies in being
able to determine, at one and the same time, the self-difference which makes it so
being-there is not being-qua-being, and the difference from others which makes it
so that being there, or the law of the world which is shared by these others, does
not abolish being-qua-being.168
Thus, the object straddles the line between the inconsistent multiplicity of being-quabeing and the consistent appearing of the being-there of the world. As Johnston puts it,
“the object as an onto-logical conjunction of l’être en tant qu’ être and être-lá, is the
condensed crossroads at which this interaction between being and appearing takes place,
an interaction in which appearing comes to leave its mark on being itself.”169 It is here
that the concept of the count-as-one operation reappears in Logics of Worlds the
appearance of the object in-world, as a ‘one’ or a consistent multiplicity, is described by

167

Johnston “Phantom of Consistency,” 364.
Badiou, Logics of Worlds. 117
169
Johnston, “Phantom of Consistency,” 363.
168

109

Badiou as an “atom of appearing” which is, as Johnston points out, defined (in part) in
the ‘Dictionary of Concepts’ at the end of Logics of Worlds with reference to the countas-one: the “atom (of appearing)” is “the instance of the One in appearing, and therefore,
the instance of what counts as one in the object.”170
Leaving aside a discussion of the first part of this definition, we can see that the
count-as-one thus, remains an important concept for Badiou as it continues to play a
crucial role in the definition of objects in-world. This is also in part why in outlining the
Badiouan edifice in the previous chapter I thought it unproblematic to use this term and
the Badiouan transcendental interchangeably (more on this in a moment). Further, though
Badiou continues to use the concept of the count-as-one in this way in Logics of Worlds it
remains a mysterious abstract-yet-real concept as Johnston claims, “It remains
troublingly unexplained who or what performs this enigmatic, mysterious operation as
well as from where it comes.”171
Returning now to the theme of the connections between the criticisms of Badiou’s
account of the social and the processes of stasis and change registered by both Osborne
and Johnston, and the criticisms that Althusser launches against the structuralists of his
day, these can be aligned if we consider how it is that what is identified as problematic by
both of Badiou’s critics is the portions of Badiou’s theory that remain idealist
“abstractions” which Badiou relies on to serve critical functions in his system. Nothing
more needs to be said about the idealism inherent to the metaphysical realist position in
mathematics (even though, according to this view mathematical entities are ‘real’ they
remain formal immaterial entities, and are thus ideal). In addition to the problems
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identified by Johnston in relation to count-as-one operation, we can add here in an
Althusserian vein, that because Badiou is insufficiently aware on the uncritical reification
of this concept, it comes to have the same kind of a-subjective subjective agency that the
concept of structure had for those whose structuralism became, as Althusser argues,
infected with ideology (and hence idealism) insofar as the count-as-one is endowed with
a quasi-intelligence as that which ensures the ordering of multiples across
situations/worlds. Further, à propos the attempted overcoming of the problems inherent to
the concept of the count-as-one by replacing it with the concept of a de-subjectified
transcendental, as Johnston has convincingly shown, the transcendental itself is still tied
to the count-as-one operation and as such is undergirded by the remaining idealist
abstraction.
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Chapter 5: Žižek and the Materialism of the Immaterial, or Why Hegel is not an Idealist

Žižek, in a recent interview, regarding his materialism, claims:
…There is a fundamental difference between the assertion that ‘everything is
matter’…and the assertion ‘there is nothing which is not matter’ (which with its
other side, ‘not all is matter,’ opens up the space for the account of immaterial
phenomena). What this means is that a truly radical materialism is by definition
non-reductionist: far from claiming that ‘everything is matter’, it confers upon the
‘immaterial’ phenomena a specific positive non-being.172
This chapter will begin our discussion of Žižek’s relation to (and revision of) Althusser
by attempting to clarify Žižek’s ‘non-reductionist’ materialism as described in the
quotation above. It will do so by locating it via Žižek’s de-progressified, Lacanian
reading of Hegel’s thought in which Hegel becomes the primary representative of a
properly—non-reductive—materialist paradigm. The Chapter that follows this one will
then assess the similarities and differences between Žižek’s view and Badiou’s arguing
that Žižek’s materialism overcomes the remaining idealism that continues to infect
Badiou’s thought. We can begin this project by first discussing the basics of Hegel’s
philosophy that are important for Žižek’s position, with an emphasis on Hegel’s
understanding of the importance of the ‘negative moment’ as this concept is crucial to
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Žižek’s own materialist view insofar as it maps on to Žižek’s understanding of the ‘notAll’.

Section One
As is well known, for Hegel, the negative moment in the dialectical process of
Consciousness’s coming to awareness of itself and its world is critical. It is the point
where mediation occurs, where what is properly “true” about the previous moment comes
into view. It is in the space of such negativity that we begin to discern that which before
was not mediated (immediate, and not fully understood), in its fully expressed actuality,
as the moment that is what it is through the exclusion of that which it negates. In the
mode of the immediate (at any given step in the process), one is under the illusion of
having a kind of complete understanding, believing that knowledge of one’s self and
one’s world is complete, closed, and whole. In the space of the negative moment, this
understanding and the perceived whole—and its explanations—becomes inadequate and
fall apart. What appeared to be complete, whole, and universal turns out not to apply,
there is a lack—an inherent ‘not-All’ in one’s knowledge—that has been covered over by
the perceived totality which then becomes, in the space of the negative moment, laid bare
in its incompleteness. This calls into question, for the knower, the previously experienced
universality of knowledge. In order to better grasp this point we can look briefly at how
this process unfolds in the opening sections of “Sense Certainty” in Hegel’s
Phenomenology.
On Hegel’s account, consciousness’s first attempts to understand its world are
founded in taking that which comes to it through the senses for what is true. According to
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Hegel, what consciousness finds is that “the thing,” namely, the object (or set of objects)
that it receives through its senses, “is.”173 This is to say that the thing has a kind of
abstract existence and that “it is merely because it is.”174 The multiplicity of things that
are found in the world, appear to consciousness as necessarily fixed, determined, and
differentiated in certain ways. Thus, what is true for consciousness at this stage is “this”
thing, in its abstract existence, that is “here,” displayed in front of consciousness “now.”
What is further revealed to consciousness in this moment is that the structure of the thing
(the “This”) is both “Now” and “Here” which then become the new determinations (or
concepts) that need to be understood.175
Thus we could ask—as Hegel did—about the “Now” (the question is: what is the
“Now?”) and say, for instance that the “Now is night” (this thing, that is here now, is
night) but as we will quickly notice, that definition is only a fleeting one for it is the case
that at some point the ‘Now’ will not be night but it will be day.176 What this realization
brings with it is a further determination and differentiation of the “now.” This is also—as
is well known—Hegel’s description of how consciousness comes to discover universal
concepts like ‘This,’ ‘Now,’ and ‘Here’ out of the particulars to which they are initially
applied in consciousness’ everyday dealings with the world. These universal concepts
arise in and come to be known as a result of the experience of them as non-universal,
fleeting, and contingent. The concept is brought to light in the negation of its particular
(and contingent) determinations. In the negation of particular ‘nows’ we come to
understand the concept of “Now” itself, but this concept is not strictly identical with any
173

G.W.F. Hegel Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977). 58
[Hereafter Phenomenology]
174
Ibid.
175
Ibid., 60
176
Ibid.

114

of its particular instantiations, it is rather ‘not’ any one of them. Thus what is also
revealed in this is the primacy of the negative moment as Hegel shows us:
The Now that is night is preserved, i.e. it is treated as what it professes to be, as
something that is; but it proves itself to be on the contrary, something that is not.
The Now does indeed preserve itself, but as something that is not night; equally it
preserves itself in the face of the day that it now is, as something that is also not
Day, in other words, as a negative in general.177
What was first posited by the moment of sense certainty as the ‘Now’ has become
distinguished from its particulars, as it is not properly any one of them but rather a
universal, which is at the same time all of its particular moments and none of them. This
is, as we have seen, discovered through the negation of attempting to identify the
universal “Now” with one of its particular instantiations, but this knowledge only comes
after or as a result of a distancing of the starting point in which the universal is not
universal but rather particular and determined, but that which is particular and determined
is perceived to be universal.
Hegel conceives of knowledge as always being mediated by the negative moment.
As we have seen in the example of consciousness’s coming to understand the concept of
“Now” it first took what was immediately given as the truth of the “Now” (now is night)
but then found that the negation of that idea (that the “Now” was not only to be identified
with ‘night’ but with ‘day’ as well) exhibited the real “truth” of the first understanding of
the term, namely that that this understanding was inadequate, that is did not offer a
completed definition—because now the “Now” is day, but this also becomes mediated in
the recognition that the universal “Now” cannot be strictly identified with either of these
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particular instantiations of it, and is in fact radically different then, and not determined
by, the particularity with which these instantiations appear.
It is only in the negative moment, as that moment in which we come to see what
is left out by our current knowledge of things, that we come to see what is universal and
hence “True” about the nature of our current mode of knowing (that it is always
inadequate, that it always leaves something out, that it is what it is based on this
exclusion). Furthermore, consciousness itself is what it is at any given moment as a
product of such inadequacies—its own determinations are only what they are as a result
of a kind of foundational exclusion that only shows itself in existence in the moment of
negation.
We should briefly recall that for Hegel, like Kant before him, the “objective”
world in which we live is the product of the interaction between consciousness (as that
which organizes, imposes meaning, and “knows”) and what is affected by it. Recall the
Kantian idea of consciousness as a ‘receptive spontaneity;’ consciousness receives
information and then spontaneously organizes it (according to the structures it imposes on
this information) so that it can be understood, or ‘known.’ It is not, on Kant’s accounting
of things, the objects of experience that modify our consciousness but rather our
consciousness that modifies the objects of experience so that they can be
comprehended.178 Hegel wishes to accept a portion of the Kantian claim. He does think,
along with Kant, that the subjective conditions of experience and knowledge cannot be
changed by objects and that objects are in fact determined by consciousness and are
grounded in such determinations. In commenting on this in the Science of Logic, Hegel
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points out, à propos the common sense idea that when one cognizes the world she
somehow “has” notions, concepts, or ideas of her objects, that though this way of
describing cognition is “true” with regard to “determinant notions” (particulars), “the I is
the pure Notion itself, which as Notion, has come into existence.”179 That is, the ‘I’ is that
from which concepts, or notions as such issue and to which particular ‘determinant
notions’ are subordinated. Thus notions are not merely ‘had’ by thought but are rather, in
part, produced by and through consciousness’s activity, and so are deeply connected to,
and unified with it. Hegel continues approvingly:
This constitutes the nature of the I as well as the Notion; neither the one nor the
other can be truly comprehended unless the two indicated moments are grasped at
the same time both in their abstraction and their perfect unity. When one speaks in
the ordinary way of the understanding possessed by the I, one understands
thereby a faculty or property which stands in the same relation to the I as the
property of a thing does to the thing itself, that is, to an indeterminate substrate
that is not the genuine ground and the determinant of its property. According to
this conception I possess notions and the Notion in the same way as I also possess
a coat, complexion, and other external properties. Now Kant went beyond this
external relation of the understanding, as the faculty of notions and of the Notion
itself, to the I. It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in the
Critique of Pure Reason that the unity which constitutes the nature of the Notion
is recognized as the original Synthetic unity of apperception, as the unity of the ‘I
think,’ or of self-consciousness.180
Though it is the case that Hegel agrees, in part, with the Kantian arguments here, He
wants to argue that the subjective conditions of experience do in fact change, even though
they are not affected by the object. They change historically, as people and cultures
change and so, individual cognition is related to communal cognition which itself shifts
and changes throughout history.
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Thus, there is, as Hegel says in the Introduction to The Philosophy of History,
‘Reason in history’ in two senses: First, insofar as he takes the Kantian claims to be
true—since reason is involved in the creation of objects as they are cognized by humans,
and insofar as humans themselves are temporal beings, human history is infused with
reason’s participation in the construction of objects. As he points out, “Reason is the
substance [of our historic world] in the sense that it is that whereby and wherein all
reality has its being and subsistence.”181 And second, at the same time that Hegel takes
the Kantian points described above to be true, he also wants—as already noted—to say
that Reason and History are connected insofar as Reason bears the mark of the history in
which it comes to be what it is. So the claim that there is “Reason in history” is also
meant to signal Hegel’s innovation over and above Kant: the claim to the historically
developmental nature Reason, and also, the historical construction, transformation, and
indexing of the Kantian transcendental conditions themselves.
Hegel goes on then, to re-conceive of the ground of both the objective world and
the individual self as being found in the struggle for recognition and the movement from
individual desire to a communally agreed upon set of “truths” that form and shape our
experiences of our world and our understanding of ourselves. Knowledge—and the
knower—is determined by our pragmatic concerns and our active dealings with one
another in the community. What is true is, in fact, determined by self-consciousness but
is so in reference to what self-consciousness is concerned with, and this is primarily
determined by the concerns of the historically located community. Thus, selfconsciousness is conditioned by the social. Objects in the world are conditioned by self-

181

Hegel, Introduction to The Philosophy of History, translated by Leo Rauch (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1988). 12

118

consciousness’s desire, or lack of desire, for them. However, this also is not merely the
desire of a single self-consciousness, but that of a historical community. It is Hegel’s
description of self-consciousness as founded in the struggle for recognition that gives us a
conception of identity in which identities are determined and understood in relation to a
historically contingent and changing communal consciousness—“Spirit” in Hegel’s
terminology—of what is to be desired.
To be sure, individual consciousness still exists, but it is grounded in a preexistent communal consciousness that is already meaning-laden and unfolds according to
a certain historical-communal understanding what is valued and meaningful. It is out of
the already meaning-laden world that the individual consciousness arises and thus that
world reflects back to the individual those things which make up her self-understanding.
In this way, self-consciousness always begins as, or finds itself, determined and
differentiated by its particular historical moment. The crucial aspect of this to see is that
this determinism is historical, the identity of individual self-consciousness is the product
of the communal modes of knowing (in the same way that knowledge itself is). Žižek, in
commenting on this, notes that:
Hegel of course learned the lesson of Kant’s transcendental idealism (there is no
reality prior to a subject’s positing activity); however, he refused to elevate the
subject into a neutral-universal agent who directly constitutes reality. To put it in
Kantian terms: while he admitted there is no reality without the subject, Hegel
insisted that subjectivity is inherently pathological (biased, limited to a distorting,
unbalanced perspective of the whole).182
Žižek’s point, as we have already begun to see, is that the Hegelian subject both
organizes its world—in a Kantian sense—and is also organized by its world insofar as its
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own organizing capacities are constructed and constrained by the existing community as
it is at a given historical moment. That is, in order for any world to show up, it must be
organized by a conscious subject, the reality that such a subject posits, however, is
always limited (biased, distorted) by the context within which she is found. There is then
(at least initially) no non-pathological subject.
If all subjects are pathological in this sense, then all are contingently constructed
in their subjecthood. Echoing the Althusserian conception, For Žižek’s Hegel,
subjectivity (first) is a product of the various differences, institutions, practices,
traditions, modes of knowledge, and ideologies that exist at a given time. So subjectivity
itself (and all of its differences) begins as the contingent, and ideologically limited,
product of history. As such, it serves to ground, (re)produce, and sustain those
differences. This ground, however, is so only on the condition that it excludes that which
it negates (i.e. universality itself in the form of the negative moment, or knowledge of the
‘not-All’ of knowledge).
In some versions of the Hegelian story, the dialectic—and thus history itself—
comes to an end in “Absolute Knowing” where the subject and its object coincide
completely in higher level which takes both out of the realm of the historical (finite)
existence and into the ahistorical (infinite), at this moment, there truly is no longer
anything left out in knowledge and existence and, in turn, there is no longer any
negativity but rather an infinite “whole.”183 This, however, is not Žižek’s version of the
story. Žižek explains the moment of “Absolute Knowing” not as a grasping of the
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Absolute in which we gain a way out of the historical process through an understanding
that becomes infinite and thus ends negation, but rather “…we fail to grasp the Absolute
precisely insofar as we continue to presuppose that, above and beyond the domain of our
finite reflected reasoning, there is an Absolute to be grasped.”184 It is precisely within the
confines of our finite reasoning that we come to know the Absolute Truth, which is
simply that “there is no Absolute beyond or above the reflexive oppositions and
contradictions of the Finite—the Absolute is nothing but the movement of self-sublation
of these finite determinations.”185
This is the source of Žižek’s materialist reading of Hegel. For Žižek’s Hegel there
is no outside, we are always already included—even as subjects—in the world that we
construct in our modes of coming to know it. Furthermore, this world is as it is on the
condition of the modes of understanding that are employed by us, which are not
constructed ex nihilo but rather are themselves founded by individuals and communities
in history—that is, the results of the historical, embodied activity of humans. These
modes themselves become what they are by being embodied, in both individuals and
communities, and the material practices in which they engage. Thus, what is “Absolute”
is precisely the historicity of systems of knowing (founded on the dialectic of negation
and mediation), the contingent and historical world that these create (and, reflexively,
that is created by these modes of knowing), and the contingent, differentiated subjects
that are born out of this. The Hegelian Absolute is nothing other than this process itself
and “Absolute Knowing” is nothing more than the awareness of this fact.

184
185

Žižek, TS. 84
Ibid.

121

Commenting on the place of contingency in Hegel recently, Žižek argues, that
what the standard views of Hegel’s system—in which there is no room for contingency
and all is determined by a necessary logical, historical, and processional development of
a pre-existent whole in the process of moving from implicit to explicit—miss is that:
The Hegelian dialectical process is not such a ‘saturated’ self-contained necessary
Whole, but the open-contingent process through which the Whole forms itself. In
other words [the standard view] confuses being with becoming: it perceives as a
fixed order of being (the network of categories) what is for Hegel the process of
becoming which retroactively, engenders its necessity.186
The necessity—if there is any—only comes after the fact in a retrospective
reconstruction of the path that consciousness has taken. This does not mean that such a
necessity was present from the beginning, nor does it mean that what we perceive as
necessary is anything more than a necessity that forms out of a contingent historical
process. We will return to this in a moment. At this point, it will be useful to take a detour
through Žižek’s understanding, and use, of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory in his
appropriation of Hegel.

Section Two
What I wish, initially anyway, to focus on are two key ingredients of Lacan’s
thought, namely the ‘Symbolic’ as that which structures and organizes, and the ‘Real’ to
be read here, following Žižek’s reading of Lacan, as that which is the symptom of the
Symbolic in that it is both inherent to, and generated by, the symbolic but also that which
acts to disrupt its continuity and universality. Seen in this way, the “real” can be viewed
as the properly negative moment of the symbolic (further explanation below).
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For Lacan, like Hegel, we come to understand the world and ourselves through a
kind of interaction in which both—ourselves and the world—become organized, ordered
and meaning-laden. One of the ways that we can understand this is through Lacan’s
analysis of the foundational nature of language. Language functions as the primary mode
through which this ordering happens. Here Lacan writes, “through the word…there is
born the world of meaning of a particular language in which the world of things will
come to be arranged.”187
The arranging of the world through language immediately takes on a foundational
tone as Lacan goes on to claim that it is not merely through language that the world gets
organized but that in fact it is “the world of words that create the world of things” and
this means that the world is what it is in large part, as the product of language.188 As
Lacan sees it, the structures of language and the meanings that these structures create
impose organization not only on the world, but on humans as well and this process
happens in an altogether unconscious fashion. We do not recognize this imposition of
structure as such because it is inscribed in, and the foundation of, our very conscious
awareness of both ourselves and the world in which we find ourselves. We only come to
consciousness within the world of meanings that exists as the result of language; and
language and meaning is the result of an ongoing material and historical process. Thus, it
is language and its historically located structures and meanings that are constitutive of
our very experience (and our very world).
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This process is, according to Lacan, the process that Freud is metaphorically
describing when he discusses the foundational nature of the Taboo against incest in his
Totem and Taboo. Here Lacan writes, “the primordial Law [prohibition of incest] is
therefore that which, in regulating marriage ties, superimposes the kingdom of culture on
that of a nature abandoned to the law of mating…This law then, is revealed clearly
enough as identical with an order of language.”189 It is with language, in its unconscious
imposition of order on both the world and individuals, through its creation of the world of
things, that humans are, to speak metaphorically, raised out of an animal-like existence in
which the world exhibits itself as unorganized and capricious and we merely act on
instincts (as in the case of killing the father out the desire for the mother in Freud’s story).
This is because the order of language imposes an order on this instinct and caprice such
that it becomes regulated.
To be sure, this story, for Lacan is not an attempt at any sort of empirically valid
explanation of the pre-history of humanity. It is an explanatory myth. One that, while
offering a plausible understanding of what humanity might be like outside of the ordering
imposition of language, is nonetheless a myth as Rosalind Coward and John Ellis point
out: “this myth can only ever be mythical precisely because any knowledge one has of
the processes pre-existing language and the unconscious are known only through
language with its symbolic relations.”190 This should not, however, lessen the force of the
point of myth itself, the goal here is demonstrate the power of language and meaning in
its ordering capacities. Speaking non mythically, it is, according to Lacan, language
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which first orders and constitutes both consciousness itself (as consciousness)—and the
multiple and different identities that particular consciousness’s take on—and allows for
the differentiation and categorization of consciousness’s objects. Lacan continues:
Symbols [words, languages, grammars] in fact envelop the life of man in a
network so total that they join together, before he comes into the world, those who
are going to engender him by “flesh and blood;” so total that they bring to his
birth, along with the gift of the stars, if not the gifts of the fairies, the shape of his
destiny.191
This can—and should—be read in connection with the point that Hegel makes
about the nature of knowledge being determined by the community. It is within the order
and the meanings that are present in a socio-historical situation that any given subject
comes to self-awareness and awareness of her world as ordered, categorized, and
differentiated in a particular way. These meanings are imposed on the subject before she
has the ability to question or resist them and as such they present themselves as necessary
categories within which she comes to think both herself and her world. Thus, this
awareness, while productive of both the subject and the object, is always conditioned by
this pre-existing social and historical situation. Nevertheless, all of this is only possible in
the mode of the symbolic, through the positing of a subject who, in the use of linguistic
utterances to refer, is herself established as a particular kind of subject within a
communal context in which those linguistic utterances refer to something that is
recognizable by others in that community.
À propos Lacan’s example referred to in the quote above, of the ways in which
language and meaning come to structure one’s existence even prior to one’s birth, we can
think of the particular type of meaning-ladenness that exists in our times of the concept of

191

Lacan, Ecrits. 68

125

‘baby’ and the network of meanings and significations that are built up around, and
connected to such a term. None of these meanings are a-historical- they shift and change
as cultures shift and change, but no matter their particular content, they are the network
of meanings and values that are imposed on one even prior to one’s birth. Regarding
‘our’ conception of this, as any contemporary—one should, I guess qualify this ‘any’
with other historico-social markers such as ‘Western’—parent who has such thoughts
knows, it is virtually impossible, for instance, to find much in the way of non-gendered
infant products. From clothing to diapers, to cribs and room decorations, almost
everything is marked by the cultural meanings that surround our current (again, local)
conjuncture’s understanding of what it is to be male or what it is to be female. Further,
parents themselves often now find out the sex of their babies very early on in a pregnancy
and this knowledge also marks the way that parents come to think of—and talk to, and
treat—their baby even as it exists in the womb; so that when and if it does arrive, there is
always-already a set of expectations for characteristics waiting for the child’s arrival into
which he or she will be fit. Further still, the entire set of meanings, values, and beliefs
that surround the advent of a pregnancy is cultural and historical (and also in many ways
economic) and this complex network of significations determines both the experience of
the pregnancy/birth/child-parent relation for both the parent-to-be, and the child from the
time that it is conceived.
Thus, as Lacan argues, I become a subject when I enter into the network of the
symbolic, when I begin to learn the language of my community and come to understand
myself in relation to it. It calls me into existence in a particular way through its structures,
which are imposed on me whenever I respond to the linguistic call—again, we return to
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the Althusserian theme of interpellation—of others in my community who use these
structures to refer to me.
The call is what in Lacanian terms structures and is structured by the symbolic.
To again weave this together with the Althusserian account of subject formation, I
become a unified being in my relation to the ‘Other’ of the symbolic, which calls on me
to perform certain actions that interpellate (or draw me together) as its subject.192 When
my students address me as a teacher it is to their call that I am subordinated. Here I am
‘subjectivized’ as a teacher and along with that, come all of the trappings of the position
of authority. The power that I seem to hold in such a position is not something which I do
in fact hold, rather I am held by it, that is to say I only ‘have’ such power in virtue of the
social recognition that I am accorded and it is this recognition that constructs my very
subjectivity as one who has such power. In the same way, when I am called out to by
someone else who holds a position of power, my advisor for example, not only does my
subjective position become cemented, but so does his (and all of the power that comes
along with it for him, and for me, all the lack of power that comes along with my
recognition of his call). It is this interpellative mechanism that, writ large, structures
one’s world and the meanings that are possible for one by designating the symbolic
coordinates of her understanding of both herself and her world.
However, as we should be able to see, even though language (and the symbolic
order) and its processes of differentiation and meaning giving, appear as totalizing (in the
same way that the coordinated desires of a community attempt to totally determine what
192
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is meaningful for Hegel), the ordering/structuring move itself generates its own
obstruction, its symptom, as that which signifies its failure to totalize. Here Lacan
describes an opposition between speech and language and reminds us of some conditions
under which language (as the imposed order/ordering act) fails in its attempted totalizing
structuring. One of these is found in what are taken by the symbolic structures of a given
language to be incomprehensible utterances (speech) of the insane, where “speech has
given up trying to make itself recognized.”193
Speech, then, is not exhaustively structured by language. Speech can be
unstructured and point to something that is excluded by the structures of any given
linguistic system. It is precisely these incomprehensible utterances, which form the
inherent borders of that system itself, which exhibit its inability to totalize. Nevertheless
this ‘exclusion’ is also the condition upon which a given language comes to signify, so it
is also a part of it. In Žižek’s terms, it is “the part which, although inherent to the existing
universal order, has no ‘proper place’ within it.”194 This is how Žižek understands the
Lacanian notion of the Real: as that which is both generated by the symbolic, and that
which forms its immanent limitation or, as Žižek puts it, “The Real is not the
transcendent substantial reality which from outside disturbs the Symbolic balance, but the
immanent obstacle, stumbling block, of the order itself.”195
This is the further foundation of Žižek’s understanding of the negative moment in
the Hegelian dialectic. That which forms the negative moment of any given historical
mode of understanding is identified by Žižek with the Lacanian “real,” and this is, as
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described above, nothing other than the symptom of that given moment’s perceived
universality, which when revealed, shows the lack of closure of the symbolic and hence
its nature as ‘not-All’ there is.
Returning now to the crux of the Hegelian/Lacanian brand of materialism Žižek
endorses, we should comment on the possibility of a lingering worry. Given all the talk of
the determination of the subject and the world by the symbolic, or language and meaning
(Lacan), or subjective consciousness and its modes of knowing/concepts (Hegel) one
might be tempted to argue that there is nothing of a materialism here, or if there is, it is
one this still infected with what can only be described as a kind of linguistic/conceptual
idealism in which the matter is determined by a meaning that floats above matter itself
and exists only in the minds of those who cognize it. The answer to this is to be found in
part in Lacan himself and also (by extension) in Žižek’s claims that his materialism is
‘non-reductive.’

Section Three
First, recall the structure of the Hegelian-Lacanian claims laid out above: the
awareness of the individual (both in regard to herself and her world) is determined by the
network of linguistic meanings within which the individual first finds herself such that
said individual is not really in control of the network of meanings and symbols that
constructs her own awareness. Further, this network itself is not static (or synchronically
structured) it is rather historical and the result of the contingent development of
communal practices and language usage. This latter point—the contingent nature of
linguistic structure—is demonstrated by the existence of the Lacanian ‘Real’—or the
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Hegelian negative moment—that is defined as the symptomatic exception/excess that
remains in the face of the seeming totality of meaning/knowledge, and which, when it
becomes visible, shows us this ‘not-All.’
The materialism inherent to this is thus born out, first, by the claim that, as
individuals we are not (initially) in control of the meaning-giving function of the
linguistic utterances that we use (in fact we are controlled by them) and, second, the
meanings themselves are embedded in the existence of the historico-social community as
it is at a given time. There is then, for Lacan (as for Žižek’s Lacanian Hegel), not a strict
division between the material (history/community) and ideal (linguistic meaning) and it is
the negative moment found in the ‘real,’ with its rendering visible the incomplete nature
of the symbolic, that shows us this. As Tom Eyers has recently pointed out, Lacan thinks
that:
By rooting our understanding of the Real within the logic of the signifier we may
begin to recognize the materiality of the immaterial, and the stubborn opacity of
the material itself. Lacan’s claim that it is through the signifier that this
materiality is revealed to us should not be taken as a concession to any standard
brand of anti-realism or hyper-textualism; to the contrary, Lacan’s aim is to
render superfluous any neat separation of the ideal from the material, from the
representative to that to which it ostensibly refers.196
Žižek’s Hegelian materialism—contra Eyers’ comments elsewhere in the same essay that
his is somehow different than Lacan’s position—is precisely an extension of this project
of making problematic any simple separation of the ideal from the material.197 We can
see this most fully if we now—with Lacan in view—turn back to Žižek’s reading of
Hegel and the connection between the Lacanian conception of the symbolic as defined by
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language and meaning, and the Hegelian communal subject. We are now, I think, in a
position to understand the point that Žižek makes—and its connection to the description
of it that we saw at the beginning of this chapter—when he renders his materialist
position in this way in the opening pages of The Parallax View:
Materialism is not the direct assertion of my inclusion in objective reality (such an
assertion presupposes that my position of enunciation is that of an external
observer who can grasp the whole of reality); rather, it resides in the reflexive
twist by means of which I am included in the picture constituted by me—it is this
reflexive short circuit, this necessary redoubling of myself as standing both
outside and inside my picture that bears witness to my ‘material existence.’
Materialism means that the reality I see is never “whole”—not because a large
part of it eludes me, but because it contains a stain, a blind spot, which indicates
my inclusion in it.198
The ‘redoubling of myself’ that Žižek refers to here is the redoubling that occurs in my
awareness of myself (and my world) as built for me out of the material of the historicocommunally grounded symbolic order that exists for me (that is, my inclusion as a being
that is itself constructed by those symbols I use to refer) and at the same time my
awareness of (in a properly materialist awareness anyway) the fact that my awareness of
this is itself partial and limited. Adrian Johnston puts this point in this way:
…What appears as external reflection (i.e. the gaze of the subject on substance) is
not confined to an epistemological field separated off from the reflected-upon
reality of being. Rather than being external, this reflection is inscribed in the
reality of being upon which it reflects as an internal inflection, an immanent
folding-back of substance on itself; the gaze of the subject upon substance is
substance-as-not-all gazing upon itself.199
In this way, Žižek’s non-reductive materialism is not a rejection of the ideal, or a
relegating of it to another realm, but rather an embracing of the existence—and
determining power—of the ideal qua subjectivity in a quasi-Kantian sense, but with a
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Lacanian-Hegelian twist in which the ideal itself is located as emerging in, and out of, the
historico-communal material. As such, subjectivity is itself (even in its ideality),
materially generated, universally always-already partial, limited, and not-All there is.
If this is correct, if the finite, pathological, and limited ideal—even though it is
that through which reality is constituted for us—emerges itself out of the material,
defined here as the symbolic-communal order, if the subject is, in Hegelian fashion,
simultaneously substance, the question is then how does such a split, such a redoubling
emerge? As Žižek himself asks the question in The Parallax View, “how, from within the
flat order of positive being, [does] the very gap between thought and being, the negativity
of being, emerge?”200
In a book co-written with Markus Gabriel, Žižek looks to Hegel’s conception of
‘habit’ as our naturally extant ‘second nature’ for the foundation of how this materially
generated emergent gap is produced:
…It is not that the human animal breaks with nature through a creative explosion
of Spirit, which then gets habituated, alienated, turned into mindless habit: the
reduplication of nature in ‘second nature’ is primordial, that is, it is only this
reduplication that opens up the space for spiritual creativity.201
The argument here goes as follows (echoing much of what we have said already): The
distinction between first nature and second nature is, for the human, not really a
distinction- we are beings whose first nature is to be beings who have a second nature.
This second nature—signified here as a collection of historically contingent and changing
‘habits’ which are built out of what is, at a given time, communally acceptable and
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founded—is what organizes and constructs subjectivity’s appearance, that is, subjectivity
is the internalization of that which is originally external and communal.
These subjective habits are truly habits insofar as they are experienced by the
individual subject not as contingent chosen activities, but rather as the necessary features
of existence. One such set of habits is (here is the importance of the Lacanian reflections
on language given above) linguistic habits, in which we become habituated to hear
meaning (which, as we have already noted, is itself historically indexed) rather than the
brute natural sounds of the utterances themselves as Žižek notes:
When I hear a word, not only do I immediately abstract from its sound and ‘see
through it’ to its meaning (recall the weird experience of becoming aware of the
non-transparent vocal stuff of a word- it appears as intrusive and obscene…), but I
have to do it if I am to experience meaning.202
My very experience of hearing is conditioned (most of the time anyway) by the second
natural habit of hearing meaning rather than brute sound. This is true of many other
habits that I pick up in existence. For instance the habitual way one greets someone in a
particular culture—say in the United States—the handshake is experienced by one who is
properly habituated, not as the brute experience of the flexing of the muscles in the arm
as it is extended and the clasping of the hand around the other hand, but as a symbolic
gesture, detached from the material action that embodies it. In this way, both in the
linguistic example and the example of the greeting, through habituation to and in
historico-cultural practices (linguistic and otherwise), the actions themselves are ‘freed’
from their material foundations and this reduplicated at a second level (which becomes
the most important level). Again referencing Hegel, Žižek argues:
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Hegel emphasizes again and again that…habit provides the background and
foundation for every exercise of freedom…through habits, a human being
transforms his body into a mobile and fluid means, the soul’s instrument, which
serves as such without us having to focus consciously on it. In short, through
habits, the subject appropriates the body…203
The ‘freedom’ Žižek speaks of here is the emergent freedom of thought out of being, the
transcendent out of the material, the ‘inner’ out of the ‘outer’ in which the outer (the
body) comes to be regulated and controlled by this inner (the subject) which itself is first
found externally to the individual (in the material of the social). Žižek continues:
The conclusion to be drawn is thus that the only way to account for the emergence
of the distinction between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ constitutive of a living
organism is to posit a kind of self-reflexive reversal by means of which—to put it
in Hegelese—the One of an organism as a whole retroactively ‘posits’ as its
result, as that which dominates and regulates, the set of its own causes (i.e. the
very multiple processes out of which it emerged).204
So for Žižek, the gap between the ideal and the material is internal to, and emerges out of
the material. It is this that marks and defines the non-reductive nature of his materialism.
It is also this that Žižek relies on in his account of change. In the next chapter we will
look at both how Žižek’s account responds to the problems inherent to Althusser’s
account and how this account differs from (and overcomes the problems of) the Badiouan
account of materialism.
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Chapter 6: Žižek Contra Badiou

As we saw in the last chapter, Žižek’s appropriation of Hegel via Lacan opens up
the possibility of what he has termed a ‘non-reductive’ materialism in which the ‘inner’
emerges out of the material or ‘outer’ of social existence and in this process becomes
detached from the outer in such a way as to be irreducible to it. As we also saw, in the
first part of this argument Žižek endorses the Althusserian conception of the material
foundations of both a given conjuncture and the individuals that find themselves in it.
Subjectivity is first founded on (and in) the particular nexus of (external) social practices
and materio-linguistic structures and meanings that come together at a given moment in
history and interpellate individuals. It is the second part of the Žižekain claim that
innovates on the Althusserian theory insofar as Žižek is unwilling to agree with
Althusser’s view that subjectivity is nothing but this. Subjectivity has for Žižek, a status
of its own and is, once interpellated, not simply reducible to these material structures
(more on this below).
As we also saw in the last chapter, by turning back to Hegel, Žižek is able to
account for the immaterial-within-material reduplication of the subject’s simultaneous
inclusion in the material reality that constructs and constricts it, and at the same time,
subjectivity’s (quasi-Kantian) role in the positing of that reality within which subjectivity
itself is included—through the emergent immaterial conceptual apparatus that is first
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handed over to it by the external communal linguistic meanings and practices. Add to this
Žižek’s Hegelian claims about the fundamental lack of closure in material being via the
conception of the primacy of the Hegelian negative moment in the dialectical process
(read here in connection with the Lacanian conception of the real) as the inherent
excessive element of the symbolic. The negative-real is, as we have seen, that which
stands for the failure of closure in any given symbolic order, the absolute and universal
‘not-All’ that underlies all perceived totality. We can, by putting all of this together,
begin to see Žižek’s overall conception of the processes underlying the two categories of
stasis and change that we have spent so much time analyzing in relation to both Althusser
and Badiou.
Like Badiou, as we will see, for Žižek, subjectivity is the foundation of the
possibility of change, though as we will also see, Žižek’s theory—despite his own
adoption of Badiouan terminology at times—does not necessitate the positing of the
intrusion of an external ‘event’ as the catalyst for such change nor does it rely on a
problematic split between ‘being’ as formal ontological multiplicity and ‘presentation’ as
structured by the counted-as-one material partial representation of being. It is the
subject’s own activity that serves both as the foundation of stasis and of the possibility of
change for Žižek. We will return to the Badiou/Žižek relation in a moment, but first we
should say more about Žižek’s reply to Althusser as this will lay the groundwork for our
discussion of the latter relation.
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Section One
As noted above, Žižek agrees in part with Althusser as to the nature of subjective
constitution out of the communal social material, but Žižek counters, in a
Hegelian/Lacanian vein, the conjunctural material out of which the subject is first
interpellated is not the structured whole/totality that Althusser makes it out to be. This is
because, on Žižek’s Hegelian understanding, given conjunctures are never whole nor
completely totalizing in the way that Althusser thinks of them. Further, the subject—
because it is, once interpellated, irreducible to the material of the social order—is not
constrained to merely sustain and reproduce the institutions and practices out of which it
emerges.
To be sure, subjectivity does act in this way, in the reduplication that we have
described subjectivity does in fact serve as the point from which and through which the
material that first constructs it is redeployed and sustained, but subjectivity isn’t
necessarily subordinated to this function as Althusser would have it. Rather, it only
appears (to subjects themselves even) that subjectivity is so constrained. Contra
Althusser and invoking the Lacanian concept of the ‘big Other’ (the view of the symbolic
order as a fully structured totality), Žižek summarizes this point in this way:
With Lacan’s “big Other” the perspective is completely the opposite: the very
‘positing’ of the big Other is a subjective gesture, that is, the “big Other” is a
virtual entity that exists only through the subject’s presupposition (this moment is
missing in Althusser’s notion of the “Ideological State Apparatuses,” with its
emphasis on the “materiality” of the big Other, its material existence in
ideological institutions and ritualized practices—Lacan’s big Other is, on the
contrary, ultimately virtual and as such, in its most basic dimension,
“immaterial”).205
205

Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes.113-114

137

The idea that there is a fully structured, social whole is a subjective ‘presupposition’
insofar as the conception of the closure of the social as a totalizing big Other, is placed on
the world by consciousness-as-interpellated: this totalization has no existence outside of
the subjective presupposition. Althusser misses this point, according to Žižek because of
his singular focus on the material external nature of interpellation—and ideology—and
thus he does not sufficiently recognize the dialectical reduplication that is involved in this
process.206
The Hegelian background to this should not be missed. Think again of Žižek’s
discussion of the role of habituation in Hegel as the means whereby what is external
(ritualized communal practices, linguistic structures as the like) becomes internalized in
such a way as to create the individual’s awareness and then is redeployed by those
individuals as that through which the world is comprehended, structured, and organized.
The world appears to us in the way that it does as a result of our activity which is, itself a
reduplication of that which first constructs this activity. Here is Žižek—in a quote already
cited in Chapter 5, but that should be recalled in this context—discussing this point:
The conclusion to be drawn is thus that the only way to account for the distinction
between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ constitutive of a living organism is to posit a
kind of self-reflexive reversal by means of which—to put it in Hegelese—the One
of an organism as a Whole retroactively posits as its result, as that which
dominates and regulates, the set of its own causes (i.e. the very multiple process
out of which it emerged).207
In interpellation, I am, pace Althusser, subjected to the materially existing practices and
structures of my socio-historical community which are then reduplicated in me as the
206
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inner structure of my subjectivity (that is, in habituation, I internalize these practices—
what I am is the internalization of them) and at the same time the ‘inner’ is then thrust
back onto the world and is what acts as the ‘virtual’ or ‘immaterial’ limit of the world
itself. In other words, I experience this limit—set by me in my subjective conceptual
presuppostions, which posit the existence big Other—as an externally imposed limit. In
this way my own positing activity becomes that which limits me (and my conception of
my world) without my knowing it. Žižek continues:
In this way—and only in this way—an organism is no longer limited by external
conditions, but is fundamentally self-limited- again, as Hegel would have
articulated it, life emerges when the external limitation (of an entity by its
environs) turns into self limitation.208
Put concisely, the Lacanian ‘big Other’ is not that which is external to me and limits my
subjectivity (as Althusser would have it), but is rather, that internalized-externality which
becomes a virtualized subjective posit or presupposition through which I limit myself and
thereby also limit my world. In this reduplication, I limit myself but experience this
limitation as coming from the world, that is, I do not comprehend it as emanating from
me. I remain, in my everyday existence, unaware of my role in this process of limitation.
Here again, is Žižek:
There is a link to Kant here, to the old enigma of what, exactly Kant had in mind
with his notion of ‘transcendental apperception,’ of self-consciousness
accompanying every act of my consciousness (when I am conscious of something,
I am thereby always also conscious of the fact that I am conscious of this)? Is it
not an obvious fact that this is empirically not true, that I am not always
reflexively aware of my awareness itself?209
I am, in a very precise way, not aware of the presuppositions that I extend to my world in
my everyday quotidian dealings with it, but it is these presuppositions, which act as the
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very frame and filter of my cognition. This frame, however—and this is the important
point—though it is virtual in the sense of being the immaterial imposition of the subjectas-constructed out of the material, has a concrete effect on the reality that I experience (in
a Hegelian fashion). It is here that the Althusserian conception of ideology—and the
distinction between it and ‘science’ that Althusser attempts to draw—returns with a
vengeance (though in a modified form): My world is a virtual, ideological construction
insofar as it is retroactively posited (by me, in the already described subjective
reduplication, without my awareness) as a closed whole, but this positing activity is not
merely imaginary: it has real consequences for the world as it exists. In further
delineating this point Žižek invokes Deleuze:
The solution to this dilemma is precisely the notion of virtuality in a strict
Deleuzian sense, as the actuality of the possible, as a paradoxical entity, the very
possibility of which already produces/has actual effects. One should oppose
Deleuze’s notion of the virtual to the all-pervasive topic of virtual reality: what
matters to Deleuze is not virtual reality, but the reality of the virtual (which in
Lacanian terms, is the Real). Virtual reality in itself is a rather miserable idea: that
of imitating reality, of reproducing its experience in an artificial medium. The
reality of the virtual, on the other hand, stands for the reality of the virtual as
such, for its real effects and consequences.210
The ‘virtual’ here is, of course, the term signifying the ‘inner’ immaterial product—the
subjective posits/presuppositions—of the ‘outer’ material structures—historically bound
social/communal/linguistic practices—that in turn, come to have a decisive effect on the
material world. Recall here the Althusserian arguments traced at the end of Chapter Two
regarding the ideological nature of structuralism. There as we saw, Althusser claims that
structuralism becomes ideological insofar as it doesn’t recognize its own status as a
theory that is, in the present, constructed out of the particularity of the material as it exists
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in its given singular moment and instead, retroactively posits the ‘truth’ that it discovers
as the origin, or eternal/explanatory truth of social existence. This is analogous to the
claim that Žižek makes here about the nature of the subjective posit insofar as the posit is
ideological in the same sense as the structuralist theory when it remains unaware of its
historical nature, but as we will see, the problems that arise for Althusser, namely that he
is unable to account for proper extraction from the ideological, are mitigated in Žižek’s
rehabilitation of the Hegelian concept of change.

Section Two
If the story, as we have told it thus far, accounts for stasis, as it offers an
explanation of the ways in which subjectivity supports and reproduces the set of
social/communal traditions, practices, and habits that first interpellate it—via a
retroactively posited virtualized totalization—it also offers us insight into the ways in
which the possibility of change appears on the scene according to Žižek. Rejecting the
Althusserian notion that subjectivity is simply reducible to the practices and institutions
that interpellate it (and thereby fully constructed and determined by them) and instead
claiming that once interpelllated, subjectivity is not so reducible, gives us an indication of
a first form of change that exists (even when such an irreducible subject merely serves as
the ideological support of a given social order) on Žižek’s accounting of things. That
there are ‘subjects’ at all is a change (as the subject is the immaterial shift that arises out
of the material), further, Žižek’s account of subjectivity’s nature as self-limiting makes its
own action the foundation for change. We can now turn to an explanation of this point
and its relation to the Badiouan account of change.
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Where there are, for Badiou, ‘events’ that are the catalyst for change, there are for
Žižek, ‘acts’—yet another term taken over from Lacan—that serve a similar function.
Johnston provides us with a succinct description of the Lacanian background of this
concept.211 As Johnston explains, in the fifteenth seminar, Lacan draws a distinction
between what he calls ‘action’ and what he calls the ‘act.’ Here is Johnston on this
distinction:
The former is simply some sort of natural and/or automatic process (for instance
the body’s motor activities). The latter by contrast, involves a dimension over and
above that of something like the mundane material occurrence. A proper act has
symbolic repercussions; it transgresses the rules of the symbolic order, thereby
destabilizing the big Other in revealing its flaws, inconsistencies and
vulnerabilities. Whereas action is part of the normal run of things, an act disrupts
the predictable cycles governing particular realities, forcing transformations of
regulated systems in response to its intrusive irruption.212
For Zizek then, the Lacanian ‘act’ has an effect similar to that of the Badiouan ‘event’
insofar as it has the power of disrupting the normal flow of static time in such a way as to
radically reorganize it. Furthermore, the transformative effects of such an act are not
limited to the externally existing order. The act also necessarily brings about a change in
those individuals who experience it. This is the further similarity between the Badiouan
event and the Žižekian/Lacanian act: the act has the effect of reorienting the subject as
well as the world in which the subject finds herself, and because it has this effect—of
both disrupting the symbolic and the subject—it is experienced by the subject in the same
way that the event is for Badiou- as something which happens to the subject, not as
something that the subject does. Here again is Johnston:
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One remarkable feature of the act that Lacan does indeed go out of his way to
underscore is that this disruptive gesture is not the outcome of prior deliberations
on the part of self-conscious reflection… Hence it seems as though the act is an
impossible miraculous occurrence that emerges and befalls individuals who are, at
least at first, subjected to the act’s subjective reverberations.213
Before commenting on this, we must first note a crucial difference here between the
Badiouan conception of the subject and the Žižekian conception, which has a decisive
effect in differentiating the two accounts in this context.
As should already be apparent by what has been said so far, whereas Badiou
rejects any notion of a pre-evental subjectivity and instead relegates pre-subjective
individuals to the status of objects, determined simply by the externally imposed counting
operation—arguing instead that events ‘subjectivize’ individuals—Žižek’s theory
requires the pre-act existence of self-limiting subjects for there to be any acts whatsoever
(and hence any change). This point tracks the Lacanian distinction, elaborated on by
Johnston, between ‘action’ and the ‘act.’
The subject is the point through which, in everyday quotidian ‘action’, a given
social structure or conjuncture is ordered and sustained (as we have seen) insofar as it is
such a subject that, through the action of self-limiting and limiting the world to
presuppositions handed over to it, (ideologically) posits a given conjuncture as Whole. In
answer to the question of ‘what does the structuring?”, Žižek need not, as Badiou does,
posit the existence of a reified, abstract, and formal process such as the ‘count-as-one.’ It
is subjectivity itself that does the ‘counting’ here in its reduplication and redeployment of
the material structures of the community.
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Further, since the external material communal structures that undergird the inner
life of the subject are themselves always and universally historical and partial,
subjectivity is also at its very core a ‘not-All’ insofar as it is itself never fully structured
and totalized (though it does not recognize this in its quotidian ‘action’). This latter point
is what gets revealed to the subject in the space of the ‘act’ and is what leads to the
possibility of change. When the (subject’s own) act reveals to her the inherent lack of
totalization it also reveals the fact that her world is ‘not-All’ there is, that it is not
totalized. This then has the effect of extracting her from her previously conditioned
existence, thereby changing both herself and the world that she inhabits insofar as her
own ordering activity—the subjective presuppositons through which the world is
ordered—is shifted by the act.

Section Three
Žižek struggles throughout his works to articulate the conditions of existence for
such a transformational subject. Many of his most decisive examples are drawn from
literature and movies. These fictive examples function for Žižek, much like the ‘thought
experiment’ functions in other philosophical contexts, they provide a nice demonstration
of the phenomena under consideration. Such examples move beyond the classical
philosophical thought experiment, however, insofar as they tend to mimic the actual
behavior of people and so are more forceful (in my mind anyway) than many of the quite
far fetched philosophical ‘thought experiments’ that academic philosophers are willing to
accept. Though this is a bit of an aside, I offer this commentary here in anticipation of the
objection that using a fictive example is problematic.
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That said, I wish to focus on Žižek’s analysis of the figure of Melville’s Bartleby
the Scrivener in the short story that bears his name. As the story goes, Bartleby, when
asked to do just about anything responds with the phrase “I prefer not to.”214 Through its
repetition, this act can come to negating the order that gives rise to it, as it literally
becomes an unconditional refusal that stops making sense from within the
symbolic/ideological space of reasons. Such a refusal, as Žižek puts it, “…is a signifier
turned object, a signifier reduced to an inert stain that stands for the collapse of the
symbolic order.”215 What Bartleby’s move does—without his conscious awareness
initially—according to Žižek, much more than simply refuse an order, is that it calls the
perceived universality of the given conjuncture into question by saying no to the structure
itself through a refusal to participate in the forms of action that are sanctioned by it.216
The motivation for this action is first found within the existing symbolic order; one is
called upon to act in a certain manner that is fitting of a certain kind of subject but the
response (the ‘I would prefer not to) comes to act as a rejection of both that call and the
subjectivity that it addresses by opening up a space in which both are seen as nontotalizing and not-All there is and thereby, revealing the universality-as-lack of closure
that underlies all subjective presupposition.
Making the Hegelian background in Žižek’s reading of this explicit will help to
clarify the ways in which the ‘act,’ though a product of subjective activity, can be
experienced by the subject analogously to the way that the ‘event’ is in the Badiouan
account of change but without all of the problems that attend the Badiouan edifice. As my
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reading of this through the eyes of Žižek’s (Lacanian) Hegel makes clear, Bartleby’s is
itself an act that supplies its own content or to put this a different way, the negativity
inherent in the refusal, is also at the same moment the creation of a new possibility and is
in this way, simultaneously positive in its negation.
Recall (again) that according to Lacan, we become the kinds of beings that we are
in relation to the Symbolic, which both calls us into existence (interpellates us) and
makes up the background of meaning for the world that we experience. In Bartleby’s case
this interpellative process begins when he is called upon by his boss to perform a certain
task that fits his position, namely to look over, and transcribe some documents to which
he responds for the first time with the famous phrase. It is thus within the world of
structured and ordered meanings that appear to Bartleby as being fixed and external to
him, that Bartleby first commits himself to his cause: to respond to the interpellative call
with a refusal. In the commitment to (repetitious) refusal, however, the destitution of the
particular content (and meanings) of the order/ordering mechanism is secured. The key
point to see here is that through its repetition, the refusal itself, has the same
interpellative effect as the initial call, but this time it is Bartleby’s own commitment to the
cause that acts as the thing which constitutes him as a subject and not the call (perceived
as) issuing from the symbolic. Thus it is his own act that interpellates him as freed from
the order that he initially posited as totalizing. Here we find ourselves not only in Lacan’s
territory but also in Hegelian waters. The act that Bartleby brings about is akin to the
action effected by consciousness’s move to skepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
Recall skepticism as:
…a moment of self-consciousness, to which it does not happen that its truth and
reality vanish without its knowing how, but which in the certainty of its freedom,
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makes this ‘other’ which claims to be real, vanish. What skepticism causes to
vanish is not only objective reality as such, but its own relationship to it.217
Self-consciousness recognizes the contingent nature of what it once took to be
necessary—the necessity that is destroyed is nothing other than self-consciousness’s
relationship to the external Other, in the form of the Lord, who has—it believes—
determined its existence up to this point. The same holds true for Bartleby’s refusal to do
what he is asked. Žižek writes:
His “I would prefer not to” is to be taken literally: it says “I would prefer not to,”
not “I don’t prefer (or care) to”…In his refusal of the Master’s order, Bartleby
does not negate the predicate, rather he affirms the non-predicate: he does not say
that he doesn’t want to do it, he says that he prefers (wants) not to do it. This is
how we pass from the politics of “resistance” or “protestation,” which parasites
on what it negates, to a politics which opens up a new space outside the
hegemonic position and its negation.218
Returning to Hegel, we can see the relationship between what Žižek is pointing out and
the moment of skepticism. In the active negation of the Master’s world (the world in
which the skeptic was once immersed and presented itself as a necessary and
transcendent world) the skeptic finds himself to have a minimal freedom: necessity
disappears for self-consciousness—not as it did in past moments, without its knowledge
of how or why—but rather self-consciousness recognizes that it is the one who has made
this necessity disappear, that this change issues from it. It accomplishes this by negating
all positive content that comes to it from without. As with Bartleby, who says “I would
prefer not to” in response to any attempt to get him to act, in his own negative activity,
the skeptic frees himself from the earlier relationship he had to the master.
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Freedom is thus tied directly to this act as Hegel notes, “through this selfconscious negation it [self-consciousness] procures for its own self the certainty of its
freedom, generates the experience of that freedom, and thereby raises it to truth.”219 It is
only in the practice of active negation of all seemingly external positive content that
freedom from the enslavement to the other is realized. It is critical that we recognize that
this freedom is not something that existed prior to this action (and just needs to be
realized). For Hegel, freedom can only appear on the scene in this activity, selfconsciousness was not free at all until its own action gave it that possibility. This freedom
is immanently generated in the act of negation.
To be sure, initially, the negative action of the skeptic, is tied to the positive order
as Hegel notes:
It [self-consciousness] pronounces an absolute vanishing, but the pronouncement
is, and this consciousness is the vanishing that is pronounced. It affirms the nullity
of seeing, hearing etc., yet it itself is seeing, hearing etc., It affirms the nullity of
ethical principles and lets its conduct be governed by these principles…it has
itself the doubly contradictory consciousness of changeableness and sameness,
and of utter contingency and non-identity with itself.220
The upshot of this, however, is that here consciousness experiences this split (the split
between its activity of negation and the positive content which the negation is tied to) not
as a split external to itself but rather one that cuts across the very center of its being: both
the positive order and its negation are found to be (through this action) within selfconsciousness, within it as a subject. Hegel continues:
Skepticism’s lack of thought about itself must vanish, because it is in fact one
consciousness which contains within itself these two modes. This new form is,
therefore, one which knows that it is the dual consciousness of itself, as self-
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liberating, unchangeable, and self-identical, and as self-bewildering and selfperverting, and it is the awareness of this self-contradictory nature of itself.221
What propels the forward movement of the dialectic here (for Hegel) is the new
found awareness of the split as not one of external imposition/internal negation but rather
that both of these sides are inherent in the subject. That is, the subject recognizes, pace
Žižek, that the ‘big Other’ is a subjective posit and that not only is the communal world
not fully determined, but that the subject herself is not either, that such determination is
itself nothing more than an ideological posit.
Furthermore, in the space of the ‘act’ the subject is both that which acts to negate
the order and that which, through this negation becomes (for itself) unchangeable and
stable—it enacts its own stability in its continued negative activity. The subject
recognizes her own inherent potential in this. The same is true for Bartleby: he becomes
the thing that he is through the continued habit of the negation of commands that come
from without. In doing this, he founds himself—in an enacted freedom from the
externality of the interpellative call—as a new stable being in the process of that negation
(the stability offered in the activity of negation):
The importance of this is not to be missed. As Hegel points out, what we find here
is the production of the positive freedom of the subject in and out of the moment of
negation. It is through this activity that the subject comes to the awareness of her being as
split, who is both free from external constraint in her ability to actively negate external
reality—as that which was immediately seen as this “external constraint,” now comes to
be viewed as internally posited—and at the same time founds herself as the source of
stability. So what we are faced with is precisely the traumatic product of the rejection of
221

Ibid., 126

149

the symbolic produced by the refusal: the internally contradictory nature of subjectivity
itself. The subject is nothing other than the “gap” between the positive content of the
symbolic order and its negation (both of which are internal to its activity). It is both the
foundation and source of all stability and determination and at the same time the
recognition of the (universal) lack of absolute determination. Žižek writes:
This brings us back to the central theme… Bartleby’s attitude is not merely the
first, preparatory, stage for the second, more “constructive” work of forming a
new alternative order; it is the very source and background of this order, its
permanent foundation…The very frantic and engaged activity of constructing a
new order is sustained by an underlying “I would prefer not to” which forever
reverberates in it—or as Hegel might have put it, the new post-revolutionary order
does not negate its founding gesture, the explosion of the destructive fury that
wipes away the Old; it merely gives body to this negativity.222
That is, Bartleby’s act of negation which is the “source” of the “new” remains its
“foundation” because it is this act that, as we have seen, first makes us aware of the
illusory nature of the externality and externally necessity of the authority of the old order.
Recall here the Hegelian claim that the skeptic’s action makes external reality “vanish.”
This is nothing other than the realization that what one once took to be externally (and
necessarily) imposed is rather only so as long as one acts based on this belief, which
points to the fact that what was thought to be externally imposed was rather imposed on
the subject by himself all along (in the subject’s self-limiting activity). This action then is
the recognition that it is the subject herself who acts to sustain the order and thus it is also
the subject herself who can challenge its assertion of authority as neither the order, nor
her (ideologically) interpellated subjectivity is fully determined. In other words, in the
‘act’ the subject comes to recognize the ‘virtual’ nature of the Whole.
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It is in this negative activity itself that one becomes able—in a Hegelian
fashion—to enact one’s freedom from the constraints of this imposed external reality, To
be sure, the freedom that is founded here is nothing more than the freedom from the
imposed/imposing demand of the old order as viewed as external to the subject, it is not
an absolute freedom. There is still subjection, it is simply that subjection is now
recognized for what it is: again, as something that is internally imposed on the subject by
herself. What is then built out of this is, in this way, founded on the stability that is
produced in the continued habitualized negation (the gap that is internal to the subject—
the experience of the subject as both that which negates and is free and that which founds
itself as a stable being in this negation). We should, moreover, take literally the Hegelian
claim that Žižek makes at the end of this remark, namely that “body” is given this
negativity.
It is literally materially the case that in acting in fidelity to the recognition that
arises as the result of the act, we give (material) body to a new possibility. Recall again
the structure of the non-reductive materialist dialectical reduplication that Žižek describes
in which what is external, is the material foundation for the production of the internal
which then is what, through the conceptual apparatus provided by the action of the
internal ‘posits,’ through the set of virtual presuppositions, the external as standing overagainst the internal.
This process is not changed in the ‘act,’ what is changed is both the content of the
virtual set of presuppositions and the subject’s relation to them (here the subject is aware
of the process in a way that it was not before). Thus, subjectivity gains a new disposition
and along with it, a new relation to the world, which, as such, brings with it a new world
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in actuality. The rest of the Žižekian story of change is similar to the Badiouan account in
that, such a ‘new’ subjectivity must work to change the world, insofar as it must work to
sustain the ‘new’ world that is already a part of its subjective presuppositions insofar as it
is ushered in by its act.
We should now be able to clearly see a further important distinction between the
Badiouan account and the Žižekian one. Žižek’s Hegelian/Lacanian materialist
conception of both stasis and change never leaves the materialist history in which it
emerges. That is, there is no split between synchrony and diachrony in which the
synchronic stands outside of the diachronic and does the determining of the particular
nature of the diachronic, as it does in Badiou’s account. What is synchronic in Žižek’s
account emerges from the materialist diachronic (not the other way around). What is
universal, and universally ‘true’ is the lack of closure that underlies the nature of the
materio-symbolic order, but this universal ‘not-All’ comes to be in the partial,
pathological, and contingent nature of history insofar as the subject’s own awareness of
this comes to be in history and this awareness (if properly habituated) becomes the
foundation of the universal truth itself.
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Conclusion: New Materialism or Neo-Durkheimianism?

The title of this study makes a claim about the nature of the materialism that is
espoused by those whose thought it occupies. It claims that there is a ‘new’ materialism
here. That there is something different in this materialism than materialisms that came
before or that it does not simply re-hash longstanding materialist claims. As noted in the
introduction, the newness claim is mostly limited to the thought of Badiou and Žižek, as
Althusser serves as a common reference point for both, and a background against which
these two are reacting.
It seems that, having worked our way through the various claims these three
thinkers make vis-à-vis materialism, and having demonstrated their shared theoretical
focal points as well as the problems that they encounter along the way, we are now in a
position to assess this ‘newness.’ I wish to begin this assessment in the reverse, that is, I
want to begin by discussing the ways in which we might be able to say that these
positions are not new. We have, I think, already been given one reason to think that at
least Badiou’s materialism is not all that new given its problematic closeness to a certain
kind of (idealist) structuralism. I want, in light of this, to look at the relation between this
brand of materialism as it appears in both Badiou and Žižek and a certain reading of
Durkheim.
We have had occasion to bring Durkheim up before in this study via Althusser’s
attempt to distance himself from the structuralism of Levi-Strauss and his followers
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insofar as he attributes the imposition of the Durkheimian conception of a “collective
consciousness” to certain elements of the structuralist enterprise.223 Further, this same
criticism was used, in Chapter four, as a backdrop for extending the complaints leveled at
Badiou’s theory by Johnston and Osborn.224 It is not a coincidence that Althusser raises
the Durkheimian claims in relation to Levi-Strauss—as was also noted in chapter two—
both Althusser and Levi-Strauss were well versed in Durkheim; so well, in fact, that the
latter was a member of the famous Collège de sociologie along with many others
including—importantly for us—Sartre and Lacan.225
The Collège was not itself affiliated with ‘official’ university life but was, rather a
collection of intellectuals and artists that met in Parisian cafés between 1937 and 1939.
Its primary aim was to undertake an analysis of society which looked critically at the
roles and relations between power, the religious, the social order, mythology, and the
like. These investigations were founded on Durkheim’s own analysis of these topics in
his analysis of the relations between society and the religious as found mostly in his The
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.226 Before we say more about the influence of the
Collège, we should say a bit more about Durkheim’s own social analysis.
As we saw in chapter two, Durkheim argues that to understand social existence
one could not simply look to the subjective viewpoint of individuals but had to
understand the conceptual rules and laws that govern what he calls the “collective
consciousness” as it is these that are determining factors (in part anyway, as combined
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with individual consciousness) for the forms of consciousness that individuals in a given
society have. These rules and laws are not themselves coextensive with collective
consciousness, but they inform and undergird its particular historical manifestations
insofar as they are the categories through which individual societies understand
themselves and organize their worlds.
As Durkheim understands it, the change in manifestations of collective
consciousness—that is, the existence of historically shifting and differing social
structures and organizations—can be at least partially accounted for by making sense of
the different ways in which these rules and laws get combined in different societies in
history. However, as Stephen Turner notes, “there is a limit to such explanations. They do
not allow for genuine moral and religious novelty” as merely recombining pre-existing
formal categories leaves out the possibility of the ‘new.’ This is a problem that Durkheim
was aware of and he offers, as Turner points out, the category of “Collective
effervescence [in order to] fill this gap.”227
The concept of collective effervescence is described by Durkheim as a moment,
found in collective ritualized religious practice, in which the normally experienced
‘profane’ world of egoistic individuation is shed and a new collective consciousness and
set of collective representations is forged. Here is Durkheim explaining the experience of
the individual in the moment of such an effervescence, as a moment in which:
…A man does not recognize himself any longer. Feeling himself dominated and
carried away by some sort of an external power which makes him think and act
differently than in normal times, he naturally has the impression of being himself
no longer…228
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As Frank Pearce points out, in the hands of the members of the Collège,
Durkheim’s thought in this regard was radicalized in a variety of ways.229 Not the least of
which was the interpretation given to Durkheim’s conception of social (and individual)
transformation via the concept of a ‘collective effervescence’ and the distinction between
the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane,’ the latter of which, for Durkheim himself, signified the
distinction between “phenomena or categorizations that are homogeneous internally but
heterogeneous to each other.”230 That is to say, within Durkheim’s theory these two
categories, while heterogeneous in relation to one another remain part of one
homogeneous social order. In the hands of the Collège, however,— and Pearce cites
Bataille’s and Caillois’ reading of this—this became, for Bataille, “a distinction between
the heterogeneous and the homogeneous” as such, and for Caillios a distinction couched
in temporal terms.231 Here is Pearce’s description of Caillios’ musings:
For Caillois… The Sacred is a key element both in ordinary life and in the
festivals found in primitive societies (and to a much attenuated degree in
contemporary societies)…Ordinary life tends to be regular, busy, safe, and
sclerotic. ‘Time is wearing and exhausting’ and there is a need for social
regeneration. This is made possible by the popular frenzy of the festival. It
releases an active sacred energy, reverses the normal course of time and forms the
social order…232
Thinking about the linkage between Durkheim and the members of the Collège
especially in relation to comments made here about the transformations and
radicalizations of the Durkheimian edifice it is hard not see this in the background,
regardless of intention, of both Badiou’s and Žižek’s theoretical projects. There is here
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(in Durkheim as reconstructed by the Collège) two ‘temporalities’ defined by stasis—the
profane—and change—the sacred, as emerging in collective effervescence in which the
individuation of profane existence is shed in favor of a collectively grounded event/act.
Looking at the overall structure of the Durkheimian claims in relation to Badiou we can
see that the conception of the profane maps on quite nicely to Badiou’s conception of the
intra-worldly structure of the counted-as-one logic of objects and individuals.
We can see this point if we think of the profane (a bit outside of the role
Durkheim himself gives it, but not, I don’t think in opposition to his usage of the term) as
the normal experience of existence that humans have in which they are individuated,
things run along as usual, in a kind of mundane fashion in which as Durkheim puts it,
“daily life drags wearily along.”233 This is certainly analogous to the Badiouan preevental world, in which all things are in their place, any inconsistencies are subtracted,
and things run along in a mundane fashion. It is the individuation inherent to both
accounts that is key for seeing the similarities—Remember here that Badiou builds his
view of this out of and in relation to both Althusser and Sartre. Thinking again about our
discussion of the Sartrean conception of the group-in-fusion that Badiou appropriates in
theorizing the event, and knowing of Sartre’s participation in the Collège it is hard not to
speculate as to the influence of the Durkheimian theory (as interpreted by the Collège) on
Sartre’s work in this regard, and its being filtered through Sartre and into Badiou.
Furthermore, the formal structures of collective consciousness in Durkheim, as
noted in chapter four, stand outside the world of subjective consciousness, but are the
formal backdrop through which individuals come to consciousness of themselves and the
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world. In this way, Durkheim’s formal structures of collective consciousness can be seen
as analogous to Badiou’s conception of the count-as-one. It is hard not to see, in light of
this, Badiou’s theory as precisely not new, and rather, simply a materialist neoDurkheimianism (even if it is unaware of this and is the unconscious inheritor of this via
the Collège).
Durkheim’s own comments regarding the experience of collective effervescence
also certainly echo the Žižekian theory of the act wherein the quotidian self is shed in
favor of a new possibility that stands outside the individuation that is imposed on it by the
conjuncture—and the subject’s own active positing of the roles and conditions
conjuncture in its reflexive redeployment of them (as described in Chapter six)—
allowing the subject to view itself as a part of the universal (negative/real) rather than the
particular (determined/quotidian). To be sure, in bringing this up, I am not necessarily
interested in making wildly speculative claims about intellectual influence, but rather,
simply want to point out, not only the historical lineage but also the translation and
transposition of some theoretical components from one theory into the next (as we have
been doing throughout much of this study) and further, that the questions and methods
that ground the respective projects of both Badiou and Žižek (and their relation to
Althusser) should not and cannot be taken to be entirely new.
We can, however, qualify this rejection of the title of ‘new’ by pointing out that,
what is ‘new’ in these theories is the ways in which they recombine and rethink the
categories and concepts that they inherit. Furthermore, we might argue that, for both
Badiou and Žižek, what is new in their materialism is the newness found in the rebirth of
the old claim to universalism, but here encountered in a new form—as appearing within
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existence (and not as external to it). Here again the Durkheimian conception of the
‘sacred’ is relevant, as whatever is ‘sacred’ and hence collective, appears materially in
effervescent moments. As Badiou puts it at the end of Logics of Worlds, “But I need
neither God, nor the divine. I believe that it is here and now that we arouse or resurrect
ourselves as Immortals.”234
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